LEBANON: DRUZE LEADERS ASSESS SYRIA THREAT,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003209 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2026 TAGS: KCRM LE PGOV PREL PTER SUBJECT: LEBANON: DRUZE LEADERS ASSESS SYRIA THREAT, RELATIONS WITH MARCH 8 AND BERRI Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) Druze politicians Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh offered us suggestions for helping Lebanon overcome Syrian influence, and discussed how to counter March 8 group calls for a national unity government. They were optimistic about improvement in the March 14 group's relations with Speaker Berri, and positive that UNIIIC is focusing on Syria as the culprit in the assassination of former PM Hariri. Jumblatt expressed interest in visiting Washington in late October. End Summary. SYRIA REMAINS A PREOCCUPATION -------------- ¶2. (S) Ambassador and polchief visited Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh on October 3. When asked how the USG could best promote stability in Lebanon and support the March 14-dominated Siniora government, Jumblatt had little new to offer in terms of advice. He advised continued international pressure on Syria, especially from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The USG should also encourage the Europeans to keep pressuring Syria and "not to go too far" with the EU-Syria Association Agreement that, as Hamadeh told us last week, would be discussed in Brussels in October. Other pressure points might include Syria's relationships with Russia and Turkey. ¶3. (S) Jumblatt suggested making contact with the "reasonable and serious" opposition in Syria. He noted that Hikmat Shihabi will soon be back in Los Angeles and that two of Ghazi Kanaan's sons are in the U.S. Both he and Hamadeh agreed that bilateral sanctions on Lebanese figures acting on behalf of Damascus could be useful. They cited the example of Issam Fares, who disappeared from Lebanon and renounced further involvement in Lebanese politics when the USG announced that it would look into the finances of pro-Syria politicians. They suggested that the USG sanction big fish, and cast a net wide. If only a few Lebanese allies of Damascus are sanctioned, such limited action would boost their images and make them martyrs in the public eye. NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT AND POSSIBLE COUNTERPROPOSALS -------------- ¶4. (C) Hamadeh shared with us some new details about the Hizballah/FPM push for a national unity government. (Note: In most of our conversations with March 8 figures the proposal has consisted of the creation of six new ministerial positions without portfolio, confessionally balanced with one representative from each of the following communities: Maronite, Greek Catholic, Orthodox, Sunni, Shia and Druze. End Note.) Hamadeh told us that in a cabinet meeting on Monday, Lahoud for the first time mentioned some names of potential new ministers. Provocatively, he proposed Arslan Talal, Jumblatt's political rival, for the Druze slot. Michel Aoun himself would assume the Maronite position. Greek Orthodox Issam Abu Jamra and Catholic MP and Aoun ally Ily Skaff were also mentioned by name. Lahoud did not specify a candidate for the proposed new Shia position (although presumably Hizballah would have its pick, and said merely that the Sunni candidate should "represent the whole Sunni community" -- implying, to Hamadeh, that the Sunni minister would be a Hariri opponent. ¶5. (S) Jumblatt and Hamadeh were clear that such an addition to the cabinet would create a "blocking minority" of over one third of the cabinet when combined with March 8 ministers already serving on it: six new ministers plus the five existing Shia ministers, or 11 ministers out of 30. Jumblatt has no doubt that Hizballah's purpose for obtaining this blocking minority is to "sabotage and delay" the proposed tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri assassination and related crimes. ¶6. (S) Our interlocutors assessed that high-profile USG pressure opposing the national unity government concept will only complicate matters for March 14. Hamadeh wants March 14 to fight its own battle in this case; "we have our own arguments." Similarly, Hamadeh feels that USG statements on Syrian interference in Lebanon might also cause a backlash; BEIRUT 00003209 002 OF 003 "we really resent outside pressure in Lebanon." Jumblatt expressed confidence that March 14 is better organized and more effective than March 8, but that it needs to relieve the tension between PM Siniora and Speaker Berri first. ¶7. (S) The Ambassador proposed that March 8 figures seeking a national unity government could be offered positions on special commissions as an alternative to the blunt "no" that has made March 14 appear to be intransigent, power-hungry, and disdainful of the growing popularity of a national unity government proposal. Hamadeh, however, was unenthusiastic, and feared that such commissions would become too powerful in their own right. In addition, the March 8 leaders' record from the national dialogue period suggests that they would not act in good faith in any institutionalized forum. Jumblatt and Hamadeh considered the possibility of using March 8's energies in a commission