LEBANON: DAS DANIN MEETS LEBANESE FORCES LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003414

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING
STATE FOR NEA/ELA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DAS DANIN MEETS LEBANESE FORCES LEADER
SAMIR JA'JA'


Classified By: Christopher W. Murray, Charge d'Affaires. Reason: Sect
ion 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Samir Ja'ja' told DAS Danin that Syria and Hizballah
will try either to stall the international tribunal for the
Hariri assassination by loading the cabinet with a blocking
minority or by bringing the government down through street
demonstrations. Ja'ja' assessed the March 14 coalition as
strong, but suggested that Prime Minister Siniora may not
have the fortitude to last in a violent confrontation; Michel
Aoun is a minor political opportunist. Ja'ja' speculated
that LAF and UNIFIL troops deployed in the south could be
attacked if sanctions were applied against Iran over its
nuclear program. He said that Hizballah emerged from the
July war weaker and less cohesive, and suggested that the two
keys to solving Lebanon's crisis are strengthening UNIFIL and
Israel handing over the Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon or to the
UN. Ja'ja' confided that while March 14 coalition will work
to elect a new president on time next year, the group will
not take up the issue of electoral reform for now because it
is a divisive issue within the bloc. End summary.


2. (C) Visiting NEA DAS Robert Danin, Polchief and Polstaff
called on Lebanese Forces Party Leader Samir Ja'ja' October
19 at his mountain residence in northern Lebanon. Danin
expressed his and the USG's strong support for Lebanon and
USG desire to see the country move forward.

SYRIAN AND HIZBALLAH AGENDAS
--------------


3. (C) Dr. Ja'ja' (who left medical school before graduation
due to the civil war but, according to Lebanese custom, bears
the title) described the overall situation in Lebanon as
satisfactory, but cautioned that there are several threats
ahead and that the parliamentary majority (i.e., the March 14
coalition) would have to be prepared to confront the "coming
possible dangers." Ja'ja' said that the internal situation
was now turbulent due to two factors: Syria and Hizballah.


4. (C) Syria, he said, is concerned about the international
tribunal that would address the Hariri assassination and
other violent acts. The only way the Syrians see to block
the tribunal is to kick out the current GOL. Since the
Syrians have no influence over the UN Security Council or
Brammertz, he said, they have plans to destabilize and topple
the GOL. "Syria is using all political and security tools in
order to break the current government." The call for a
national unity government is a bid to stall the international
tribunal by blocking cabinet approval for its establishment.


5. (C) Hizballah, according to Ja'ja', has its own reasons
not to like the tribunal, though the issue is a marginal one
for Hizballah. The major concern for Hizballah is the strict
application of UNSCR 1701, which Hizballah agreed to in order
to reach a ceasefire. The March 14 coalition, however, views
the resolution as a whole -- including the revival of the
1949 Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement. If the Agreement is
operating and Israel respects the Blue Line, he said,
Hizballah "has no more work to do."


6. (C) The "Hariri Government" did not agree to dilute the
resolution, Ja'ja' continued, as Hizballah had wished.
(Note: It is unclear whether Ja'ja' meant to slight Siniora
by several references to his government as the "Hariri
Government" or whether this was a mere slip. End note.)
Hizballah's ministers refused to allow a German team to come
to Lebanon and survey the Blue Line, for example. After that
controversy, according to Ja'ja', Hizballah decided to oppose
the GOL.


7. (C) Ja'ja said that a third player, and a relatively minor
one, is General Michel Aoun. All Aoun wants is a share in
the GOL because he is looking for the Presidency. Aoun cares
neither about the tribunal nor about UNSCR 1701, Ja'ja'
suggested. Aoun knows that Syria and Hizballah are playing
games to prevent a new presidential election when Lahoud's
term ends, and Aoun wants to be in the cabinet so that he can
prepare for the eventuality under which the cabinet rules

BEIRUT 00003414 002 OF 003


alone, after Lahoud's term. (Note: Should Parliament fail
to elect a successor, the cabinet would continue to rule
without a president. In such a situation, Aoun might try to
assume primacy within the cabinet if he were a member at that
time. End note.)

RIOTS TO UNNERVE SINIORA
--------------


8. (C) Hizballah is planning with Syria to instigate riots
and popular unrest as well as continue attacks such as the
recent grenade attacks, Ja'ja' asserted. He claimed that
according to one piece of information, Hizballah plans to
enter the Grand Serail and physically expel Siniora. When
Danin asked how vulnerable the GOL might be, Ja'ja' replied
simply that it is not vulnerable at all. March 14 is strong
enough to resist attacks by force.


9. (C) However, if there is a confrontation which results in
deaths at the hands of GOL security forces, Ja'ja' said, "I
don't know how Prime Minister Siniora will react. There is
the human factor," he said. "In my assessment, we might be
able to sustain him and help see him through. He was, during
the war, at one point..." Ja'ja' paused, making a hand
gesture to suggest "wishy-washy." "Two weeks ago, he was
extremely tired. Biologically, Ja'ja' continued, Siniora is
an unknown variable. (Comment: Ja'ja' dwelt on this theme a
while longer, as if to ensure that we would not miss his
assessment of Siniora as perhaps lacking the nerve to sustain
a violent confrontation with Hizballah. End comment.)

