LEBANON: FPM OFFICIAL PREVIEWS PARTY CONFERENCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003148

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: LE PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FPM OFFICIAL PREVIEWS PARTY CONFERENCE,
POLITICAL GOALS


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Ibrahim Kanaan, MP and top FPM party official, told
emboffs that this weekend's FPM Conference for the Displaced
will not be a political rally, though its timing may suggest
otherwise. He described the FPM's immediate political aims
as limited to a national unity government and denied any
interest in removing PM Siniora from office or enhancing the
powers of the presidency, the office so clearly sought by FPM
leader Michel Aoun. On Hizballah's arms, Kanaan trotted out
familiar positions including the Shia need for weapon to
"balance" the financial might of Christians and Sunnis. He
assessed that the FPM had lost some support recently but that
Aoun remains the Christian community's most popular leader --
by some measures. Kanaan denied an alarming interpretation
of Hizballah leader Nasrallah's September 22 speech.
Finally, he accepted a demarche on FPM's financial links with
Hizballah and said that the problem "is being taken care of."
End Summary.


2. (SBU) Polchief, the Ambassador's Special Assistant, and
Polstaff visited Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) MP and top
party official Ibrahim Kanaan at his residence on September

26. Joining Kanaan were three FPM activists, including
Michel Aoun's nephew Alain Aoun.

CONFERENCE FOR THE DISPLACED
--------------


3. (C) We asked Kanaan about the FPM's planned Conference for
the Displaced, scheduled for September 30. The Conference
is widely seen as an opportunity for FPM leader Michel Aoun
to make a public riposte against Lebanese Forces leader Samir
Ja'ja', who addressed a large pro-March 14 rally of
Christians in Harissa on September 24. The Conference is not
a political event and had been planned for years, Kanaan
maintained. Polchief noted that Aoun needed a big event to
counter Ja'ja's rally and dovetail with September 22 rally.
This, plus the fact that there had been no announcement of
the Conference until Ja'ja' was at the podium last Sunday,
strongly suggested that Aoun's principal interest in holding
a Conference is to obtain a political platform. Kanaan
smiled at this as if to acknowledge it was true.


4. (C) Nevertheless, according to Kanaan, the FPM has
prepared copious records and reporting on the issue of the
Displaced and hopes to have a successful Conference. As
Kanaan explained the issue, tens of thousands of Christian
inhabitants of the Chouf were driven out by Druze militia
during the Lebanese Civil War. While the Council of the
Displaced has operated since the early 1980's under the
direction of Walid Jumblatt, it has spent USD 3-4 billion but
has resettled few Christians in the Chouf. The majority of
the displaced remain in Beirut and other cities to which they
fled. (Note: The focus on the Council's role, while perhaps
justified in light of the institution's undoubted corruption,
is an opportunity for the FPM to both grab the spotlight and
smear March 14 member Walid Jumblatt. End Note.)

FPM POLITICAL AIMS
--------------


5. (C) Kanaan repeated the key FPM demand for a national
unity government consisting of a Council of Ministers
enlarged to include ministers appointed by Michel Aoun.
Polchief told Kanaan that the proposal sounded like it would
create gridlock in the GOL. Further to this, he continued,
the Siniora government enjoys tremendous support among the
international community at present. Any attempt to topple
the Siniora government -- constitutionally or otherwise --
would not be likely to meet with support or approval from
Lebanon's partners.


6. (C) Kanaan countered that forming a new government did not
mean replacing Siniora, whom he acknowledged had done a good
and competent job of managing the July-August crisis and
continued to be a competent technocrat. Kanaan was at pains
to stress that the FPM would deal with Siniora; Kanaan

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minimized the harsh words that Siniora and Aoun had exchanged
in early September and mentioned that he and Aoun have been
invited, and will go, to PM Siniora's Iftar at the Serail on
Friday evening. (When asked, Kanaan said laughingly that he
has not yet received any invitation to the Qureitem Iftars
being thrown by Saad al-Hariri each evening this month.)


