LEBANON: ARMENIAN PATRIARCH ADVISES INDIRECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002831 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016 TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: ARMENIAN PATRIARCH ADVISES INDIRECT APPROACH TO SYRIA Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Armenian Patriarch Catholicos Aram I suggested that now was an opportune time to pull Syria from the Iranian orbit. He recognized the perfidious nature of the Asad regime and the considerable role it played in the shipment of arms to Hizballah, but the senior cleric also argued that Bashar Asad must realize his best chance for survival rests with Syria rejoining the Arab world. Concerned that a U.S. approach would be misread by the Lebanese as an attempt to "sell out" Lebanon, the Patriarch believed that an indirect approach, through either Saudi Arabia or Egypt, stood the best chance of convincing President Asad that if he remained under the control of Tehran, Syria would have little leverage in the significant regional changes that are beginning to be discussed in the wake of the just-suspended Lebanon war. End summary. ¶2. (U) The Armenian Patriarch met the Ambassador and poloff at his summer residence in Bikfayya on August 30. Patriarch Aram indicated he is planning to visit the U.S. in early December to attend conferences at Notre Dame University and in the Washington area. The Patriarch said he had been intensively engaged with Lebanon's other religious leaders during the recent hostilities, particularly with Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, Sunni Grand Mufti Mohammad Qabbani and Acting Chairman of the Higher Islamic Shia Council Abdel Amir Qabalan. RESCUING SYRIA FROM "PERSIA" -------------- ¶3. (C) The senior cleric to the region's influential Armenian community (most of whom in Lebanon are Orthodox, falling into Aram I's community) said that Hizballah remains the primary threat to Lebanon's stability. Describing Hizballah as an organization that is Lebanese in form, but not in "essence," Patriarch Aram argued that the recent war has had far-reaching regional consequences, not the least of which is Iran's growing capacity to intimidate the region's moderate regimes. Patriarch Aram said one possible strategy to thwart Iranian ambitions was to somehow pull Syria out of its orbit and return the country to its natural position as a key Arab state. ¶4. (C) The cleric said he had no illusions about the duplicitous character of Bashar Asad, but said the real challenge was the tight inner circle surrounding the "inexperienced and not very impressive young leader" who were convinced that only by lashing Syria to an "ascendant" Iran could the Allawite regime survive. Declaring that Bashar's father, Hafez Asad, would never have fallen into this "Iranian trap," Aram expressed his belief that by careful "indirect" diplomacy, Syria could be persuaded to rejoin its Arab brethren. BASHAR'S POOR JUDGMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) The Patriarch said all of Bashar's political calculations revolve around his survival, but Aram, who based his opinions on numerous interactions with the Syrian president, also said that Bashar is a consistently poor judge of international developments and their implications. Aram understood that neither the U.S. nor the EU could approach Syria at this time, but he asked the Ambassador whether it might not be an auspicious time for a moderate Arab regime to engage the Syrians and explain the long-term consequences of their ill-advised interference in Lebanon and close alliance with the unstable Ahmedijihad. ¶6. (C) When asked if such discussions might be misinterpreted in Lebanon as proof of the popular conspiracy theory that some type of deal would be cut with Syria to the serious detriment of Lebanon, the Patriarch admitted it was a grave danger, especially given the current anxious state of the Lebanese people. But he asked what was the alternative. He concluded, in thinking about the Lebanese paranoia of being "sold out" to Syria, that it would be best for the U.S. to avoid an approach to Syria but to use intermediaries. BEIRUT 00002831 002 OF 003 ¶7. (C) If, as he said, the underlying cause of the most recent conflict lay in the long-unresolved Middle East peace process, the Patriarch argued it was essential to bring Syria in out of the cold. He continued his thesis by pointing out that "Persian" Iran had no real interest in the Syrian regime and was simply exploiting its maladroitness in managing its foreign affairs. If the more sympathetic regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt could persuade Bashar that he might fare better with his Arab brothers, not only would Hizballah lose its easiest means of resupply, it would also give Syria one more chance to play a constructive regional role. Aram, whose church has a significant following in Syria, said it was risk worth pursuing. ¶8. (C) Regarding the immediate future of Hizballah, the Patriarch said he sadly agrees that if the organization is able to re-arm itself, another round of hostilities with Israel was almost inevitable. The Patriarch confided that he could never say so in public, but admitted he fully understood the Israeli reaction on July 12. The cleric was also convinced that Israel, despite the costs and its current internal debate over the conduct of the war, would likely act in the same manner if Hizballah attacked again. OPTIONS FOR HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶9. (C) The Patriarch spoke conceptually about what might happen if Hizballah was finally forced to decide whether it was truly Lebanese or not. Aram said the organization's militia may try to merge its fighters into the Lebanese army, but he felt that would be disastrous for the still unsteady LAF. It would also disrupt the confessional balance within the LAF, which heretofore has not had divisions drawn exclusively from one sect. A second option, which he admitted was unlikely, was that Hassan Nasrallah might actually shift the organization's focus to act as a purely political force. Much more likely, he concluded, Hizballah would keep its militia as a "non-functioning" force, primarily to maintain its still-valuable reputation as the country's "heroic resistance." This transformation, of course, was dependent on current efforts to prevent it from being re-armed with heavy weaponry. The cleric indicated this last option was the most preferred and fed into Hizballah's fierce repudiation of any effort to "disarm" its militia, a term that Aram suggested should be avoided. THE PALACE VERSUS THE STREET -------------- ¶10. (C) Lastly, the Armenian religious leader advised the U.S. to turn its attention from "the palace to the street." Aram said it was his opinion that the Arab street really felt no fundamental antipathy toward America, but believed the U.S. was only interested in the regimes, most of whom, according to the Patriarch, suffer a serious "legitimacy deficit." The cleric maintained that most Arab regimes were perceived by their citizens to be corrupt, unresponsive, and unrepresentative. Although he did not offer specifics, Patriarch Aram urged the U.S. to dedicate increased resources to the people of the region, rather than its leaders. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Despite his musings regarding a dialogue with Syria, Aram I is no fan of Syria and was one of those who applauded the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon last year. He can barely conceal his disdain for President Emile Lahoud (despite the fact that Lahoud's mother was Armenian and that he is married to an Armenian). Aram's relations with the Tashnag party, Lebanon's largest Armenian political faction, are scratchy, too, because of the Tashnag's fealty to Lahoud and alliance with Michel Aoun: the Tashnag's one Member of Parliament was elected on Aoun's list. (As an aside, Aram I told us that he is telling the Tashnag to be no part of Aoun's attempt to overthrow Prime Minister Siniora, whom Aram I described as an excellent PM.) What struck us most about this meeting with Aram I, however, was not what he said but what he didn't raise: Turkey's participation in UNIFIL. While other Armenians in Lebanon (including the Tashnag) express deep hostility to Turkey's involvement here, BEIRUT 00002831 003 OF 003 the senior Armenian cleric, in a meeting that lasted over an hour and touched on many topics, did not raise it. FELTMAN