BERRI ON THE RAMPAGE AGAINST SINIORA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003089 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY SUBJECT: BERRI ON THE RAMPAGE AGAINST SINIORA Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a 9/25 one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri relentlessly attacked Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Siniora, according to Berri, was to blame for Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's harsh rhetoric at the 9/22 Hizballah rally: The PM visited Berri on 9/21, before that night's cabinet meeting. The two worked out deals, inter alia, on Surete General Chief Wafiq Jezzini's behavior (a subject that dominated the Ambassador's discussion with Berri),diplomatic appointments, and reconstruction efforts. As Siniora led the cabinet, Berri went secretly to see Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, convincing him to drop his criticisms of the GOL in his speech scheduled for the following day. But when Berri subsequently learned that Siniora had "betrayed" him, he passed word to Nasrallah to revert to his original speech with its anti-Siniora flavor. Suggesting that he's not eager to change the cabinet despite Siniora's alleged perfidy, Berri said that he hopes eventually to revive something like the national dialogue. But, he said, given how deep the distrust is, he has to rebuild reasonably amicable relationships among individuals before daring to call a group together. One of his goals, he said, was to come up with some kind of reconciliation between Walid Jumblatt and Nasrallah. While the latter expressed a willingness to try, Jumblatt is not yet ready, he confessed. End summary. SINIORA SEEKS OUT BERRI TO HELP LOWER TENSIONS -------------- ¶2. (S) Asked by the Ambassador for his views on the current situation, Berri (who returned on 9/20 from a vacation in Switzerland and Spain) launched into what was in essence a 75-minute monologue -- an unusually long meeting for Berri -- on how Siniora had betrayed him. Siniora, Berri reported, had shown up at the Speaker's official residence without an appointment last Thursday (9/21),in hopes of working out some backroom understandings with Berri on how best to handle some controversial issues at the cabinet meeting that night. Berri said that he took Siniora at his word when the PM said that he wanted to lower tensions, especially in advance of the Hizballah rally scheduled for following afternoon. THE JEZZINI AFFAIR: BERRI AND SINIORA COME UP WITH DEAL -------------- ¶3. (S) One of the toughest issues, Berri said, related to Surete General chief Wafiq Jezzini. Berri rejected Siniora's argument that Jezzini deserved to be disciplined for not showing up at meetings called by Acting Interior Minister Fatfat or PM Siniora. After all, Berri said, during the July-August crisis, Siniora summoned security chiefs and officials to the Grand Serail for meetings and "never once" invited Jezzini. "Did I complain?" Berri said, suggesting the Siniora now had no right to complain when Jezzini failed to show up. Moreover, Berri said, "it is true" that Fatfat, as only Acting Minister, is not technically or legally Jezzini's boss. But, again, Berri ("unlike your friend General Aoun," he laughed) had never made a fuss about that. Why, he asked, is Siniora making Jezzini's attendance record an issue, when the Speaker could now make Fatfat's tenure as Acting Minister a problem? ¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador said that he did not think that the failure to show up at meetings was the real reason behind Siniora's pique at Jezzini. Nodding, Berri said that Siniora and Fatfat want to "monopolize" the security organs, especially at the expense of the Shia. That explains why Jezzini was never called to the Grand Serail during the July-August crisis. Moreover, Fatfat is trying to make appointments inside the Surete General, without consulting with Jezzini (or -- in what we suspect is the real problem -- Berri). Finally, Siniora and Fatfat were scheming to interconnect Surete General and Internal Security Forces (ISF) databases, which would allow Wissam al-Hassan (the Hariri-appointed head of the ISF's intelligence branch) to spy on Jezzini. ¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador argued that it took the 9/11 attack before the U.S. security institutions had real BEIRUT 00003089 002 OF 004 connectivity; there was no reason why Berri should be so suspicious of data sharing between the ISF and Surete. It is good for Lebanon's security if the security institutions can share information more easily. If that is the