LEBANON: FATFAT SEEKS HELP FROM "FRIENDS" TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002725

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER LE SY IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FATFAT SEEKS HELP FROM "FRIENDS" TO
COUNTERACT WEAK PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GOL

Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C/NF) In an uncharacteristically frank discussion with
Ambassador and Staffdel, Acting Minister of Interior Ahmed
Fatfat described the GOL as measurably stronger now than it
was prior to July 12, but public perception has nevertheless
deemed Hizballah the winner. According to Fatfat, lack of
USG support for GOL security services has hindered their
operational effectiveness and has caused a negative public
perception of "friendly" nation support for Lebanon. Fatfat
was pessimistic about the GOL's ability to control its border
with Syria, noting the ease with which large shipments could
transit surreptitiously. Fatfat considers recent events as
giving the region a real opportunity for a lasting peace, but
warned of a rise in violence should progress on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict not come soon. Fatfat also
leveled criticism at Free Patriotic Movement Leader Michel
Aoun for his political alliance with Hizballah. End Summary.


BATTLING PERCEPTIONS
--------------


2. (C/NF) The Ambassador and Senate Foreign Relations Senior
Staffer Puneet Talwar met with Acting Minister of the
Interior Ahmed Fatfat on August 22 to discuss the current
needs and strategic planning of the Ministry's Internal
Security Forces (ISF). Fatfat, who also sits in the Cabinet
as Minister of Youth and Sports, noted that the political
situation in Lebanon is currently divided between perceptions
and realities. The "reality" for Fatfat, is that the GOL is
stronger now than it was prior to July 12th. Fatfat was
unequivocal in his praise for PM Siniora. The March 14th
majority is "holding strong," especially after what Fatfat
called "helpful" speeches by Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah
and Syrian President Bashar al-Asad last week. However,
Fatfat warned that any USG attempt to open a channel with
Syria, even vis-a-vis Hizballah and Iran, would be a mistake
and would harm Lebanon.


3. (C/NF) The "perception" of most Lebanese, from Fatfat's
point of view, is that Hizballah won the war. "The Israelis
are proving this," added Fatfat, through the continuous
Israeli media criticism of the Israeli government. Hizballah
has increased its strength among the Shi'a to the extent
that, "there is really only one party among the Shi'a" for
Fatfat. Fatfat noted that Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah has
made five public speeches since July 12, only one of which
(given immediately before the cessation of hostilities) made
significant mention of the GOL. Fatfat compared Hizballah's
largesse after the cessation of hostilities with that of
Lebanon's "friends," concluding that the international
community and the Lebanese government were ill prepared to
respond. "Hizballah has the money to begin paying
immediately," explained Fatfat, "We (the GOL) have rules to
follow.... It,s not enough just to be popular with the
people."

WHAT THE ISF WANTS
--------------


4. (C/NF) Fatfat cautioned that the Lebanese people have the
impression that the "friends" of Lebanon - the U.S., France
and other Arab nations - did not do enough over the past year
to assist Lebanon and the GOL. Fatfat illustrated his point
by referring to recent manpower increases to the GOL's main
police and security force, the MOI-directed ISF. Fatfat
explained that the ISF had increased in size over the past
year from a force of 13,000 to over 22,000 and has the
mandate to grow to 28,000. Currently, the ISF only has
10,000 machine guns, leaving over half of the ISF unarmed.
The problem, explained Fatfat, is not the lack of men, but a
lack of supplies. Putting it in simple terms, Fatfat called
for USG support and equipment for both the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) and the ISF to increase Lebanon's defensive
capabilities.


5. (C/NF) The ISF's major needs fall into three categories:

BEIRUT 00002725 002 OF 003


weaponry, communications equipment, and vehicles. Fatfat has
previously requested an additional 10,000 AK-47 machine guns
to equip the ISF. The UAE has pledged additional military
support for Lebanon. Qatar recently delivered 100 trucks for
ISF use.


6. (C/NF) Fatfat criticized USG officials he met on his
recent trip to the U.S. for not recognizing the severity of
Iran's interference in Lebanon. Fatfat reported that he told
several USG interlocutors that he estimated Iranian support
for Hizballah at least USD 50 million per month. Fatfat
complained that this figure was scoffed at by his USG
contacts. "They're probably paying more than that per month
now," added Fatfat. Fatfat also noted that he perceived a
resistance in the U.S. Congress to assist Lebanese security
services.


