MGLE01: WASHINGTON-BOUND JUMBLATT REACHING OUT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000281 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH LONDON FOR TSOU PARIS FOR ZEYA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL LE SY SA SUBJECT: MGLE01: WASHINGTON-BOUND JUMBLATT REACHING OUT TO AOUN, WAITING FOR SA'AD HARIRI TO RETURN REF: BEIRUT 241 BEIRUT 00000281 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a 1/28 meeting, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt described his efforts to find a candidate for an upcoming parliamentary by-election on which both his "March 14" allies and Michel Aoun can agree. He reiterated his belief that Sa'ad Hariri needs to return to Lebanon, but not before soothing the feelings of the "annoyed" Saudi leadership (which maintains a stranglehold on Hariri finances). Seeing Hizballah content to maintain a "balance of terror" against the March 14 forces, he described Prime Minister Siniora's strategy for bringing boycotting Shi'a ministers back to the cabinet as ill-advised, and said Siniora's proposed memorandum of understanding with those ministers takes the country "back to square one." He warned us of a new disinformation campaign against the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC),and described his plans to visit Washington in early March. End summary. DEALING WITH AOUN ON THE BAABDA-ALEY RACE -------------- ¶2. (S) Called on by the Ambassador and emboff at his residence in Moukhtara on January 28, Walid Jumblatt said he would try to seek a compromise candidate between the Aoun and March 14 forces to fill the late Edmond Na'eem's seat in a parliamentary by-election for the Ba'abda-Aley district. The question was: would Aoun agree to one? Jumblatt expected Aoun to oppose newscaster and assassination attempt survivor May Chidiac as a candidate, since she was the nominee of Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja'. Liberal Party leader Dory Chamoun -- son of President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958) and the other announced contender for the seat -- "won't get many votes," Jumblatt said. ¶3. (S) Even though two "March 14" candidates with no chance of getting Aoun's support -- Chidiac and Chamoun -- were already in the race, there was still a chance of finding a consensus candidate, according to Jumblatt. Former Beirut Bar Association head Shakib Qortbawi, "a patriot," fit the bill. Former MP Salah Honein (whom Jumblatt unceremoniously dumped from his candidate list in the 2005 parliamentary elections in order to make room for Lebanese Forces candidates) was also good, but Jumblatt doubted that Aoun would accept him. Jumblatt was not enthusiastic about former MP Pierre Dakkash (whom Aoun described as a possible compromise candidate in a January 29 television interview). The problem was that Aoun would reject even Qortbawi's candidacy if it were Jumblatt's initiative. The trick would be to get Qortbawi nominated by Aoun's side, Jumblatt suggested. ¶4. (S) Failing a compromise candidate, the outlook was not promising. If the March 14 and Aounist forces ran opposing candidates, "this time the Shi'ites will be massively against us while the Christian vote will be divided." In addition, the election would be cast as a struggle between Jumblatt and Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah -- one which, given Hizballah's ability to tip the balance in a district roughly evenly divided among Shi'a Muslims, Christians, and Druze -- Jumblatt and the "March 14" forces would humiliatingly lose. ¶5. (S) To avoid this possibility, it would be worth it to "sell Aoun one more MP" in Ba'abda-Aley if Aoun and the March 14 side could agree on a common candidate. Aoun was being as difficult as ever, however: "nothing embarrasses him!" Jumblatt continued, "Suddenly (Aoun) decided to forget about (UNSCR) 1559, suddenly he decided to support foreign hostage taking!" (Note: Jumblatt was referring to unguarded comments Aoun made on New TV that seemed to justify Hizballah's taking of hostages in the 1980s. End note.) Even so, the March 14 forces would continue to try to work with him. "We will be sending him a message" soon, he said. Aoun's real problem in the March 14 forces was with Samir Ja'ja'. Personal relations between Aoun and Ja'ja' were bad, and there was tension on the ground between the rank-and-file of Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement and that of Ja'ja''s Lebanese Forces. BEIRUT 00000281 