STRENGTHENING A SHAKY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002615 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2026 TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER EAID LE SY IS SUBJECT: STRENGTHENING A SHAKY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES -- AND A TEETERING GOL Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) This message contains a non-exhaustive list of initiatives that we suggest the USG support, in the first days of the fragile cessation of hostilities forged by U.S. leadership in UNSCR 1701. We seek to strengthen the GOL and move Lebanon toward a permanent cease-fire. After the U.S. success in getting UNSCR 1701 adopted unanimously, we see other steps as essential to translate the diplomatic progress into lasting improvements on the ground. ¶2. (C) Despite the silencing of the guns, few of our Lebanese contacts are optimistic about the cessation of hostilities that entered into force today, 8/14. Most people cite two parallel dangers: first, Israel is expected to define the prohibition on "offensive military operations" more narrowly than the average Lebanese would see as reasonable. We have told our contacts that Israel will continue its surveillance activities and use all means to disrupt suspected resupply of weapons and strategic goods to Hizballah. Second, Hizballah, while likely to suspend (at least initially) rocket attacks into Israel, may lick its wounds momentarily before resuming attacks against Israeli positions inside Lebanon. Hizballah can easily -- intentionally -- provoke Israeli force protection operations that will be seen by the Lebanese as excessive. ¶3. (C) Thus, despite the cessation of hostilities, Israeli-Hizballah fighting could easily spin out of control, with both sides perhaps crossing the informal red lines the next time around (e.g., Hizballah fires rockets into Tel Aviv, Israel destroys Lebanon's power plants or hits GOL institutions, etc.). Even lower-level fighting would make many countries reluctant to step forward with troop contributions for the beefed up UNIFIL force that, upon deployment, triggers the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. And that, we would guess, is exactly what Hizballah and its Iranian and Syrian backers desire: no additional UNIFIL troops, no LAF deployment to the south, no IDF withdrawal, and no Hizballah disarmament. ¶4. (C) At the same time, the Lebanese cabinet is approaching a moment of truth. With a cabinet meeting on exactly how to implement UNSCR 1701 postponed, ministers will soon -- upon LAF deployment with UNIFIL -- have to say once and for all whether they will stand up to Hizballah and insist on disarmament, first in the south and eventually everywhere. As we will explore in other messages, the cabinet's 8/12 unanimous acceptance of UNSCR 1701, while good news, is less solid than it appears. Yet the continued IDF presence in south Lebanon makes it difficult for the non-Hizballah members of the cabinet to unify behind immediate disarmament of Hizballah, lest they be accused of collusion with an Israeli occupation. We do not underestimate the ability of Lebanon's political class to muddle through by relying on the ambiguity of various interpretations. But the cabinet might easily collapse over UNSCR 1701, with far-reaching, and mostly negative, political and security implications for Lebanon. ¶5. (C) We believe that we can reinforce the cessation of hostilities and build public support for the requisite Hizballah disarmament if we can show some changes on the ground now. In many ways, for most Lebanese, today feels like yesterday, despite the cessation of hostilities: people remain distracted by the need to find gasoline, milk, and other essentials; people worry about the destabilizing impact of the IDPs who have no homes to reclaim; businesses cannot import essential supplies or export products; travel in and out of Lebanon remains difficult and open only to those who have no fear of transiting Syria -- to name only a few of the hardships of daily life here. Israel may hope that these deprivations move more people away from Hizballah, but, with the cabinet now behind UNSCR 1701, people should start to feel some relief as an incentive to go further. ¶6. (C) To build momentum for the more permanent cease-fire, we suggest that the USG support some initiatives now, to demonstrate that there are initial benefits to subscribing to the cessation of hostilities -- and that normal life can gradually be restored as implementation of UNSCR 1701 moves forward. The sticks for non-compliance remain clear: ongoing Israeli military presence in south Lebanon, defensive Israeli measures that will strike Lebanese as offensive, and the ongoing Israeli air and sea blockade. With those sticks obvious to all, we believe that the international community, BEIRUT 00002615 002 OF 003 under USG leadership, should offer some carrots now. Our ideas, most of which deal with access and safety, follow: -- Immediate opening of an air shuttle for passenger travel between Beirut and (probably) Amman. We have discussed this idea before, and now we hope it can be implemented. Given that the Israelis have, we understand, expressed confidence in Jordan's security procedures, we suggest that Lebanon's national carrier, Middle East Airlines, be permitted to begin operating passenger shuttles multiple times a day between Beirut and Amman (assuming the Jordanians would be amenable). If we could inform the Lebanese even today that runway repairs and munition-clearing could commence now, this shuttle could start operating on one of the runways within days. We can also broker Israel's acceptance of Lebanon starting longer-term runway repair and replacement of destroyed fuel tankers now. We can at the same time make it clear that more general aviation traffic depends on the GOL having effective plans to prevent arms, money, and alien smuggling via the airport. -- Immediate lifting of the sea blockade for fuel tankers and automatic clearances for shipments of grain and humanitarian deliveries (perhaps from recognized sources) to Lebanon, with the UN required to inform the Israelis. The