Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT2608
2006-08-14 04:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: JUSTICE MINISTER CONFIDENT OF GOL

Tags:  MOPS PTER PREL LE SY IS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002608 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2016
TAGS: MOPS PTER PREL LE SY IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUSTICE MINISTER CONFIDENT OF GOL
CONSENSUS ON CEASEFIRE (PART I)


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002608

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2016
TAGS: MOPS PTER PREL LE SY IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUSTICE MINISTER CONFIDENT OF GOL
CONSENSUS ON CEASEFIRE (PART I)


Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During an expansive conversation on 8/13 with
Ambassador and poloff over lunch, Lebanese Minister of
Justice Charles Rizk said that the unanimous 8/12 Cabinet
decision to accept UNSCR 1701 had strengthened the GOL. He
added that while this first session had been a simple
agreement on principles, a further session planned for 1800
on 8/13 would decide on the specifics of implementation
(Note. This second session has since been cancelled due to
an apparent rift over whether Hizballah will disarm south of
the Litani. End Note). Rizk predicted that Hizballah would
emerge as a weakened political force in Lebanon, but that the
party should be enticed further into the political fold in
order to get it to disarm. Rizk admitted that President
Emile Lahoud, a close friend of Rizk's since childhood, has
been sidelined throughout this crisis, while Speaker of
Parliament Nabih Berri has been buoyed to such an extent that
he may be willing to override Hizballah and Syria's protests
and support Lahoud's ouster. Rizk urged that reconstruction
begin immediately following a ceasefire before discontent
begins to fester among the one million mainly-Shia IDPs. End
Summary.

"WE WERE NEVER ON THE VERGE OF CRACKING"
--------------


2. (C) Describing the 8/12 Cabinet meeting which approved
UNSCR 1701 as a "message of moderation," Rizk said that the
decision had helped bolster the Lebanese central government.
"For the first time, decisions are being made in the Serail
(government building)" -- as opposed to Syria or elsewhere.
He said that there had been no threat of government collapse
over the decision, and that Hizballah accepts the resolution
in principle and supports the LAF/UNIFIL-plus deployments,
though it is still not clear if Hizballah intends to disarm.
Rizk paraphrased the position of one Hizballah minister, Trad

Hamadeh, as being, "I stick to the wording of the resolution
because it is not specific on the handing over of weapons."
Rizk noted that the postponement of a resolution to the
Shebaa issue is a "difficult thing for Hizballah to swallow."


3. (C) Rizk commented that ministers allied with Nabih
Berri argued during last night's session that the GOL must
accept the resolution now since the Israeli bombardment would
not let up otherwise. According to Rizk, Berri views himself
as "the Godfather of the whole exercise" in bringing an end
to the conflict, realizing that he stands to gain ground in
the aftermath vis-a-vis Hizballah. "What's happening is a
miracle for him," claimed Rizk, "He can become the super
Shi'ite leader." He added that Berri and PM Siniora had
"complemented each other" very well throughout the crisis,
noting that the war had raised Siniora's status, "which makes
Saad Hariri very uncomfortable."

EARLY CAMPAIGN SEASON?
--------------


4. (C) As to whether a politically stronger Berri would
lend his critical support to March 14 parliamentarians'
calling for the ouster of Lahoud, Rizk said that he thinks
Berri would be "prepared" to do so. Rizk, a close friend of
Lahoud and one of three Lahoud ministers in the Cabinet, said
that he feels "very sorry for the presidency" which has been
diminished to such an extent that Lahoud was kept waiting
forty-five minutes last night before PM Siniora's arrival at
the Cabinet meeting. Rizk commented that the latest
resolution further undercut Lahoud's position, and that
Lahoud had told him, "Charles, I only have the Shi'a and the
Syrians." "After 1701," Rizk remarked, "I don't know how
Emile can bear it."


5. (C) Rizk, who entertains his own presidential ambitions
and hopes to portray himself as a compromise candidate by
distancing himself from Lahoud's politics, sidthat Berri
would need to be satisfied with a repacement for Lahoud, and
would of course need buy-in from the March 14 bloc. Former

BEIRUT 00002608 002 OF 003


Foreign Minister Jean Obeid would satisfy Berri for his
"selfish, destructive, corrupt, and nepotistic aims,"
according to Rizk, but he is hardly presidential material and
is barely conversant in French and English.

SYRIAN INFLUENCE NOT WHAT IT WAS
--------------


6. (C) Rizk noted that concerns about possible Syrian
engineering are overblown. "The days when they can dictate
who can be president are over." Instead of picking their
preferred puppet, the Syrians would now simply settle for the
"least bad" president. Rizk derided last week's visit of
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem to Lebanon, saying he
had arrived on "a big horse," but left on "a little donkey."
However, Rizk still sees the external geopolitical game as a
critical factor in Lebanese dynamics, as it has always been.
Calling Iran the "master of ceremonies," Rizk urged that the
USG approach Iran to discuss resolving their differences,
including Lebanon and Hizballah.

WHITHER HIZBALLAH?
--------------


7. (C) As for Hizballah's prospects following a ceasefire,
Rizk said that Hizballah will be hurt but should be
"recuperated politically and reintegrated into the state,"
but disarmed. Describing the group as "a fish in a pond with
no water," Rizk suggested that the massive internal
displacement of Hizballah supporters will weaken the group at
its base. A wounded Hizballah is a dangerous Hizballah, as
Rizk sees it, and it would be better to entice them to join
further in legitimate politics and surrender their weapons
rather than simply to pressure or ignore them. "We can't
leave them out in the cold."


8. (C) Rizk said that other ministers should convince
Hizballah of the need to move away from armed "resistance"
and instead put the party's energy into helping to rebuild
Lebanon and solidify a strong central government. "We should
tell Hizballah, 'Now, your resistance should be to help
rebuild the state.' Who said that weapons are the essence of
the resistance?" Rizk noted again that movement on the
Shebaa issue would help in disarming Hizballah.

RECONSTRUCTION IS A PRIORITY
--------------


9. (C) Rizk stressed that in order to bring Hizballah
further into the central government fold, the GOL and
international community should immediately undertake to
provide shelter for the one million-plus IDPs driven from
their homes in the South and the Beirut suburbs. Estimating
that the government has only two weeks to provide for the
IDPs before their discontent begins spilling over into
revolt, Rizk urged that "the Shi'a have to be taken care of."
He fully agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion that,
during the long process of rebuilding of permanent housing,
IDPs should be provided with some sort of transitional
structures other than simply tents, which would provide
insufficient shelter for families during the winter. Rizk
said that putting up shelters for returning IDPs in the
spread-out southern villages should prove easier than in
formerly-overcrowded Beirut suburbs such as Dahiyyeh, where
people had lived in vertical structures.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C/NF) Rizk's read-out of the Saturday night cabinet
session was more rosy than what we've heard from other
ministers. Although UNSCR 1701 was indeed endorsed
unanimously, Ministers Marwan Hamadeh, Nayla Mouawad, and
Pierre Gemayel told the Ambassador by phone that the
discussion was difficult. Some of the ministers, apparently,
tried to corner the Shia ministers into saying explicitly
that Hizballah would voluntarily disarm, per the resolution,
first below the Litani and then everywhere. The Shia
ministers would not do so. Ergo, a second cabinet session
was scheduled for Sunday night, in which to discuss the

BEIRUT 00002608 003 OF 003


details of implementation. That meeting was subsequently
cancelled, as PM Siniora wanted more time to work on making
sure that the Shia were on board not just for the principles
of UNSCR 1701 but also the details.
FELTMAN