LEBANON: FATFAT SEEKS HELP FROM "FRIENDS" TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002725 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER LE SY IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: FATFAT SEEKS HELP FROM "FRIENDS" TO COUNTERACT WEAK PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF GOL Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) In an uncharacteristically frank discussion with Ambassador and Staffdel, Acting Minister of Interior Ahmed Fatfat described the GOL as measurably stronger now than it was prior to July 12, but public perception has nevertheless deemed Hizballah the winner. According to Fatfat, lack of USG support for GOL security services has hindered their operational effectiveness and has caused a negative public perception of "friendly" nation support for Lebanon. Fatfat was pessimistic about the GOL's ability to control its border with Syria, noting the ease with which large shipments could transit surreptitiously. Fatfat considers recent events as giving the region a real opportunity for a lasting peace, but warned of a rise in violence should progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not come soon. Fatfat also leveled criticism at Free Patriotic Movement Leader Michel Aoun for his political alliance with Hizballah. End Summary. BATTLING PERCEPTIONS -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) The Ambassador and Senate Foreign Relations Senior Staffer Puneet Talwar met with Acting Minister of the Interior Ahmed Fatfat on August 22 to discuss the current needs and strategic planning of the Ministry's Internal Security Forces (ISF). Fatfat, who also sits in the Cabinet as Minister of Youth and Sports, noted that the political situation in Lebanon is currently divided between perceptions and realities. The "reality" for Fatfat, is that the GOL is stronger now than it was prior to July 12th. Fatfat was unequivocal in his praise for PM Siniora. The March 14th majority is "holding strong," especially after what Fatfat called "helpful" speeches by Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah and Syrian President Bashar al-Asad last week. However, Fatfat warned that any USG attempt to open a channel with Syria, even vis-a-vis Hizballah and Iran, would be a mistake and would harm Lebanon. ¶3. (C/NF) The "perception" of most Lebanese, from Fatfat's point of view, is that Hizballah won the war. "The Israelis are proving this," added Fatfat, through the continuous Israeli media criticism of the Israeli government. Hizballah has increased its strength among the Shi'a to the extent that, "there is really only one party among the Shi'a" for Fatfat. Fatfat noted that Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah has made five public speeches since July 12, only one of which (given immediately before the cessation of hostilities) made significant mention of the GOL. Fatfat compared Hizballah's largesse after the cessation of hostilities with that of Lebanon's "friends," concluding that the international community and the Lebanese government were ill prepared to respond. "Hizballah has the money to begin paying immediately," explained Fatfat, "We (the GOL) have rules to follow.... It,s not enough just to be popular with the people." WHAT THE ISF WANTS -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Fatfat cautioned that the Lebanese people have the impression that the "friends" of Lebanon - the U.S., France and other Arab nations - did not do enough over the past year to assist Lebanon and the GOL. Fatfat illustrated his point by referring to recent manpower increases to the GOL's main police and security force, the MOI-directed ISF. Fatfat explained that the ISF had increased in size over the past year from a force of 13,000 to over 22,000 and has the mandate to grow to 28,000. Currently, the ISF only has 10,000 machine guns, leaving over half of the ISF unarmed. The problem, explained Fatfat, is not the lack of men, but a lack of supplies. Putting it in simple terms, Fatfat called for USG support and equipment for both the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the ISF to increase Lebanon's defensive capabilities. ¶5. (C/NF) The ISF's major needs fall into three categories: BEIRUT 00002725 002 OF 003 weaponry, communications equipment, and vehicles. Fatfat has previously requested an additional 10,000 AK-47 machine guns to equip the ISF. The UAE has pledged additional military support for Lebanon. Qatar recently delivered 100 trucks for ISF use. ¶6. (C/NF) Fatfat criticized USG officials he met on his recent trip to the U.S. for not recognizing the severity of Iran's interference in Lebanon. Fatfat reported that he told several USG interlocutors that he estimated Iranian support for Hizballah at least USD 50 million per month. Fatfat complained that this figure was scoffed at by his USG contacts. "They're probably paying more than that per month now," added Fatfat. Fatfat also noted that he perceived a resistance in the U.S. Congress to assist Lebanese