case, Berri said, then why are Siniora and Fatfat leaving the Lebanese Armed Forces, Military Intelligence (G-2),Presidential Security, and State Security out of the process? Siniora told Berri that it is because only the Surete and ISF fall under the ISF, but Berri argued that it is because the Sunnis want to strip the Shia of any role in security. ¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked whether the problem might simply be with Jezzini, not an entire confession. After all, we have heard that France has issued an arrest warrant for Jezzini (who is in charge of passports and immigration) for using forged documents to acquire French passports for himself and his family. This does not engender trust. Berri bristled, saying that LAF Commander Sleiman had the same problem with the French, yet people are "praising" rather than sidelining Sleiman. Moreover, Berri said, "everyone knows" that the USG has had a long-standing relationship with Surete General. If they didn't know it, they do now, he said (referring to a front-page story on the 9/23 Hariri-owned Mustaqbal newspaper that reproduced in full a Jezzini memo outlining a USG armored vehicle gift). "People say" Jezzini is Hizballah-allied, Berri said. But that obviously isn't true or else the USG would not deal with him. "You remember," Berri continued, "you told me that you could not deal with Hussein Laquis" (a Hizballah ally who was dropped from consideration in favor of Jezzini, after the former Surete General chief Jamil al-Sayyid resigned in April 2005). "Jezzini is not Laquis." ¶7. (S) In any case, Berri said, he won Siniora's approval for a way by which everyone could save face. Jezzini would go to Fatfat's office the next time he was called, and that would be seen by all as implicit recognition of Fatfat's authority. Fatfat would not make appointments inside Surete General without consulting with Jezzini (who presumably would consult with Berri). And Siniora would call a meeting for all security chiefs to discuss how to build security databases that were interconnected. Berri said that both he and and Siniora were satisfied with this outcome. Berri understood that Siniora would orchestrate just such a cabinet outcome. DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS: SUBSTITUTING A MARONITE FOR AN ORTHODOX FOR WASHINGTON -------------- ¶8. (S) Berri also raised diplomatic appointments with Siniora, asking the PM whether London, Washington, New York, Cairo, and the Arab League were all so insignificant that the posts could be left indefinitely without ambassadors. Siniora briefed Berri on recommendations made by the MFA for these and other positions but noted that he had a problem: the MFA, with Emile Lahoud's backing, proposed a Maronite (Boutros Assaker) for Washington, when that slot had been held by a Greek Orthodox. Putting a Maronite there would mean a further reshuffling, in order to give a Greek Orthodox an important embassy elsewhere. Berri said that he agreed with Siniora that Anthony Chedid, currently the MFA's Director of International Organizations and a Greek Orthodox, could substitute for Assaker. Berri would get Lahoud's approval for the needed papers of accreditation. But the appointments should for forward for cabinet approval that night, they agreed. (Comment: Neither Chedid nor Assaker are particularly inspiring choices. End comment.) BERRI TELLS SINIORA TO START DISTRIBUTING COMPENSATION ON FRIDAY -------------- ¶9. (S) On reconstruction, Berri urged Siniora to begin to distribute the cash according to the formula he announced previously (up to $40,000 for housing, furniture, and fixtures) and to announce compensation for cars, crops, factories, and shops. After much back and forth ("he really doesn't like to spend money," Berri marveled),Siniora agreed to Berri's insistence to give a 2 p.m. press conference on Friday, a couple of hours before Hizballah's scheduled rally, to announce the start of cash distribution and payments for vehicles destroyed. Berri said that the timing was not coincidental -- such an announcement would accrue good will to the cabinet in advance of Hizballah's rally. BEIRUT 00003089 003 OF 004 BERRI USES SINIORA'S CONCURRENCE TO CONVINCES NASRALLAH TO MODERATE SPEECH -------------- ¶10. (S) Based on these understandings, Siniora went off to lead the cabinet meeting. Berri made arrangements for a secret meeting with Nasrallah, "our first meeting since the SIPDIS war." (Berri noted that today's newspapers talk of a 9/24 Nasrallah-Berri meeting, but the actual session took place three days earlier.) Berri said that he "worked on Nasrallah for five hours" to