SULEIMAN FRANJIEH MASKS PRO-SYRIA BIAS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003088 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY SUBJECT: SULEIMAN FRANJIEH MASKS PRO-SYRIA BIAS WITH HARIRI-BASHING Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Former MP and ex-Minister Suleiman Franjieh, receiving an Embassy delegation on 9/18, expressed considerable worry about the March 14 majority using Hariri money and influence to impose its will on Lebanon. Even the special tribunal for the Hariri assassination might become a tool to settle scores with political rivals, he argued. Echoing many of Michel Aoun's comments, Franjieh suggested that the Sunnis -- and Hariri in particular -- were a bigger threat to Lebanon's Christians than the Shia and Hizballah. While claiming to want to dispense with confessionalism, Franjieh said that, until such sweeping changes in Lebanon's political culture could be made, then at least confessionalism needed to work better, particularly in terms of Lebanon's Christians. While Franjieh purported to be advancing an independent stand, we suspect, given his family's long alliance with Syria's Assad family, we are sure that he ermains heavily -- and voluntarily -- influenced by Syrian thinking. But unlike many other of Lebanon's pro-Syrian politicians in the so-called "National Front," Franjieh does retain a strong and loyal following in his native Zghorta region. End summary and comment. SECURITY FEARS AND WORRIES OF AIRSTRIKES, GIVEN RUMORS FRANJIEH OFFERED NASRALLAH SHELTER -------------- ¶2. (C) On 9/18, the Ambassador, Pol/Econ Chief, and Pol Advisor called on former Minister Suleiman Franjieh at his imitation, self-designed Swiss chalet in Bneshay, northern Lebanon. Franjieh -- who lost his MP seat in the 2005 elections -- was accompanied by advisor Rony Arayji and financial backer Richard Haykel. Despite the clear evidence of checkpoints under construction by his Marada militia-turned party on the road leading to his house, Franjieh denied that he was upgrading the security. ¶3. (C) Sitting below mounted trophies of game he has hunted around the world, Franjieh noted that he and his wife Rima spent the July-August conflict moving between different houses. They wanted to avoid potential Israeli airstrikes, given rumors and (inaccurate) news reports that Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah had taken refuge in 
SIPDIS Franjieh house. Rima, Franjieh said, was particularly scared with the Israelis hit a radio tower near their house and assumed that they were the actual target. Franjieh described Hizballah's 7/12 capture of the IDF soldiers from Israel as a "military operation" that he thought should naturally lead to a prisoner exchange. HARIRI RULE WORSE FOR LEBANON THAN HIZBALLAH-ISRAEL WAR -------------- ¶3. (C) On the Hizballah-Israel war, Franjieh thought that PM Siniora and his cabinet were exaggerating the economic and physical losses. Incredulous that the total direct and indiret costs were anywhere close to $15 million claimed by some, Franjieh said that, whatever the losses, the war was far less costly to Lebanon than the years of Hariri bloc domination. At the end of the civil war, Franjieh noted, Lebanon had approximately $1 billion in debt. Today, that number exceeds $40 billion, a figure he blamed on Rafiq Hariri. The Ambassador noted that, for nearly all of the post-war period, Franjieh had been a cabinet minister. Yes, Franjieh acknowledged, but he "always" opposed Hariri's plans. Hariri rule was far worse for Lebanon than the Hizballah-Israel war. BEST TO TRANSCEND CONFESSIONALISM, BUT -- UNTIL THEN -- MAKE IT WORK BETTER -------------- ¶4. (C) Answering the Ambassador's question about his press comments after paying a call on Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, Franjieh confirmed that he thought it was time for Lebanon to get past its confessional political system. He denied the existence of a Christian-Muslim divide, saying that there is a Christian-Sunni-Shi'a-Druse divide instead. It would be best for Lebanon to get beyond these divisons. But as long as confessional politics are the norm in Lebanon, he argued, then the confessional system must be better respected. The BEIRUT 00003088 002 OF 003 Christians, he said, "must participate in it and have our share." Picking up a cue from Michel Aoun, Franjieh described it as unacceptable that the cabinet's Christians are aligned with the March 14 movement, which he took as meaning that they were subordinate to Hariri's Future party. Glossing over the fact that he himself had voted for the current electoral law when it was proposed in 2000, Franjieh -- noting his agreement with Michel Aoun on this point -- also pushed for electoral reform, to prevent the Christians from again being disenfranchised. NATIONAL UNITY CABINET NEEDED NOW -------------- ¶5. (C) Franjieh noted that he also backed Michel Aoun's call for a national unity cabinet. The Ambassador asked why there was such a rush for a new cabinet now. After all, at the very least, there will be a new cabinet no later than a year from now, when a new president is elected. Franjieh argued that, because of the boycott of Emile Lahoud, there is a vacuum where the presidency should be. Thus, it is better to have a national unity cabinet now, a cabinet that has broad acceptance in the country. Given that one never knows what might happen, one should build the national unity cabinet now, in preparation for all contingencies. Moreover, Christians will leave Lebanon if there is no immediate solution, if they continue to feel disenfrachised by the Siniora cabinet. Franjieh did not seem interested in pursuing a different strategy -- replacing Lahoud now -- to address his concerns. In what seemed in the context to be an incongruous comment, he also noted that Lebanon needs a secular and federalist system, "imposed on Lebanon from the outside." HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS PROVIDE "BALANCE" TO HARIRI MONEY -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador noted that Hizballah's weapons -- not PM Siniora, not Saad Hariri, not even the current vacuum in the