SHI'ITE MUFTI ALI AL-AMIN INVOKES THE SPIRIT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003007 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE NEA/ELA FOR ABERCROMBIE-WINSTANLEY/WILLIAMS/DONICK NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER LE SUBJECT: SHI'ITE MUFTI ALI AL-AMIN INVOKES THE SPIRIT OF THE VANISHED IMAM Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) As the dust continues to settle following the 33-day conflict between Hizballah and Israel, there is increasingly vocal criticism of Hizballah within Lebanon. Most importantly, there are even stirrings of disgruntlement with the Shi'a community. The most prominent of the Shi'a critics is Shaykh Ali Al-Amin, the Ja'afari Shi'ite Mufti of Tyre and Jabal Amil in southern Lebanon. Having studied under the late Imam Mohammad Baker al-Sadr in Najaf, Amin was later a professor in Qom before returning in the 1970s to Lebanon where he joined with the movement of the Imam Musa al-Sadr, the so-called "Vanished Imam" who disappeared while on a trip to Libya in 1978. While it is reported that Amin was later a head jurisprudent within Hizballah, he denies that he was ever a member of the organization. ¶2. (SBU) Of late, Amin has launched a media barrage challenging Hizballah's version of its war with Israel and avowing the principles of Musa Al-Sadr, including the extension of full and sole state authority to the South. We have combed through Amin's various media salvos - an 8/22 an-Nahar interview, a 9/5 LBC interview, a 9/10 al-Arabiyya interview, a 9/14 al-Sharq al-Awsat oped, and a 9/15 L'Hebdo magazine interview - to try and piece together the key elements of the Shaykh's message. NEO-SADRIST AWAKENING -------------- ¶3. (SBU) In his interviews and articles, Amin repeatedly invokes the memory of Sadr, who led a Shi'a political awakening through his Movement for the Deprived -- which later became the Amal Party -- in the 1970s. Specifically, he says that Sadr called for the full extension of state control -- including the deployment of the army -- to southern Lebanon. According to Amin, Sadr believed that the state and army were "disappeared" ("taghyeeb" -- also an allusion to the fate of Musa al-Sadr) from the South by the 1969 Cairo Argeement essentially establishing the so-called "Fatahland" in southern Lebanon. "Sadr raised his voice," argued Amin in his LBC interview, "How could the people be driven away, their homes destroyed, while the Arab voices were silent? He demanded the return of the state to the South...I believe this was the reason for his kidnapping and disappearance." FAILURE OF THE SHI'A LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Amin challenges the Shi'a political leaders -- primarily Hizballah and Amal -- who he claims have paid lip service to the Lebanese state while maintaining their support for an autonomous "resistance" in the South. Throughout the years, claims Amin, the "Shi'a people" have called again and again for the return of the state and army in order to assume sole authority over the South. Specifically, they asked for this following the conflicts with Israel in 1993 and 1996, and then again following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. These calls were all ignored by the Shi'a political leadership. Amin lays particular blame for this on Amal leader Nabih Berri, who he says should have "inherited the line" of Musa al-Sadr, the Amal forefather -- "The popular bases of Amal and the people were calling for the deployment of the army. Why was everyone in the Amal leadership silent?" ¶5. (SBU) Amin further criticizes Berri for ignoring the needs of the South. Referring to the recent day-and-night parliamentary sit-in organized by Berri to protest the Israeli blockade, Amin says in his LBC interview that, "I wish the parliamentary strike had taken place in Sanaya Park (where refugees were camped in central Beirut),so the parliamentarians could sleep with the refugees. Why is Berri in the Parliament? He should come to the South and see the people's problems, their suffering. And he shouldn't come and sleep in a five-star hotel." REINSTATING THE STATE -------------- BEIRUT 00003007 002 OF 003 ¶6. (SBU) Amin expresses doubt regarding the recent post-conflict support shown by Amal and Hizballah for the return of state authority to the South. "What state do they want? If it's the one that was present before 12 July and after 2000, then no, this is not the state that we want." Amin argues that the South must be returned to the "bosom" of the state, whereby the government and army assume sole control over security, national defense, economic affairs, and foreign policy, with the full participation of all communities. Only through this reassertion of government authority -- absent in some places for nearly forty years -- can the South finally