LEBANON: JUSTICE MINISTER CONFIDENT OF GOL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002608 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2016 TAGS: MOPS PTER PREL LE SY IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUSTICE MINISTER CONFIDENT OF GOL CONSENSUS ON CEASEFIRE (PART I) Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During an expansive conversation on 8/13 with Ambassador and poloff over lunch, Lebanese Minister of Justice Charles Rizk said that the unanimous 8/12 Cabinet decision to accept UNSCR 1701 had strengthened the GOL. He added that while this first session had been a simple agreement on principles, a further session planned for 1800 on 8/13 would decide on the specifics of implementation (Note. This second session has since been cancelled due to an apparent rift over whether Hizballah will disarm south of the Litani. End Note). Rizk predicted that Hizballah would emerge as a weakened political force in Lebanon, but that the party should be enticed further into the political fold in order to get it to disarm. Rizk admitted that President Emile Lahoud, a close friend of Rizk's since childhood, has been sidelined throughout this crisis, while Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri has been buoyed to such an extent that he may be willing to override Hizballah and Syria's protests and support Lahoud's ouster. Rizk urged that reconstruction begin immediately following a ceasefire before discontent begins to fester among the one million mainly-Shia IDPs. End Summary. "WE WERE NEVER ON THE VERGE OF CRACKING" -------------- ¶2. (C) Describing the 8/12 Cabinet meeting which approved UNSCR 1701 as a "message of moderation," Rizk said that the decision had helped bolster the Lebanese central government. "For the first time, decisions are being made in the Serail (government building)" -- as opposed to Syria or elsewhere. He said that there had been no threat of government collapse over the decision, and that Hizballah accepts the resolution in principle and supports the LAF/UNIFIL-plus deployments, though it is still not clear if Hizballah intends to disarm. Rizk paraphrased the position of one Hizballah minister, Trad Hamadeh, as being, "I stick to the wording of the resolution because it is not specific on the handing over of weapons." Rizk noted that the postponement of a resolution to the Shebaa issue is a "difficult thing for Hizballah to swallow." ¶3. (C) Rizk commented that ministers allied with Nabih ;Berri argued during last night's session that the GOL must accept the resolution now since the Israeli bombardment would not let up otherwise. According to Rizk, Berri views himself as "the Godfather of the whole exercise" in bringing an end to the conflict, realizing that he stands to gain ground in the aftermath vis-a-vis Hizballah. "What's happening is a miracle for him," claimed Rizk, "He can become the super Shi'ite leader." He added that Berri and PM Siniora had "complemented each other" very well throughout the crisis, noting that the war had raised Siniora's status, "which makes Saad Hariri very uncomfortable." EARLY CAMPAIGN SEASON? -------------- ¶4. (C) As to whether a politically stronger Berri would lend his critical support to March 14 parliamentarians' calling for the ouster of Lahoud, Rizk said that he thinks Berri would be "prepared" to do so. Rizk, a close friend of Lahoud and one of three Lahoud ministers in the Cabinet, said that he feels "very sorry for the presidency" which has been diminished to such an extent that Lahoud was kept waiting forty-five minutes last night before PM Siniora's arrival at the Cabinet meeting. Rizk commented that the latest resolution further undercut Lahoud's position, and that Lahoud had told him, "Charles, I only have the Shi'a and the Syrians." "After 1701," Rizk remarked, "I don't know how Emile can bear it." ¶5. (C) Rizk, who entertains his own presidential ambitions and hopes to portray himself as a compromise candidate by distancing himself from Lahoud's politics, sidthat Berri would need to be satisfied with a repacement for Lahoud, and would of course need buy-in from the March 14 bloc. Former BEIRUT 00002608 002 OF 003 Foreign Minister Jean Obeid would satisfy Berri for his "selfish, destructive, corrupt, and nepotistic aims," according to Rizk, but he is hardly presidential material and is barely conversant in French and English. SYRIAN INFLUENCE NOT WHAT IT WAS -------------- ¶6. (C) Rizk noted that concerns about possible Syrian engineering are overblown. "The days when they can dictate who can be president are over." Instead of picking their preferred puppet, the Syrians would now simply settle for the "least bad" president. Rizk derided last week's visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem to Lebanon, saying he had arrived on "a big horse," but left on "a little donkey." However, Rizk still sees the external geopolitical game as a critical factor in Lebanese dynamics, as it has always been. Calling Iran the "master of ceremonies," Rizk urged that the USG approach Iran to discuss resolving their differences, including Lebanon and Hizballah. WHITHER HIZBALLAH? -------------- ¶7. (C) As for Hizballah's prospects following a ceasefire, Rizk said that Hizballah will be hurt but should be "recuperated politically and reintegrated into the state," but disarmed. Describing the group as "a fish in a pond with no water," Rizk suggested that the massive internal displacement of Hizballah supporters will weaken the group at its base. A wounded Hizballah is a dangerous Hizballah, as Rizk sees it, and it would be better to entice them to join further in legitimate politics and surrender their weapons rather than simply to pressure or ignore them. "We can't leave them out in the cold." ¶8. (C) Rizk said that other ministers should convince Hizballah of the need to move away from armed "resistance" and instead put the party's energy into helping to rebuild Lebanon and solidify a strong central government. "We should tell Hizballah, 'Now, your resistance should be to help rebuild the state.' Who said that weapons are the essence of the resistance?" Rizk noted again that movement on the Shebaa issue would help in disarming Hizballah. RECONSTRUCTION IS A PRIORITY -------------- ¶9. (C) Rizk stressed that in order to bring Hizballah further into the central government fold, the GOL and international community should immediately undertake to provide shelter for the one million-plus IDPs driven from their homes in the South and the Beirut suburbs. Estimating that the government has only two weeks to provide for the IDPs before their discontent begins spilling over into revolt, Rizk urged that "the Shi'a have to be taken care of." He fully agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion that, during the long process of rebuilding of permanent housing, IDPs should be provided with some sort of transitional structures other than simply tents, which would provide insufficient shelter for families during the winter. Rizk said that putting up shelters for returning IDPs in the spread-out southern villages should prove easier than in formerly-overcrowded Beirut suburbs such as Dahiyyeh, where people had lived in vertical structures. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) Rizk's read-out of the Saturday night cabinet session was more rosy than what we've heard from other ministers. Although UNSCR 1701 was indeed endorsed unanimously, Ministers Marwan Hamadeh, Nayla Mouawad, and Pierre Gemayel told the Ambassador by phone that the discussion was difficult. Some of the ministers, apparently, tried to corner the Shia ministers into saying explicitly that Hizballah would voluntarily disarm, per the resolution, first below the Litani and then everywhere. The Shia ministers would not do so. Ergo, a second cabinet session was scheduled for Sunday night, in which to discuss the BEIRUT 00002608 003 OF 003 details of implementation. That meeting was subsequently cancelled, as PM Siniora wanted more time to work on making sure that the Shia were on board not just for the principles of UNSCR 1701 but also the details. FELTMAN