presidency -- posed an existential threat to Lebanon. It is important, the Ambassador said, for Lebanon to begin dealing with this issue now. Franjieh responded that "the weapon of money is worse than the weapon of war," repeating his comments about the huge debt piled up by Rafiq Hariri and complaining about political distortions caused by the Hariri wealth. Hizballah's weapons provide a "balance" to Hariri money. For now, Franjieh claimed to be a "partner" with Hizballah, again as a way to counter the Hariri money: "I allied with the Shi'a in thie south, but I don't want to belong to anyone." ¶7. (C) Moreover, Franjieh noted, Siniora's cabinet itself, in its July 2005 cabinet decree, gave legality and legitimacy to Hizballah's weapons, when the cabinet expressed support for the "resistance." Franjieh claimed to be against indefinite retention of Hizballah's weapons but noted that Hizballah had been fighting "for a long time" in the south. Thus trying to disarm Hizballah forcefully will lead to civil war. To move Hizballah toward disarmament, one had to solve Sheba'a Farms, the Lebanese prisoners in Israel, and Israeli air violations. At that point, other parties won't tolerate retention of Hizballah's arms. Hizballah's weapons do not pose a threat inside Lebanon. But, if they become a threat, "we will arm ourselves." Franjieh also mentioned solving the nuclear issue with Iran and re-starting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as steps to defang Hizballah. UNDER HARIRI'S "MICROSCOPE," FRANJIEH CAN'T SMUGGLE ARMS -------------- ¶8. (C) Noting UNSCR 1701's requirement to combat arms smuggling, the Ambassador asked Franjieh is he was aware of arms smuggling into Lebanon. The Ambassador noted that we were concerned by rumors that many groups were starting to smuggle arms, not just Hizballah. Looking perplexed at the oblique query about whether he had been smuggling arms himself, Franjieh asked, "from where? To whom? Bring me the reports, and I'll tell you." Denying that he is involved, Franjieh added, "everyone in Lebanon has weapons. If there's a war, I'll bring them in. But, now, Hariri has me under a microscope. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL: BEIRUT 00003088 003.2 OF 003 HIZBALLAH AFRAID -------------- ¶9. (C) On the proposed special tribunal with international character for the Rafiq Hariri assassination, Franjieh said that he had heard the rumors that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad had threatened to destroy Lebanon if the tribunal goes forward. He did not believe the threat. But, he said, Hizballah is afraid. What, he asked, would happen if the special tribunal would ask Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to testify? After all, some rumors suggested that the explosives-laden truck that killed Hariri had come from the southern suburbs. The Ambassador noted that none of the UNIIIC reports have suggested that Hizballah is implicated, so Hizballah's fears at this point appear to be unwarranted. ¶10. (C) Franjieh responded that the special tribunal could easily be politically, rather than judicially, motivated, just as the UNIIIC has proven to be. The Ambassador noted the consensus that UNIIIC Serge Brammertz is a professional who has kept politics out of his work. Franjieh referred to Brammertz' predecessor Detlev Mehlis and Mehlis' deputy Gerhard Lehmann (who has also left the UNIIIC) in arguing that the UNIIIC was political and the tribunal might be, too. He asked again about what would happen if Nasrallah were summoned to appear at the special tribunal. Answering his own question, he said that civil war would result. ¶11. (C) As the Ambassador closed the meeting and chatted with Franjieh on the way to the motorcade, financial advisor Haykel told Pol/Econ Chief that Franjieh's concern with the tribunal stems from his fear that the tribunal will become a tool by the March 14 majority against their poiltical rivals. The experience of the Mehlis investigation alarmed many in Lebanon that the tribunal could be exploited for political ends. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Franjieh purported to be outlining an independent political path for the sake of Lebanon. But, as his subsequent appearance at the massive Hizballah rally on 9/22 showed, he is still very much aligned with Damascus. But unlike some of the other pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians (Wi'am Wihab, Elie Ferzli, former PM Omar Karami, etc.), Franjieh still has a large and loyal following in the Zghorta/Ehden Maronite-dominated region in northern Lebanon. In fact, his electoral list last year outpolled that of Nayla Mouawad about two-to-one in their home district. But Mouawad and her two running mates won the three seats because the Zghorta/Ehden district was (under the 2000 election law) affixed to a larger district that included Sunni-majority Tripoli, where voters went with the Hariri slat that included Mouawad's list. Ergo, the 2000 law that Franjieh supported in 2000 worked against him in 2005, when the Sunni vote shifted from being pro- to anti-Hariri. ¶13. (C) Franjieh's anti-Hariri line probably reflects the thinking of his friend Bashar al-Asad, as it is revisionist history for him to claim that he always opposed Rafiq Hariri. In one of Rafiq Hariri's last conversations with the Ambassador, Hariri claimed that he had helped fund some of Franjieh's pet projects. Moreover, when Hariri resigned the premiership in October 2004 (in the aftermath of the Syrian-imposed extension of Emile Lahoud's presidential term),the Ambassador passed Franjieh in the hallway of the Hariri family compound in Qoreitem -- not a location where a die-hard, eternally anti-Hariri politician would normally be seen. We were struck in this meeting by Franjieh's barely masked paranoia about UNIIIC and the special tribunal. We don't know whether Franjieh is worried for himself -- he was Interior Minister at the time of Hariri's assassination -- or reflecting the worries of the Asad family. But, with the long ties between the Asad and Franjieh families, maybe one cannot distinguish between those two types of worries. FELTMAN