7. (C/NF) Fatfat outlined the responsibilities and success of
the ISF under his direction, including the recent takeover by
the ISF, from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),for security
at the airport (via ISF chairmanship of a new airport
security committee). Clearly proud of the ISF's cooperation
with the FBI, Fatfat mentioned the MOI's antiterrorism
successes, including ISF intelligence used to foil a
terrorist plot to bomb New York's transportation tunnels.
Current priorities of the ISF focus on three poles of
instability: Syria, Syrian-sponsored Palestinian groups, and
Iran. Fatfat pointed to recent reports of the Syrian
Nationalist Party (PPS) elements, as well as some Sunni
extremist groups and Syrian-controlled Palestinian groups
arming themselves as immediate real threats to Lebanon's
continuing internal security. Fatfat revealed that he had
recently sent his family abroad for safety concerns, a step
he had never taken, either during the civil war or after
gunmen attacked his North Lebanon residence last year.


8. (C/NF) On enforcement of the arms embargo and curtailing
arms smuggling, Fatfat was equally circumspect about the
ISF's role. Fatfat explained that the ISF only has a
consultative role with the GOL customs offices at Lebanese
points of entry. The LAF, which recently deployed 8600
troops to police the border with Syria, holds the primary
responsibility for border control. Fatfat noted
pessimistically that it would be extremely easy to continue
to smuggle contraband and weapons into Lebanon, with over 270
crossing points with Syria and only 4 officially controlled
access points. Fatfat asked rhetorically how the LAF could
secure its border with Syria when, "even Israel couldn't
control the 18 km border between Naqoura and Shebaa." When
asked about the role of the ISF in the South, Fatfat made it
clear that the ISF would only be present in a limited
coordination role in the South and Central Biqa'.

HIZBALLAH VICTORY GOOD FOR ISRAEL?
--------------


9. (C/NF) Fatfat called the perception of an Israeli defeat
in the conflict as Israel's "chance for real peace."
Pointing to the Israel-Palestine conflict as the "central
issue," Fatfat characterized the present detente as a "good
moment for them." Noting that this was the first conflict
between Israelis and Arabs where the war occurred "on both
sides of the border," Fatfat clearly hopes that a wider
lasting peace is achieved in the short term. "We can go back
to an armistice with Israel like in 1949, but this is not
enough for a permanent solution," he offered.


10. (C/NF) Fatfat sees an historical progression within the
leadership of Arab states since the formation of Israel.
Sunni bourgeoisie rule was replaced by Arab nationalist
movements, then Arab nationalists by leftists, and the
leftists by Islamists. If Islamists fail in their political
objectives, Fatfat sees the Islamists abandoning normal
political processes for terrorism.


11. (C/NF) A solution for Shebaa Farms would, for Fatfat,
make it difficult for Lebanon's Islamists (i.e., Hizballah)
from continuing down this path. Fatfat described Shebaa as
in issue that is important "on the political level."
Originally, Syria used Hizballah as a tool for hindering the
process of normalizing Lebanese-Israeli relations, starting

BEIRUT 00002725 003 OF 003


with the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000.
Fatfat suggested that solving Shebaa and sufficient movement
on the issues of Israeli mines in Lebanon, the status of
Lebanese prisoners in Israel, and curtailing Israeli
overflights would make it "difficult for Hizballah to keep
its weapons."


CHRISTIANS LOOKING FOR A LEADER
AND IT'S NOT AOUN
--------------


12. (C/NF) Turning to the question of future Lebanese
leadership, Fatfat openly criticized Michel Aoun's Free
Patriotic Movement's cooperation with Hizballah. Describing
Aoun as "50 percent mad," Fatfat called a potential Aoun
presidency "dangerous for Lebanon." Fatfat offered his
analysis that the Christians are perpetually in search of a
leader and that Aoun currently is the most important
Christian leader in Lebanon. While Aoun was stronger before
July 12th, Fatfat reckons that Aoun's subsequent slow decline
might not be enough to end his political career. "If no
other leader emerges," Fatfat hypothesized, "the Christians
will stay with Aoun."


13. (C/NF) Fatfat mentioned the historical view that only a
Christian figure could be accepted as a "national leader" for
Lebanon. "Hizballah will never be a party for all of the
country," he added. Nasrallah, and to a lesser extent Aoun,
had positioned themselves prior to the war as potential
national leaders. However, for Fatfat, their post-war
statements - particularly Nasrallah's exclusive focus on the
South and the Biqa' in his rhetoric - has revealed their true
confessional loyalties.


14. (U) Staffdel Talwar did not have the opportunity to
clear this cable.

FELTMAN