LEBANON: ARMENIAN PATRIARCH ADVISES INDIRECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002831

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ARMENIAN PATRIARCH ADVISES INDIRECT
APPROACH TO SYRIA

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Armenian Patriarch Catholicos Aram I suggested that
now was an opportune time to pull Syria from the Iranian
orbit. He recognized the perfidious nature of the Asad
regime and the considerable role it played in the shipment of
arms to Hizballah, but the senior cleric also argued that
Bashar Asad must realize his best chance for survival rests
with Syria rejoining the Arab world. Concerned that a U.S.
approach would be misread by the Lebanese as an attempt to
"sell out" Lebanon, the Patriarch believed that an indirect
approach, through either Saudi Arabia or Egypt, stood the
best chance of convincing President Asad that if he remained
under the control of Tehran, Syria would have little leverage
in the significant regional changes that are beginning to be
discussed in the wake of the just-suspended Lebanon war. End
summary.


2. (U) The Armenian Patriarch met the Ambassador and poloff
at his summer residence in Bikfayya on August 30. Patriarch
Aram indicated he is planning to visit the U.S. in early
December to attend conferences at Notre Dame University and
in the Washington area. The Patriarch said he had been
intensively engaged with Lebanon's other religious leaders
during the recent hostilities, particularly with Maronite
Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, Sunni Grand Mufti Mohammad Qabbani
and Acting Chairman of the Higher Islamic Shia Council Abdel
Amir Qabalan.

RESCUING SYRIA FROM "PERSIA"
--------------


3. (C) The senior cleric to the region's influential
Armenian community (most of whom in Lebanon are Orthodox,
falling into Aram I's community) said that Hizballah remains
the primary threat to Lebanon's stability. Describing
Hizballah as an organization that is Lebanese in form, but
not in "essence," Patriarch Aram argued that the recent war
has had far-reaching regional consequences, not the least of
which is Iran's growing capacity to intimidate the region's
moderate regimes. Patriarch Aram said one possible strategy
to thwart Iranian ambitions was to somehow pull Syria out of
its orbit and return the country to its natural position as a
key Arab state.


4. (C) The cleric said he had no illusions about the
duplicitous character of Bashar Asad, but said the real
challenge was the tight inner circle surrounding the
"inexperienced and not very impressive young leader" who were
convinced that only by lashing Syria to an "ascendant" Iran
could the Allawite regime survive. Declaring that Bashar's
father, Hafez Asad, would never have fallen into this
"Iranian trap," Aram expressed his belief that by careful
"indirect" diplomacy, Syria could be persuaded to rejoin its
Arab brethren.

BASHAR'S POOR JUDGMENT
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5. (C) The Patriarch said all of Bashar's political
calculations revolve around his survival, but Aram, who based
his opinions on numerous interactions with the Syrian
president, also said that Bashar is a consistently poor judge
of international developments and their implications. Aram
understood that neither the U.S. nor the EU could approach
Syria at this time, but he asked the Ambassador whether it
might not be an auspicious time for a moderate Arab regime to
engage the Syrians and explain the long-term consequences of
their ill-advised interference in Lebanon and close alliance
with the unstable Ahmedijihad.


6. (C) When asked if such discussions might be
misinterpreted in Lebanon as proof of the popular conspiracy
theory that some type of deal would be cut with Syria to the
serious detriment of Lebanon, the Patriarch admitted it was a
grave danger, especially given the current anxious state of
the Lebanese people. But he asked what was the alternative.
He concluded, in thinking about the Lebanese paranoia of
being "sold out" to Syria, that it would be best for the U.S.
to avoid an approach to Syria but to use intermediaries.

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7. (C) If, as he said, the underlying cause of the most
recent conflict lay in the long-unresolved Middle East peace
process, the Patriarch argued it was essential to bring Syria
in out of the cold. He continued his thesis by pointing out
that "Persian" Iran had no real interest in the Syrian regime
and was simply exploiting its maladroitness in managing its
foreign affairs. If the more sympathetic regimes of Saudi
Arabia and Egypt could persuade Bashar that he might fare
better with his Arab brothers, not only would Hizballah lose
its easiest means of resupply, it would also give Syria one
more chance to play a constructive regional role. Aram,
whose church has a significant following in Syria, said it
was risk worth pursuing.


8. (C) Regarding the immediate future of Hizballah, the
Patriarch said he sadly agrees that if the organization is
able to re-arm itself, another round of hostilities with
Israel was almost inevitable. The Patriarch confided that he
could never say so in public, but admitted he fully
understood the Israeli reaction on July 12. The cleric was
also convinced that Israel, despite the costs and its current
internal debate over the conduct of the war, would likely act
in the same manner if Hizballah attacked again.

OPTIONS FOR HIZBALLAH
--------------


9. (C) The Patriarch spoke conceptually about what might
happen if Hizballah was finally forced to decide whether it
was truly Lebanese or not. Aram said the organization's
militia may try to merge its fighters into the Lebanese army,
but he felt that would be disastrous for the still unsteady
LAF. It would also disrupt the confessional balance within
the LAF, which heretofore has not had divisions drawn
exclusively from one sect. A second option, which he
admitted was unlikely, was that Hassan Nasrallah might
actually shift the organization's focus to act as a purely
political force. Much more likely, he concluded, Hizballah
would keep its militia as a "non-functioning" force,
primarily to maintain its still-valuable reputation as the
country's "heroic resistance." This transformation, of
course, was dependent on current efforts to prevent it from
being re-armed with heavy weaponry. The cleric indicated
this last option was the most preferred and fed into
Hizballah's fierce repudiation of any effort to "disarm" its
militia, a term that Aram suggested should be avoided.

THE PALACE VERSUS THE STREET
--------------


10. (C) Lastly, the Armenian religious leader advised the
U.S. to turn its attention from "the palace to the street."
Aram said it was his opinion that the Arab street really felt
no fundamental antipathy toward America, but believed the
U.S. was only interested in the regimes, most of whom,
according to the Patriarch, suffer a serious "legitimacy
deficit." The cleric maintained that most Arab regimes were
perceived by their citizens to be corrupt, unresponsive, and
unrepresentative. Although he did not offer specifics,
Patriarch Aram urged the U.S. to dedicate increased resources
to the people of the region, rather than its leaders.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Despite his musings regarding a dialogue with
Syria, Aram I is no fan of Syria and was one of those who
applauded the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon last
year. He can barely conceal his disdain for President Emile
Lahoud (despite the fact that Lahoud's mother was Armenian
and that he is married to an Armenian). Aram's relations
with the Tashnag party, Lebanon's largest Armenian political
faction, are scratchy, too, because of the Tashnag's fealty
to Lahoud and alliance with Michel Aoun: the Tashnag's one
Member of Parliament was elected on Aoun's list. (As an
aside, Aram I told us that he is telling the Tashnag to be no
part of Aoun's attempt to overthrow Prime Minister Siniora,
whom Aram I described as an excellent PM.) What struck us
most about this meeting with Aram I, however, was not what he
said but what he didn't raise: Turkey's participation in
UNIFIL. While other Armenians in Lebanon (including the
Tashnag) express deep hostility to Turkey's involvement here,

BEIRUT 00002831 003 OF 003


the senior Armenian cleric, in a meeting that lasted over an
hour and touched on many topics, did not raise it.
FELTMAN