7. (C) Another top FPM interest is electoral reform followed
by early parliamentary elections. After ripping the
international community for pushing for early elections in
2005 -- an FPM litany -- the party now agreed that reform of
the Syrian-installed electoral law should be a first
priority. Kanaan said he is unimpressed with the work of
ex-minister Fouad Boutros, who headed the commission to
propose a new law, and says that the FPM will introduce
suggestions or even a draft of its own. The group debated
whether Lebanon could hold early parliamentary elections.
While not all the FPM members present were as certain that
Lebanon's parliament can be dissolved before the expiration
of its term in 2009, Kanaan asserted, without going into
specifics, that there are constitutional interpretations to
justify early elections.


8. (C) Although Michel Aoun's apparent bid for the presidency
was not discussed directly, Polchief asked whether Aoun has
any interest in enhancing the power of the president. At
present, he observed, the post does not exercise much real
power. Kanaan responded that while there are no clear plans
"for now," there are additional powers that could be added to
the presidency under "a full implementation of Ta'if." He
added that the Lahoud presidency is an aberration in that
Lahoud is isolated and has no political allies.

HIZBALLAH'S ARMS
--------------


9. (C) We repeatedly asked Kanaan to acknowledge that
Hizballah's arsenal is an unnatural, destabilizing and
dangerous feature in Lebanese politics, but he stuck
faithfully to the FPM party line. Disarming Hizballah is
desirable and achievable but cannot be accomplished by force.
The Sheba'a Farms and prisoner issues may be mere pretexts,
but once they are removed Hizballah will have no more excuse
to keep weapons. Hizballah's weapons are not directed
internally. The Shia need weapons to balance the power
conferred upon the Sunni and Christians by their financial
resources and foreign backers.


10. (C) Against these points, we refuted Kanaan's implication
that the international community is seeking forcible
disarmament of Hizballah. We also cast doubt that Sheba'a
and the prisoners would be Hizballah's last excuses to keep
weapons; the party would find other excuses and make other
demands before disarming. And finally, we pointed out the
contradiction of the last two points: if Hizballah does not
use its weapons to influence internal Lebanese politics, then
how does keeping those weapons "balance" the Shia's power
against that of the Sunni and Christians? The best policy,
we said, is for Lebanese political figures on all sides to
stop giving political cover to Hizballah and start (at least)
saying the right things: that it is unacceptable for the
party to keep its weapons and, especially, for it to
undertake unilateral armed action.

IS HIZBALLAH GOOD FOR FPM'S POLITICAL FORTUNES?
-------------- --


11. (C) Polchief asked Kanaan about the FPM's political
fortunes, which appeared to take a hit following the war and
particularly following the Lebanese Forces rally. Kanaan
responded that according to an An-Nahar poll, Aoun was
selected as the most popular choice among Christians for a
ministerial post (75 percent in favor according to Kanaan),
even if he would not accept to serve as a minister. Kanaan
added bashfully that he had himself placed second in the
poll. Nevertheless, FPM's popularity had dipped by a few
points since the war, Kanaan acknowledged, but he predicted
the party would recover.

HIZBALLAH RALLY
--------------


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12. (C) We asked Kanaan about some potential interpretations
of Hassan Nasrallah's September 22 speech. For one thing,
did he mean to imply that a "clean state" -- that is, a
corruption-free one -- was a further condition for Hizballah
to disarm? Kanaan said that that interpretation is a
misunderstanding and that clearly corruption is a pervasive
problem that will be hard to solve. Hizballah's conditions
for disarming are clear and limited to Sheba'a and prisoners.
In fact, Kanaan takes credit on behalf of the FPM for the
fact that Hizballah has made its conditions clear and gone on
record that it will disarm when they are met. We noted that
the conditions do not always appear so clear.

DEMARCHE
--------------


13. (C) In a pull-aside, Polchief delivered to Kanaan a
demarche on Hizballah aid and financial resources. Kanaan
was familiar with the issue. Polchief stated that while the
USG has no desire to blacklist, defame or destroy the FPM,
and in fact would like to work with the FPM, the party could
easily find itself in legal difficulties because of its
dealings with Hizballah. In addition, those dealings make it
hard for policymakers in the international community to see
the FPM as a part of the solution to Lebanon's difficulties,
as opposed to being part of the problem. Kanaan focused on
the terrorist financing aspect of the demarche and said that
"this is being taken care of."
FELTMAN