002.2 OF 004 ¶6. (S) Aoun's current insistence on dialogue and consensus on all issues threatened to bring the political process to a halt for "years," Jumblatt said. Even so, Jumblatt admitted, Aoun "has a point" in his criticism of the Siniora government's handling of certain recent high-level appointments in the Interior Ministry, all of which had gone to Hariri-oriented Sunni Muslims. SA'AD HARIRI AND THE SAUDIS -------------- ¶7. (S) Jumblatt thought it important that Sa'ad Hariri reach out to Aoun in person. Even more important, however, was that Hariri use his connections to placate a Saudi leadership that was "annoyed" by the demise of its most recent (comment: and unhelpful) attempt to mediate between Lebanon and Syria. The Saudis were "panicked," and that explained their attempt to broker an understanding between Syria and Lebanon on Syrian terms. "They're terribly rich, and afraid," Jumblatt said of the Saudi leadership. The Saudi ambassador in Lebanon, a key player in the mediation process who outraged Siniora and the March 14 forces with a well-publicized call on the disgraced President Lahoud January 24, appeared to be "listening too much to Nasrallah." ¶8. (S) Jumblatt said Hariri had called him the night before from Washington (January 27) to say that his meeting with President Bush had been "excellent." "I said 'okay,'" Jumblatt recalled, "'but don't forget about King Abdullah.'" Until Hariri soothed Saudi feelings, he would continue to be "squeezed" by the Kingdom, which -- by Jumblatt's account -- owed Hariri something in the range of USD 4 billion. ¶9. (S) Jumblatt expressed frustration with Sa'ad Hariri's continuing absence from Lebanon. Hariri had given no indication of when he might return, and time was running out to make plans for February 14, the first anniversary of his father Rafiq Hariri's assassination. Were Sa'ad Hariri in Lebanon by February 14, it would be appropriate to stage a massive rally on that day. With him absent, it was not clear how to commemorate the event. ¶10. (S) Hariri's presence was essential to keep the Sunni community firmly in the "March 14" camp. "I can't replace him" in that capacity, Jumblatt noted. It would also allow him to put some direction back into the political party founded by Sa'ad's father Rafiq, the Future Current, which is now "completely disorganized." It would also allow him to use his family's financial resources more effectively. For example, Hariri could spend the money he would otherwise pay "staying a week at the Athenee" -- the exclusive Paris hotel that has become something of an alternate "March 14" headquarters -- in politically useful patronage in Lebanon's remote, impoverished, predominantly Sunni Akkar region, Jumblatt said. CABINET CRISIS AND HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶11. (S) The Ambassador described as seriously flawed and dangerous the draft memorandum of understanding, described in previous reporting, that Prime Minister Siniora hopes will make possible the return of the cabinet's Hizballah- and Amal Movement-aligned Shi'a ministers and so end the cabinet crisis. The paper, as currently drafted, states that Hizballah is not a militia (and therefore not subject to UNSCR 1559's requirement to disarm). In which case, Jumblatt said, "we're back to square one." The fact that Siniora continued to offer this concession to Hizballah suggested that he was "badly advised," Jumblatt added. ¶12. (S) Jumblatt described Hizballah as maintaining a "balance of terror," and sending a message to the March 14 forces along the lines of "we're here, we have a state within a state, go to hell." He saw Speaker of Parliament and Amal Movement leader Nabih Berri taking a position in favor of "reshuffling" the 1989 Ta'if Agreement in a way that would require consensus for practically any cabinet decision of consequence. "If you want to have a cup of coffee, we need consensus," said Jumblatt, describing the extreme to which Berri seemed to be going. Jumblatt said he was not in contact with Berri, and wondered why Berri felt compelled to meet Iranian President Ahmadinejad during Ahmadinejad's BEIRUT 00000281 003.2 OF 004 recent visit to Damascus. ¶13. (S) On Nasrallah, Jumblatt asked, "How can (he) be a Lebanese leader with this link to the extreme left wing in Tehran?" Hizballah would only grow stronger with the consolidation of a "Shi'ite empire" ranging from Afghanistan to Lebanon. Dealing with Hizballah effectively, in his view, required a regional