security services. ¶7. (C/NF) Fatfat outlined the responsibilities and success of the ISF under his direction, including the recent takeover by the ISF, from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),for security at the airport (via ISF chairmanship of a new airport security committee). Clearly proud of the ISF's cooperation with the FBI, Fatfat mentioned the MOI's antiterrorism successes, including ISF intelligence used to foil a terrorist plot to bomb New York's transportation tunnels. Current priorities of the ISF focus on three poles of instability: Syria, Syrian-sponsored Palestinian groups, and Iran. Fatfat pointed to recent reports of the Syrian Nationalist Party (PPS) elements, as well as some Sunni extremist groups and Syrian-controlled Palestinian groups arming themselves as immediate real threats to Lebanon's continuing internal security. Fatfat revealed that he had recently sent his family abroad for safety concerns, a step he had never taken, either during the civil war or after gunmen attacked his North Lebanon residence last year. ¶8. (C/NF) On enforcement of the arms embargo and curtailing arms smuggling, Fatfat was equally circumspect about the ISF's role. Fatfat explained that the ISF only has a consultative role with the GOL customs offices at Lebanese points of entry. The LAF, which recently deployed 8600 troops to police the border with Syria, holds the primary responsibility for border control. Fatfat noted pessimistically that it would be extremely easy to continue to smuggle contraband and weapons into Lebanon, with over 270 crossing points with Syria and only 4 officially controlled access points. Fatfat asked rhetorically how the LAF could secure its border with Syria when, "even Israel couldn't control the 18 km border between Naqoura and Shebaa." When asked about the role of the ISF in the South, Fatfat made it clear that the ISF would only be present in a limited coordination role in the South and Central Biqa'. HIZBALLAH VICTORY GOOD FOR ISRAEL? -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) Fatfat called the perception of an Israeli defeat in the conflict as Israel's "chance for real peace." Pointing to the Israel-Palestine conflict as the "central issue," Fatfat characterized the present detente as a "good moment for them." Noting that this was the first conflict between Israelis and Arabs where the war occurred "on both sides of the border," Fatfat clearly hopes that a wider lasting peace is achieved in the short term. "We can go back to an armistice with Israel like in 1949, but this is not enough for a permanent solution," he offered. ¶10. (C/NF) Fatfat sees an historical progression within the leadership of Arab states since the formation of Israel. Sunni bourgeoisie rule was replaced by Arab nationalist movements, then Arab nationalists by leftists, and the leftists by Islamists. If Islamists fail in their political objectives, Fatfat sees the Islamists abandoning normal political processes for terrorism. ¶11. (C/NF) A solution for Shebaa Farms would, for Fatfat, make it difficult for Lebanon's Islamists (i.e., Hizballah) from continuing down this path. Fatfat described Shebaa as in issue that is important "on the political level." Originally, Syria used Hizballah as a tool for hindering the process of normalizing Lebanese-Israeli relations, starting BEIRUT 00002725 003 OF 003 with the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000. Fatfat suggested that solving Shebaa and sufficient movement on the issues of Israeli mines in Lebanon, the status of Lebanese prisoners in Israel, and curtailing Israeli overflights would make it "difficult for Hizballah to keep its weapons." CHRISTIANS LOOKING FOR A LEADER AND IT'S NOT AOUN -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) Turning to the question of future Lebanese leadership, Fatfat openly criticized Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement's cooperation with Hizballah. Describing Aoun as "50 percent mad," Fatfat called a potential Aoun presidency "dangerous for Lebanon." Fatfat offered his analysis that the Christians are perpetually in search of a leader and that Aoun currently is the most important Christian leader in Lebanon. While Aoun was stronger before July 12th, Fatfat reckons that Aoun's subsequent slow decline might not be enough to end his political career. "If no other leader emerges," Fatfat hypothesized, "the Christians will stay with Aoun." ¶13. (C/NF) Fatfat mentioned the historical view that only a Christian figure could be accepted as a "national leader" for Lebanon. "Hizballah will never be a party for all of the country," he added. Nasrallah, and to a lesser extent Aoun, had positioned themselves prior to the war as potential national leaders. However, for Fatfat, their post-war statements - particularly Nasrallah's exclusive focus on the South and the Biqa' in his rhetoric - has revealed their true confessional loyalties. ¶14. (U) Staffdel Talwar did not have the opportunity to clear this cable. FELTMAN