dedicated to reconstruction, but Hamadeh said that if they were brought into any role in foreign policy or security, "its over." RELATIONS WITH BERRI SET TO IMPROVE -------------- ¶8. (S) Jumblatt gave us an update on Speaker Berri's efforts to obtain funding for and control over the Council of the South. Saudi, Kuwaiti and Emirati funds have been deposited in the Central Bank for use by the Council. The other large Gulf donor, Qatar, remains determined to carry out its projects without coordination. Berri will travel to Saudi Arabia on October 8 to raise more funds, and Hamadeh suggested Berri would be easier to deal with politically when he returns, flush with cash for the south. (Note: In a meeting with the Ambassador on 10/3, Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja said that King Abdullah had made the decision to invite Berri to Saudi Arabia, in hopes of keeping Berri at least neutral in the March 8/Aoun-March 14 fights. End note.) UNIIIC -------------- ¶9. (C) On the tribunal, Hamadeh noted the irony that while language citing "crimes against humanity" had been removed from the statute draft, the cabinet was considering accusing Israel of such crimes during its last Council of Ministers meeting. Hamadeh assessed that changing the text such that the statute strips immunity on crimes involving international law would broaden the scope of the tribunal to other crimes, some not closely related to the Hariri case. ¶10. (C) Hamadeh mentioned that in a conversation he had had with Serge Brammertz, each of the UNIIIC investigator's questions related to Damascus. (Note: Hamadeh survived a bomb attack in October 2004, the first in a series of bombings that included the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri. For this reason he has been both a political actor in the UNIIIC investigation and a witness. End Note.) Hamadeh concluded from the conversation that Brammertz is focused on Syria as the culprit in his investigation. FOLLOW-UP COMMENTS FROM JUMBLATT -------------- ¶11. (C) Jumblatt met briefly with DCM on October 4, and led off with the comment that a national unity government would be a disaster, resulting in government paralysis. Hizballah continues to receive its instructions from Tehran and Damascus. Hassan Nasrallah may not be the one who actually calls the shots for Hizballah, but his image has captivated many people in the Arab world, including Egypt, and Hizballah is thus feeling confident. ¶12. (C) Jumblatt urged the U.S. to press for rapid action in resolving the GOL statute that would govern the establishment of the international tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri and possibly other bombings. Jumblatt said the Cabinet needs to act quickly, because if a GOL-UN accord on the text of the statute cannot be found soon, the whole enterprise could be lost in national unity government as early as November. Jumblatt, as we have reported elsewhere, thinks the Cabinet will have no choice but to approve an international tribunal statute, given that it had been agreed to in principle by Nabih Berri during the national dialogue earlier this year. Approval by Parliament will be no problem, given the March 14 group's majority. Meanwhile, Bashar al-Asad seems increasingly nervous about where the BEIRUT 00003209 003 OF 003 UNIIIC is heading, as evidenced in his recent interview with the Spanish newspaper El Pais. ¶12. (C) Jumblatt was relaxed when we raised the issue of Sunni-Shia tensions. Jumblatt admitted that Nabih Berri is angry at PM Fouad Siniora for not sending enough reconstruction money to the South, but Berri should be happier when he returns from Saudi Arabia early next week, presumably with reconstruction funds from the Saudis. Jumblatt thought it useful that March 14 leader Saad Hariri's people had reached out to the Jemaa Islamiyya group as a way of engaging, productively, Sunni extremists (See Beirut 3179). WASHINGTON VISIT? -------------- ¶13. (C) Jumblatt expressed interest in visiting Washington in late October to discuss what to do about Syria and to strengthen the Siniora government. We will follow up on this possibility. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (S) Hamadeh and Jumblatt's advice to us -- to keep a low profile on our support for March 14 and the Siniora government -- has been echoed by other political figures lately. As we will report septel, PM Siniora told the Ambassador today (10/4) that the U.S. should work quietly, without public noise. (While we respect their views, we're not sure we agree: some public comments about what is clearly a Hizballah/Syrian/Aounist plot underfoot might serve to to help undermine it.) They are clearly preoccupied with Syria's next move, shaken by the energetic campaign waged by Hizballah and FPM to weaken the cabinet, and sensitive to repeated new charges that they are stooges of Israel or the USG. Nevertheless they and other March 14 leaders are grateful for our support behind the scenes on such issues as monitoring Syrian interference and establishing the tribunal. They are also open to our advice, more so than before, on dealing with their political rivals; that fact may indicate increased weakness, anxiety and division on the part of March 14 in general. End Comment. FELTMAN