Israelis would retain the ability to stop suspicious freighters at the sea embargo line for inspection. As with the airport, this partial opening of sea lanes would provide some relief to Lebanon while maintaining a strong incentive -- the potential full reopening -- for the GOL to improve its security procedures at the port. -- Large-scale Mine Action activities: On the first day of the cease-fire, Lebanon already suffered casualties when IDPs, returning home, encountered unexploded ordnance. With the long-standing U.S. leadership in Mine Action activities in Lebanon (and given that we are held largely responsible for Israeli weaponry, whether of U.S. origin or not),we could play an important role in providing safety for people returning to the south that would have a major impact on public opinion here. The UAE has also announced a resumption of its mine-clearing program. We recommend a vast increase in USG funding for Mine Action activities, to be announced immediately and used as quickly as possible. -- Immediate deployment of a planning unit to UNIFIL. UNIFIL is going to play the key role in coordinating the IDF's withdrawal and the LAF deployment, yet UNIFIL in its current incarnation does not have sufficient planning capacity. If the French are expected to play a key role in the beef-up UNIFIL authorized in UNSCR 1701, perhaps we could encourage the French could send a planning unit to Naqoura now. If the French are not available, someone else should provide competent military planners. UNIFIL and LAF deployment needs to be done right, and that requires planning. The initial planning meeting held today by UNIFIL Commander Pellegrini was encouraging (with the Lebanese and Israeli generals eventually sitting in the same room, although talking through Pellegrini),but UNIFIL needs more planning power. -- Providing transitional housing materials for IDPs -- which could in many cases be done through local purchases, thus helping Lebanon's economy overall. It is already clear from spontaneous traffic jams today that IDPs who are from the south want to go back home. (The UN counted 1200 cars an hour heading south out of Beirut, each averaging five people, on the main road alone.) Many of them are going to discover that their houses have been damaged, some severely, by the fighting. Purchases (or shipments, for items not in stock in Lebanon) of building materials such as, wood, corrugated steel and plastic sheeting would enable residents to move back home, by permitting them to make at least part of their houses habitable. As part of this, we should accelerate the delivery of basic cooking utensils and cooking gas as well. -- Focus on reopening hospitals and medical clinics in the south. This will entail working with NGOs and others to ensure that staff can return safely to hospitals, that fuel supplies are sufficient for generators, and that medical and other supplies are delivered. -- Transfer of UN security responsibilities from the UNICEF representative to either the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (our first choice) or the UNSYG's Personal Representative to Lebanon. While this is an internal UN organizational matter BEIRUT 00002615 003 OF 003 that would not be noticed by the Lebanese, it is in fact critical to the ability of the Humanitarian Coordinator to work effectively. Currently, the UN's Designated Security Officer (DSO) for Lebanon is housed with UNDP and temporarily placed with UNICEF. This means that the HC cannot prioritize relief staffing needs. Given our lack of confidence based on prior experiences in both UNDP's and UNICEF's local representation, we suggest that the USG quietly suggest to UN headquarters that the DSO be housed either with the HC or in the office of Geir Pedersen. (While Geir Pedersen is bureaucratically senior to HC David Shearer, there is no formal link between their critical operations. But, according to both, Pedersen and Shearer work well together, having done so for years in the West Bank during the second Palestinian Intifada.) -- Shipment to Lebanon of military-style trestle and Bailey bridges, to restore key traffic linkages. Until Lebanon begins to take seriously its responsibilities under UNSCR 1701 to control arms smuggling, the Israelis will be reluctant to allow the restoration of all transportation linkages. But, in coordination with the Israelis, we and others could provide some emergency, military-type steel spans as temporary replacements in some areas quickly. -- Work on a private-sector initiative that could bring U.S. business representatives -- with as many Lebanese-Americans as would be willing to participate -- to Lebanon in September, to look at how U.S. business consortia might be willing to participate in Lebanon's reconstruction, both by adopting certain projects to finance and by finding economic opportunities to create local jobs. While this initiative would be (for security reasons) kept at arm's length from the USG, initiatives sponsored by the American business community will have far-reaching impact by providing hope to the Lebanese people that Lebanon's international connections, like its infrastructure, can be repaired. ¶7. (C) Over the longer term, we need to be prepared for reconstruction and job creation in the areas of the country hardest hit by the fighting -- which means in the areas of the country where Hizballah's infrastructure and support was strongest, such as the south. To beat out the Iranian funding that will surely flow in, we will need to be generous, flexible, and quick. Our strategy should be to strengthen the GOL and its institutions, in order to counter the "state-within-a-state" charitable institutions Hizballah had used (with Iranian financing) to garner support. We will send ideas septel on the longer term, but in general we believe we should focus on some infrastructure work, some housing guarantee financial programs, and much related job creation. One complication we will face: how to use our assistance to reduce support for, and reliance on, Hizballah, while ensuring that we stick to USG rules about not helping those associated with terrorist organizations. FELTMAN