strategy. "We need to work on Najaf," he said, referring to the center of Shi'a learning in Iraq. In addition, it was necessary to "cut the Syrian link" that gave Hizballah geographic continuity, following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, with Iran. LATEST "TRICKS" -------------- ¶14. (S) Jumblatt warned that there was "a new trick" being used to derail the UN investigation of Rafiq Hariri's assassination. An apparent disinformation effort was taking the form of a "fishy story" picked by a daily "as-Safir" writer close to "renegade Druze" leader (and Jumblatt enemy) Wi'am Wahhab. The story referred to a Palestinian currently living in Sweden who was allegedly involved in the Hariri assassination. On the presumption that this person is an Israeli agent, SARG apologists would use the story to "prove" that -- contrary to the UNIIIC's conclusions to date -- Hariri had in fact been killed by Israel's Mossad. This character would become "a new Hossam Hossam," claimed Jumblatt, referring to the UNIIIC witness whose recanting of his testimony was showcased by SARG officials in an attempt to discredit the investigation. ¶15. (S) Jumblatt claimed that, in the meantime, the SARG was distributing weapons in Lebanon. Some of them had reportedly wound up in the hands of the Druze community's distant-number-two hereditary leader, "Prince" Talal Arslan. Asked how much of a popular following his rival, Arslan, had, Jumblatt answered: "enough to create some trouble." JUMBLATT ON HAMAS ELECCTION IMPACT -------------- ¶16. (S) Jumblatt worried that the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections would "radicalize" the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. If Iran were to become more active in financing certain Palestinian factions in the Lebanese camps, it would "create a big problem," he said. As it was, Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) had reinforced its based in Na'ameh, on the coast between Beirut and Sidon. In addition, a suspiciously large number of Syrian "workers" -- 800, Jumblatt claimed -- were based in a factory near Na'ameh, perhaps kept there in reserve in case Lebanese authorities attempted to disarm the Na'ameh base. WASHINGTON VISIT -------------- ¶17. (S) Jumblatt said that he would visit Washington during the first week of March for private speaking engagements, and would be available for meetings with USG officials from March 6 onward. He would see if his longtime political ally, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, would be able to travel with him. In any event, Jumblatt planned to depart Beirut for Paris, where he would spend a few days before departing from there for Washington. He was also considering stopping in London and Cairo on his return trip, having received an invitation to visit the UK from British Ambassador James Watt. He mused about stopping by Saudi Arabia as well, to help Lebanon make amends with the Saudi royal family. COMMENT -------------- ¶18. (S) As we have maintained in previous reporting, Prime Minister Siniora's proposed memorandum of understanding with his boycotting Shi'a ministers would be a disaster if agreed upon. It would immediately put the GOL in non-compliance with UNSCR 1559 while seemingly placing a GOL stamp of approval on any cross-border actions that Hizballah undertakes in the future. At the same time, it would do nothing to prevent the Hizballah- and Amal Movement-aligned ministers from walking out and pulling the rug out from BEIRUT 00000281 004.2 OF 004 Siniora yet again. The most optimistic scenario would have the memorandum, if agreed upon, quickly forgotten, like the cabinet's summer 2005 policy statement, which similarly offered an open-ended endorsement of Hizballah. At the very least, the Siniora government should try to extract as high a price as possible from Hizballah and Amal in return. Siniora needs to take another look at his bargaining position, to see how he can get Hizballah-Amal concessions on issues such as support for reform, credible appointments of senior personnel in the security sector, and removal of Lebanon's Hizballah apologist ambassador to the United States. But, at this writing, we do not believe that Siniora has any support for his approach. Not only is Walid Jumblatt, a key ally, opposed, but so are the Christians. Over lunch with the Ambassador on 1/29, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja' noted that he, like Jumblatt, will not agree to Siniora's memorandum. FELTMAN