convince him to drop the Siniora-bashing part of his speech for the next day, based on the understandings Berri had worked out with Siniora. At long last, Nasrallah agreed to talk of international affairs, not domestic politics. Nasrallah tried to get Berri to join him in complaining about Siniora, but Berri said that he trusted Siniora. BUT SINIORA DOESN'T DELIVER -------------- ¶11. (S) Exhausted, Berri did not return his phone messages when he returned that night and only learned from the newspapers Friday morning that the cabinet disciplined Jezzini and did not discuss diplomatic appointments. When he called Siniora to complain, Siniora admitted that he needed more time as well before announcing the start of compensation payments. Furious, Berri sent a message to Nasrallah to use the previous text of his speech. While Berri agreed with the Ambassador that the language and tone of the speech escalated tensions in Lebanon, Berri blamed Siniora. ¶12. (S) In a way, Berri said, "Siniora gave me a gift." So many people were pushing Berri away from moderation to extremism. Aoun "hates me," because Aoun sees Berri as the only obstacle preventing a collapse of the Siniora cabinet. The Syrians are deeply unhappy with Berri's partnership with Siniora, and Hizballah does not understand why Berri refuses to go along with the proposal to withdraw the Shia ministers and make Siniora's cabinet politically unviable. "I don't have to be moderate when someone doesn't respect me," Berri said. NATIONAL UNITY CABINET -- GOOD IDEA, BUT TO KEEP IN THE POCKET FOR NOW -------------- ¶13. (S) The Ambassador asked whether that means that Berri will now work insist on a national unity cabinet, as Hizballah and Aoun are doing. Berri said that "no one" can oppose a national unity cabinet, but the question is the timing. He suggested having discussions about a national unity cabinet but to put any likely formulas for such a cabinet "into our pockets until the time is right." The Ambassador asked whether the time might be right after Emile Lahoud is removed from the presidency. "I am thinking about the same thing," Berri laughed, but added that he is worried that the political climate in the country could deteriorate severely in the meantime. The Ambassador suggested that an easy solution to that would be to accelerate the presidential elections to the quickest date possible. PREMATURE FOR NATIONAL DIALOGUE BEFORE INDIVIDUAL RECONCILIATION WORK -------------- ¶14. (S) The Ambassador asked Berri whether he was going to try to resume the national dialogue, as has been rumored. Berri said that he thought that the national dialogue would be a good way, eventually, to release tension and allow Aoun to feel that he is playing a proper national role. But the distrust is so great between politicians that it would be unrealistic now to call everyone back to the table and expect a constructive atmosphere, he said. Instead, he was doing some bridge-building between individuals who participated in the national dialogue. Once he senses that he has been successful in restoring some confidence, he then will call for some form of national dialogue. ¶15. (S) Berri said that he was working particularly hard to rebuild some kind of relationship between Nasrallah and Jumblatt. He claimed to have convinced Nasrallah to set aside his bitterness over Jumblatt's rhetoric and positions in order to try to find some common ground with Jumblatt. Jumblatt, however, is refusing to go along with Berri's proposal. Yet even with Jumblatt there is a signal of BEIRUT 00003089 004 OF 004 flexbility, Berri said, saying that Jumblatt's press statements on 9/24 were "moderate." When the Ambassador asked what Berri meant, he responded that Jumblatt had said that his problem with Hizballah was its alliance with Syria. That, Berri said, shows that Jumblatt is prepared to deal with a purely Lebanese Hizballah, a position Berri thought was helpful. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (S) Berri's harsh message about Siniora was in contrast to his upbeat mood. This suggests to us that he is calculating how to use Siniora's "betrayal" to his tactical advantage -- probably meaning more jobs or reconstruction support sent his way for his followers. After all, Siniora will be the one who will have to blink in any Siniora-Berri fight: Siniora cannot fight Syria, Hizballah, Michel Aoun, and Nabih Berri all at once. We did not get the sense that Berri is in any hurry to see the cabinet replaced by a national unity cabinet, either, as Berri's share of the power would be reduced as the cabinet expands to take in at least a share for Aoun. FELTMAN