ROLE OF EXTERNAL FORCES
--------------


10. (C) Danin noted that the USG is encouraged by the LAF's
deployment to the south. Ja'ja' responded that the LAF and
UNIFIL deployments are both a strength and a weakness.
Hizballah doesn't like the deployments because they restrict
its margin of maneuver. Hizballah, however, can't fight the
LAF or UNIFIL.


11. (C) Iran, on the other hand, can turn the LAF and UNIFIL
deployments into a target in Lebanon. "We are on the verge
of a security confrontation with Iran" over the nuclear
issue, he said. "When the UNSC imposes sanctions in two to
three months, Iran will not sit idly by -- it will respond."
Iran may respond in Iraq, but it won't make much difference
there, he said. One place Iran can truly hit back is in
south Lebanon, and it will resort to Hizballah.


12. (C) Syria is against the LAF/UNIFIL deployments for the
same reasons. The Syrians don't want security in Lebanon
because they want to assert influence. They are lobbying
Sunni fundamentalists, including small radical groups in
Syria itself, in Iraq, in the Palestinian territories, and in
Lebanon including its Palestinian camps.

HIZBALLAH WEAKER
--------------


13. (C) When DAS Danin asked what Hizballah hoped to
accomplish in its July attack against Israel, Ja'ja' said
that he believed Hassan Nasrallah had made a poor calculation
and that he had believed his attack and kidnapping would not
precipitate a war. If he had taken the example of Israel's
reaction to the Gaza kidnapping of an Israeli soldier into
consideration, Nasrallah would have known better. According
to his sources, Ja'ja' added, Iran was angry with Nasrallah
for starting a war at the wrong time.


14. (C) Nasrallah is weaker now than at the start of the war,
Ja'ja' speculated. Hizballah's core group is unchanged
(i.e., the same people with the same level of commitment) but
beyond this "people are tired." Even in Shia communities
people are starting to speak out, he claimed. Making matters
more complicated, the Shia community in general feels
threatened and without a role alongside the Sunnis and
Christians. Speaker Berri is playing a positive role, Ja'ja'
estimated, in easing tensions.

SOLUTIONS
--------------

BEIRUT 00003414 003 OF 003




15. (C) Ja'ja' then turned to his proposed solutions. "Step
up UNIFIL fast, to 15,000" he said. UNIFIL should bring
military intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities to use
against Hizballah. Humint should play as great a role as
reconnaissance.


16. (C) When Danin asked whether UNIFIL's efforts could be
made effective in a short time frame, Ja'ja' said he had no
doubt that it could with help from friendly parties in the
south. Christian villages in the south, Ja'ja' said, are
"fed up" with Hizballah, as are many Shia communities. They
feed information to GOL intelligence agencies, which are
effective. Anything shared with the GOL is leaked
immediately to Hizballah, however.


17. (C) Ja'ja's second proposed solution was to solve the
Sheba'a Farms issue expeditiously. If the issue is solved in
a month or two, he assessed, Hizballah will be disarmed
politically. Berri would be free to oppose the "resistance."
The internal cohesion of Hizballah, and the unity between
Hizballah and Amal, would be gone. Do whatever it takes to
obtain Israeli withdrawal from the Sheba'a Farms, he appealed.


18. (C) DAS Danin suggested that Lebanese may be backing
themselves into a corner with the Sheba'a Farms issue, and
doubted that the Israelis would see such withdrawal as
worthwhile. Handing the land over to Lebanon would also
require UN support and Syrian agreement; how can Lebanon get
around Damascus' veto?


19. (C) By unilateral drawing the border, Ja'ja' responded.
There is a precedent, he noted, in the drawing of the
Iraq/Kuwait border following the first Gulf War. The UN has
ample documentation of Lebanon's claim to unilaterally
determine the border. Danin pointed out that the UN
certified complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000,
but Ja'ja' replied that the UN certified the "withdrawal
line" but did not assert that that line was an international
border.


20. (C) Ja'ja' allowed that the Sheba'a Farms is "not such a
big deal -- 48 or 55 square kilometers. But this is how to
disarm Hizballah." Even the Shia won't fight if Sheba'a is
returned. Sheba'a has assumed mythical dimensions, he said.
Handing over the Sheba'a -- to Lebanon or to the UN -- in the
right way could give a boost to the GOL.


21. (C) Asked what would happen if Hassan Nasrallah imposed
additional conditionalities on disarming, such as the
creation of a "strong state" as mentioned in his September 22
address, Ja'ja' responded that Hizballah, in such a case,
would be creating an internal problem and "we will deal with
them."

ELECTIONS
--------------


22. (C) Ja'ja' was confident that President Lahoud could be
removed without extraordinary effort. The March 14 coalition
enjoys a parliamentary majority with 71 deputies, and will
elect a new president on time before the expiration of
Lahoud's term, he said. March 8 figures may insist that
electing a president requires a two-thirds majority of
Parliament, but that is only for the first round, he
asserted. On the second round, March 14 will elect a
president with a simple majority.


23. (C) On parliamentary elections and the "flawed" electoral
law, Ja'ja' allowed that the issue is a "bone of contention"
between the Lebanese Forces and the rest of its March 14
partners. While the LF supports reforming the law,
itbelieves that "now is not the time" due to the risk of
creating tension within the coalition. The priority now, he
said, should be on strengthening the government and
establishing the international tribunal.


24. (U) This message has been cleared by DAS Danin.
MURRAY