LEBANON: CODEL LANTOS CAUTIONS PM SINIORA THAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002776 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2016 TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: CODEL LANTOS CAUTIONS PM SINIORA THAT GOL ALSO HAS RESPONSIBILITIES Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) When PM Siniora asked for U.S. assistance in lifting Israel's air and sea blockade of Lebanon, Congressman Lantos directly challenged the Prime Minister to explain what his government was doing to ensure the secure border provisions of UNSCR 1701 were being fully implemented. Rep. Lantos used Siniora's argument that the LAF needed robust security assistance to improve its capabilities as irrefutable evidence that Lebanon's army alone could not secure the Syrian-Lebanese land border, and capable international forces were required along that border, at least until the army able to perform that critical mission. In response to PM Siniora's suggestion that the recent conflict could provide an opportunity for a comprehensive Middle East peace effort, Rep. Lantos strongly demurred, stating that his long experience in dealing with Syria's Bashar Assad, as well as his father Hafez Assad, convinced him that neither Assad nor Iran's Ahmedijihad were sincerely interested in such a process. Rep. Lantos advised PM Siniora that "painful and difficult intermediate steps" were necessary before Lebanon and the international community could realistically entertain such a proposal. A similar cautionary message was delivered to the Lebanese press, as well as Minister of Economy and Trade Sami Haddad in a brief subsequent meeting. End summary. ¶2. (U) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora met with Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) and the Ambassador at the Grand Serail on Saturday afternoon, August 26. Senior GOL advisors Mohammad Chatta and Rola Nouraddine attended the meeting, as did emboff, House International Relations Committee Senior Staffer Alan Makovsky, HIRC Democratic Staffer Michael Beard, and Deputy Staff Director of HIRC Republican Staff Kristen Gilley. Mrs. Tom Lantos also attended the meeting. MUTUAL RESPECT -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Rep. Lantos expressed his admiration for the resilience and fortitude of the Lebanese people during an extraordinarily trying period and conveyed his hope that the Siniora government would be able to take the difficult next steps to ensure the recent war would be the last that Lebanon 
would have to face. Rep. Lantos explained to the Prime Minister his long and close association with Lebanon, dating back to his first trip in 1956 and then again in 1965, when he considered taking the position of President of the American University of Beirut. He also reminded PM Siniora that he was in Lebanon in early 1983, only days before 241 U.S. Marines, sent to Lebanon on an international peacekeeping mission, were murdered by the terrorists who currently comprise Hizballah. ¶4. (C/NF) PM Siniora responded that he and his countrymen deeply appreciated the friendship toward Lebanon that Rep. Lantos and the American people have consistently shown. Siniora spoke of his satisfaction with the response of the international community regarding the formation of the enhanced UNIFIL, which he hoped would begin its deployment within days. Siniora also spoke of his expectation for the possibility for peace and security in the region "beyond Lebanon's borders" and conveyed his anticipation concerning the impending visit to Beirut by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on August 28. A TRAGEDY REPEATED -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) When the Prime Minister stated the Lebanese people wanted a lasting peace that would forever remove the suffering of war from Lebanon, Rep. Lantos interjected that that would only occur if Lebanon was able to secure its borders. Lantos warned that if Iranian and Syrian weapons began to cross the Syrian-Lebanese border once again, it would be only a matter of time before the country was plunged back into conflict, with all the human and material loss that entailed. ¶6. (C/NF) PM Siniora agreed with Rep. Lantos' overall premise, but argued that special circumstances existed in BEIRUT 00002776 002 OF 003 Lebanon that made the issue of secure borders particularly problematic. Siniora said he understood the concern of the international community with arms smuggling to Hizballah, but as Prime Minister of a complex, unwieldy government, he had to proceed within the confines of what was actually feasible. ¶7. (C/NF) When PM Siniora began his exposition (which he has repeated in several other meetings) that if Shebaa Farms could be resolved in a just manner, it would de-legitimatize the arms of Hizballah, Rep. Lantos strongly objected and flatly stated that if the Prime Minister was trying to frame Shebaa as the primary cause of Lebanon's instability, he was not being intellectually honest. A CLASH OF VIEWS -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) PM Siniora pushed back, and declared that, of course, he understood Shebaa was being used by the Iranian/Syrian/Hizballah troika as a means to exert their influence and promote a radical agenda in both Lebanon and the immediate region. For that very reason, Siniora argued, it was necessary to remove the issue from the political arena once and for all. Addressing the Representative's skepticism, Siniora confided that he could care less if the United Nations, whose "temporary' custodianship he favors, holds onto Shebaa for "100 years." Siniora emphatically defended his notion that removal of Israeli troops from the area was the undeniable key to disarming Iran's powerful proxy in Lebanon -- and in the process initiating the decline of Iranian and Syrian influence in the region. ¶9. (C/NF) Siniora, patiently asking for consideration of his proposal, argued that his government was slowly, but steadily, constricting