enjoy security and stability. THE DANGER OF INDEPENDENT ACTION -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The recent decision by Hizballah to kidnap two Israeli soldiers plunged all of Lebanon into a war for which it was not prepared, argues Amin. He believes that Hizballah should not have the right to take unilateral action as it did on July 12, and that a repeat performance can only be avoided by Hizballah's full submission to state authority. "We will defend our nation. This nation isn't just for you, it's for me and you to defend together. Maybe you chose a path I did not wish to take. The Shi'a are not isolated from the rest of the Lebanese people. They are part of the Lebanese people. No one group from the Shi'a can decide to create a defense or foreign or financial policy for all of the Lebanese." Amin argues that Hizballah should integrate into the Lebanese army, and explicitly supports Fuad Siniora's Seven Points which call for no weapons in Lebanon -- "whether hidden or not" -- other than those of the Lebanese army, though Amin also lends his full support to the UNIFIL mission, since it is in the interests of strengthening state control. COSTS OF THE JULY WAR -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Claiming that there is a "large, silent majority" of Shi'a who oppose Hizballah's decision to kidnap the two Israeli soldiers, which he dubs the "most expensive prisoner exchange ever", Amin lays bare Hizballahi propaganda about the conflict. This was not a war for Lebanon, Amin argues, but was merely a case of Lebanon being used and abused for the benefit of other powers. In this case, Iran reaped the main benefit since it could show to the world its regional muscle and press for diplomatic negotiations over its nuclear file. Amin says that Lebanon should never be forced into a war with Israel on its own for the sake of the Arab cause. "We know that this war was not a war of popular liberation," claims Amin in his al-Arabiyya interview, "This was a war of armies, as was evidenced by the types of weapons used. It is not possible for Lebanon to undertake this type of war on its own, but it requires a comprehensive Arab strategy of confrontation of which Lebanon is only a part. If the Arabs are not prepared to confront, though, then should Lebanon on its own bear the responsibility of this confrontation? That which is required of the whole can not be undertaken by a part." ¶9. (SBU) Amin also denies that Hizballah won a "victory" in the last war, as Nasrallah is so fond of repeating. He acknowledges that Hizballah evidenced courage and steadfastness, but adds that "courage is not sufficient to claim victory. We must compare the price paid for what was gained." Nor was it enough simply to fight for "dignity" -- as Nasrallah also tried to claim -- when people were forced to sleep in schools and parks, their houses were reduced to rubble, their land reoccupied, and their blood spilled. "All this about dignity and dignity!" exclaimed an angry Amin in his LBC interview, "What is this dignity?! After all that we have suffered, what have we reaped? Money (referring to post conflict Hizballah handouts)?! Does he buy these sufferings with money?" OTHER VIEWS ON POLITICS -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Politically, Amin does not call for a "third way" BEIRUT 00003007 003 OF 003 that challenges Hizballah and Berri's control over Shi'a political life. He argues that, with the extension of Lebanese government control over the South, there will be a multiplicity of opinions. He does not call for the formation of an Iranian-style Wilayet el-Faqih in Lebanon, and fully supports the Siniora government, saying that it "comes within the framework of the Ta'if Accord." He is also against reinitiating the "National Dialogue" since, yet again, he argues that power and decision-making should be consolidated in the hands of the state alone. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Our March 14 contacts -- including Saad Hariri, Marwan Hamadeh, and Walid Jumblatt -- tell us that they have made contact with Amin, and are helping to broadcast his message (such as the al-Arabiyya interview). While we would certainly want to meet with the Mufti to discuss his ideas more, we have been advised -- and ourselves agree -- that for him to meet with representatives of the USG right now would give his enemies ammunition to use against him. Our political contacts have heard that Amin is already being banned from participating in funerals in Tyre and other areas. Furthermore, two days following Amin's appearance on LBC, Hizballah's al-Manar TV reported (falsely) that the Ambassador had requested a list of Shi'a opposed to Amal and Hizballah in order to meet with them and propagate their ideas. As is clear though, Ali al-Amin does not need any help. FELTMAN