Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2910
2006-09-08 14:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

UK PROPOSES CHAIRING SECURITY COORDINATION UNIT IN

Tags:  PARM PREL EAID PGOV LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHLB #2910/01 2511442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081442Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5488
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0255
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002910 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR PM, NEA, AND INL;
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2026
TAGS: PARM PREL EAID PGOV LE
SUBJECT: UK PROPOSES CHAIRING SECURITY COORDINATION UNIT IN
PM SINIORA'S OFFICE


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002910

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR PM, NEA, AND INL;
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2026
TAGS: PARM PREL EAID PGOV LE
SUBJECT: UK PROPOSES CHAIRING SECURITY COORDINATION UNIT IN
PM SINIORA'S OFFICE


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C/NF) In a 9/6 meeting with the Ambasador and DATT, UK
Ambassador James Watt and British Brigidier General Andrew D.
Mackay accurately described a problem faced by donors wishing
to help the Lebanese security services: No one is in charge
of coordinating requests or trying to match offers with
needs. Various political and security officials peddle
competing lists of desired equipment, spare parts, and
ammunition. McKay claims that he has the backing of PM
Siniora and Defense Minister Murr to set up and head a UK-led
unit within the PM's office and that would include officers
from both the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal
Security Forces (ISF). This unit would both coordinate
assistance and promote security sector reform. It would not,
Mackay insists, be a layer inserted between the security
services and bilateral donors, and it would refrain from
dealing with sensitive intelligence matters. Mackay
emphasized the benign-looking UK face of this coordination
unit in its initial stage, and we concur that this unit,
under UK leadership, is both welcome and consistent with our
own practice of allowing the UK to lead on security sector
reform. But we are less enamored with what happens next:
Mackay estimates that after 2-3 months, a European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDH) lead would replace the UK.
According to Mackay, the ESDH lead is essential to freeing up
EU resources for security sector reform. Mackay noted that
he will be circulating his ideas in Washington on Monday,
9/11. End summary and comment.

NO CENTRAL LEBANESE COORDINATION
IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, ASSISTANCE
--------------


2. (C/NF) Mackay and Watt reviewed territory familiar to
all of us who have worked in security sector assistance and
reform: various Lebanese players have different ideas about

what is needed or desired, and they find different advisors
and experts willing to reinforce their inclinations. Thus,
while the U.S. and UK coordinated closely with the LAF on a
comprehensive list of priorities for equipment, spare parts,
and ammunition, this coordinated list is not the only one
being shopped around for the LAF. The situation with the ISF
(national police) is even less clear. Potential donors have
their own buraucratic requirements, ideas and desires, and no
one is working full time to match offers with requirements.

SINIORA, MURR ENDORSE UK IDEA
OF SETTING UP COORDINATION UNIT
--------------


3. (C/NF) Mackay said that he had received an enthusiastic
endorsement from both PM Siniora and Deputy PM/Defense
Minister Murr to establish a coordination unit within the
Prime Minister's office in the Grand Serail. This unit would
promote security sector reform, coordinate lists of
requirements consistent with security sector reform goals,
and help make the connections between donors and needs.
Mackay himself would head the unit and be assisted by other
UK military and civilian staff. Officers from the LAF and
ISF would be seconded to this unit, to ensure the connection
between the unit and the security services. With the British
Embassy next door to the Grand Serail, the UK staff of the
coordination unit would rely on the Embassy for secure
communications. Force protection concerns are addressed
largely by the extensive security around the Grand Serail.


4. (C/NF) Answering a question from the Ambassador, Mackay
emphasized that the unit does not intend to replace the
existing bilateral communication between donors and the LAF
and ISF. He would not, for example, presume to insert
himself as a layer between the Embassy's active ODC and DATT
and the LAF. But he would provide a service to all
contributors in making sure that what the LAF and ISF were
both requesting and receiving made sense and supported our
collective goal of security sector reform. In addition,
Mackay emphasized that the unit would not be involved in any
intelligence matters. Assistance and cooperation in the
intelligence field will be handled separately and
bilaterally, he said.


BEIRUT 00002910 002 OF 002


BUT UK LEAD TO BE REPLACED
BY ESDP MISSION IN 2-3 MONTHS
--------------


5. (C/NF) For the European countries, Mackay said, it is
important that the EU be involved. In his consultations,
French and Italian officials emphasized the need for a
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) mission. An ESDP
role ensures that EU funds toward security sector reform will
flow, Mackay said. Thus, he anticipates that, after two to
three months, he and his UK team would depart Lebanon,
turning over the unit to an ESDP mission. Mackay said that
part of his task would be to set up the proper terms of
reference for the unit so that it would meet the needs of
non-EU donors even after the UK left.


6. (C/NF) In responding, the Ambassador and DATT agreed
with the UK description of the problem. They also noted
that, for political reasons, the U.S. has for more than a
year supported a UK lead on security sector reform issues and
remains satisified with U.S.-UK cooperation on security
sector reform. Thus, having a UK-led coordination unit
within the PM's office seemed a sensible approach. But both
the Ambassador and DATT expressed reservations about the
eventual transfer of the unit to an ESDP mission. While the
French have been constructive partners on the political track
in Lebanon, the French have been far less forthcoming on
security sector cooperation. The Ambassador asked whether
there wasn't a danger that the French would simply use the
ESDP mission to promote purely French aims, using access and
EU resources to do so. Watt agreed that there would have to
be some kind of understanding to ensure that a "Mad Gallic
takeover" didn't occur when the ESDP stepped in. The DATT
suggested that, after the proposed UK transition to the ESDP
mission, perhaps the unit could concentrate largely on
assistance to the ISF, since that seemed to be where EU
resources would go anyway. That way, traditional donors to
the LAF could continue to work bilaterally.


7. (C/NF) Mackay noted that he would travel to Washington
for meetings next week. He said that his primary
interlocutor is PM DAS Michael Coulter and will attend an
interagency security assistance wroking group meeting.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C/NF) Despite the tight working relationship we have
with the French Embassy on political matters, we have found
working with the French on security sector issues here to be
exasperating. On security assistance, the French are opaque.
We believe that this Gallic elusiveness is due in part to
French commercial jealousies and in part to the fact that
their aid to the LAF is far lower than would be comensurate
with the leadership role they purport to play. With the UK,
by contrast, we have fewer political dealings (given that the
UK profile is far lower here) but extremely close cooperation
on security sector reform and assistance. Mackay is well
respected and well informed. As long as the coordination
unit is under a UK lead, we are certain that the unit Mackay
proposes will play a useful role. (The French, in fact, told
Mackay separately that they will not hinder his mission but
neither will they support it.) But, given our suspicions
that the French will try to harnass EU money for their own
ends, we are far less comfortable with the idea that this
unit would transform into a ESDP mission. Admittedly, in
Lebanon, we have little experience with an ESDP mission and
look to Washington and others for guidance. Ultimately,
given the size of the proposed USG contributions to the LAF
and the ISF, the GOL is unlikely to ignore us. Thus, if we
do not like what Mackay's unit becomes, we can always opt
out. So we suggest supporting Mackay's idea for now, while
reserving judgment on what happens once/if ESDP takes over.
Perhaps by the time Mackay bows out, the GOL, too, will be
exercising a more effective lead than is currently the case.
FELTMAN