Hizballah's room for maneuver. He maintained that 15,000 troops of the LAF, even if lacking the "desired level of discipline," along with the 10,000 to 15,000 international troops would essentially saturate the former operating area of Hizballah in south Lebanon, leaving the terrorist organization with less and less room to cause mischief. ¶10. (C/NF) Once again, he asked for U.S. assistance in addressing Shebaa, because with it, he argued, he could force Hassan Nasrallah into a position from which he would find it impossible to rationalize his militia and its weaponry. Rep. Lantos reiterated his deep concern that Siniora was depending on developments that experience indicated to him would be foolhardy. The Congressman pressed hard that the only way to constrain Hizballah -- and its Syrian and Iranian masters -- would be to establish a "watertight" secure land border that would deny Hizballah and Presidents Assad and Ahmedijihad the means to once again attack Israel, and in the process destroy Lebanon. ¶11. (C/NF) Rep. Lantos urged PM Siniora to allow the augmented UNIFIL force to fortify the LAF along the entire Syrian-Lebanese land border until such time as an empowered LAF could perform the difficult task on its own. Rep. Lantos said it wasn't enough for "German technology" to be employed along the border, for what good would it do if weapon movements were detected, but the LAF did nothing to actually stop them. Rep. Lantos asked for intellectual honesty with this issue of paramount importance, because if the mission of securing the border failed, warfare would surely break out again -- and Lebanon and its people would suffer an even greater tragedy. OPPORTUNITY OR A DESERT MIRAGE -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) Turning from the issue of secure borders, PM Siniora described his belief that the great losses suffered by both sides in the war, and an apparent renewed international commitment to pursue stability in the region, could well lead to a new comprehensive peace initiative. Siniora argued that Israel must now realize its security depended on acceptance by its neighbors, and not intermittent, but inconclusive, phases of warfare. The Prime Minister asked for U.S. assistance in this endeavor to finally redress long-standing grievances and initiate the process for a comprehensive peace. ¶13. (C/NF) In response, Congressman Lantos explained his BEIRUT 00002776 003 OF 003 many disappointing dealings with despotic regimes, from Syria, to Iran, to North Korea. Whether it was Hafez Assad or his "completely untrustworthy" son Bashar, Rep. Lantos said he was absolutely convinced they did not wish to engage in true peace negotiations. He cautioned the Prime Minister that "many difficult intermediate steps" were necessary before anyone of good will could entertain notions of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Lantos said he deeply regretted the situation, but to proceed on the assumption that either Assad or Ahmedijihad were actually prepared to allow peace and stability to establish itself in the region was merely wishful thinking. ¶14. (C/NF) He strongly advised PM Siniora to stand firm for his democratic and pro-reform principles, and to make the difficult decisions that would allow the international community to effectively assist with the implementation of UNSCR 1701. Rep. Lantos promised the Prime Minister that the U.S. would stand behind it in each area of support -- security, humanitarian and reconstruction -- but it required his government to likewise fulfill its considerable responsibilities. Only in that manner, he emphasized, could Lebanon find peace and prosperity. SIMILAR MESSAGE TO THE ECONOMIC MINISTER -------------- ¶15. (C/NF) In a brief follow-on meeting with Minister of Economy and Trade Sami Haddad, Rep. Lantos listened to the Minister's urgent request for assistance to lift the "incredibly damaging" blockade of Lebanon by IDF forces. As in his discussion with PM Siniora, Rep. Lantos clearly enunciated the responsibilities of the Lebanese government under UNSCR 1701. Lantos unequivocally stated that, although he wished to see the embargo "end tomorrow," the international community was insistent that the country's borders be sealed tight against weapons shipments to Hizballah. Rep. Lantos agreed that Lebanon's army would be the preferred execution agent, but until the LAF was proficient and "so inclined," it was necessary for UNIFIL's soldiers to perform the duties next to their LAF colleagues. ¶16. (C/NF) As in his earlier meeting, Rep. Lantos maintained that Lebanon needed time to regain her balance after decades of Syrian control, a period that had damaged the initiative and capability of its armed forces. The Representative urged Minister Haddad to use his influence not only to reestablish the country's economy, but to convince his political allies that Lebanon needed to address its responsibilities squarely and in a timely manner. Rep. Lantos ended the meeting after about 15 minutes. PRESS CONFERENCE -------------- ¶17. (U) Rep. Lantos put the blame for the just-suspended war squarely on Hizballah. In a straight, factual manner, he reminded the press of the murder of 241 U.S. Marines who had come only to help Lebanon. Rep. Lantos said the tragic loss of life in the current war had to be laid directly at the feet of Hassan Nasrallah's organization, and asked the Lebanese people to ensure that such destruction would never again take place. ¶18. (U) The Representative spoke about the painful lessons the U.S. learned in the aftermath of September 11th, and pointed out what he considers to be a parallel lesson for Lebanon, that the country could ill-afford to lose control of her borders to terrorists. He assured the Lebanese people of America's full and generous support, but reminded them that they too had to play a role and take up the responsibilities of international citizenship. ¶19. (U) CODEL Lantos did not have the opportunity to clear this cable. FELTMAN