LEBANON: A/S WELCH'S MEETINGS WITH PM SINIORA ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002601 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016 TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: A/S WELCH'S MEETINGS WITH PM SINIORA ON AUGUST 11 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Over the course of three hours in two meetings on August 11, PM Fouad Siniora made steady, but incremental movement toward accepting the most recent draft language of the UN resolution. His strongest objections were directed toward the specific use of chapter 7 to authorize the multi-national stabilization force, and what he considered insufficient language regarding Shebaa. Siniora said he could not accept a direct call for chapter 7 authorization for "UNIFIL plus," because Nabih Berri claimed to feel it impinged on Lebanon's sovereignty. Siniora did, however, tentatively agree that the UN resolution could use "chapter 7-type language" as long as it didn't specifically state it was a chapter 7 authorization. Concerning the issue of Shebaa Farms, Siniora acknowledged it was "a Syrian/Iranian creation," but that did not eliminate the critical need to specifically address it in the resolution. He listened carefully to a suggestion that Shebaa might be treated in a "side letter," as well as in the EOV language that would be made by the Secretary, but still, he would not commit himself. In the second meeting, Siniora finally agreed to text changes that allowed a closing of the gap on what he referred to as "Chapter 6.999" language and informed the Assistant Secretary he would have a decision on the treatment of Shebaa later in the evening. Finally, the Prime Minister wanted assurances that Lebanon's "state of siege" would be lifted upon cessation of hostilities. End summary. ¶2. (C/NF) A/S Welch and the Ambassador met with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora at the Grand Serail for 90 minutes in the morning and for a similar period late in the afternoon on August 11. Senior advisors Mohammad Chatta and Rola Nouraddine attended both meetings, as did Deputy Legal Counsel Jonathan Schwartz and poloff (notetaker). In the morning meeting, the Prime Minister appeared to try to put his guests on the defensive with a charge that none of his requests for State Department assistance had really helped, specifically referring to the on-going situation with Lebanese JSF forces pinned down in the village of Marjaayoun. The A/S pushed back hard and the meeting settled down to business. ¶3. (C/NF) The Assistant Secretary explained to PM Siniora that both Lebanese and Israeli negotiators were insisting the other side was somehow gaining all the advantage with recent changes made to the draft resolution. This attitude was seriously complicating the effort to close the gap. Siniora retorted the Israelis were deliberately concealing the fact that they had achieved a major political victory -- a northern border that would be disarmed -- but were trying to obtain even more. ¶4. (C/NF) Future Movement and parliamentary majority leader Saad Hariri unexpectedly joined the participants in the late afternoon session. MP Hariri voiced his concerns and opinion on a number of issues, but for the most part played an advisory role. SHEBAA -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) PM Siniora reiterated his earlier charge that the Government of Israel was "blackmailing" his government on the issues of Shebaa and the timing of IDF withdrawal from Lebanese territory. He claimed GOI, in fact, realized they were obtaining a considerable victory with the effective disarmament of Hizballah -- and with it a secure northern border. Siniora conceded in straightforward language that he understood Shebaa was an Iranian/Syrian creation, but charged that Israel's "intransigence" would put Lebanon back into the tender mercies of the Iranians (and Syrians). ¶6. (C/NF) He re-emphasized his requirement that the draft contain some language that would allow him to go to the Lebanese people and say the end result was "somehow worth the country's heavy price paid in lives, suffering, and material loss." Lebanon, he said, has suffered for the West's proxy war against Iran, so Lebanon deserves something in return. He used the earlier U.S. statement that the status quo ante was unacceptable, and argued that just treatment of Shebaa would create the conditions to achieve that goal. He said BEIRUT 00002601 002 OF 003 that somehow Shebaa must be put on the international agenda -- which A/S Welch and the Ambassador argued had happened, at least regarding delineation, with the existing language. CHAPTER 7 -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) According to Siniora, it was Nabih Berri who was the principal roadblock to using chapter 7 to authorize the proposed international stabilization force, now viewed by the Lebanese as "UNIFIL plus." Berri reportedly feels chapter 7 will enable UNIFIL to carry out significant operations independent of the Government of Lebanon. The Assistant Secretary explained that unless a robust international force SIPDIS could act with initiative and confidence, there were two serious consequences: few nations would commit troops to such a force, and the Government of Israel would have little confidence the force could carry out its difficult mission. ¶8. (C/NF) The Prime Minister considered these reasons and gave tentative (albeit reluctant) approval to the idea that the resolution could use actual language that is typically associated with Chapter 7 resolutions, but warned that it would be extremely difficult for Lebanon to accept a specific chapter 7 authorization. ¶9. (C/NF) At the close of the session, Siniora asked the A/S to return for a final meeting later in the afternoon. When he confirmed that A/S Welch was meeting next with Berri, Siniora asked that three points be emphasized with the Speaker: the proposal to handle chapter 7 authorization, US suggestions regarding Shebaa, and an explanation of how the period between cessation of hostilities and the actual cease-fire would be "refereed." SECOND MEETING BEGINS WITH SHEBAA -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) At the outset of the second meeting, Siniora stated that both sides were "now at the moment of truth." The Assistant Secretary suggested that instead of focusing on a line-by-line review of the proposed text, it would be far better to nail down two issues that the Secretary believed were the last major gaps in the soon-to-be-introduced resolution: Shebaa, and control of the borders to prevent weaponry from reaching Hizballah, especially in the interim period between cessation of hostilities and a full cease-fire. ¶11. (C/NF) The Assistant Secretary made it clear that trying to force additional Shebaa language into the resolution at this point would be a "deal breaker." In fact, A/S Welch noted, the French-proposed bracketed language regarding Shebaa in the draft resolution had to be dropped, in order to help ensure Israel won't reject the resolution outright. He conveyed to Siniora the Israeli contention that Olmert's government had gone as far as it could. The advantages of mentioning Shebaa in the Secretary's upcoming EOV, as well as the ability of the UN SYG to use the resolution's language to deal with the issue in a serious way appeared to influence the Prime Minister, who said he would consider the argument in the hope that, what he could not get from the resolution, he could point to in the Secretary's EOV. CONTROL OF THE SY/LE BORDERS -------------- ¶12. (C/NF) Siniora agreed that the period between the cessation of hostilities and full cease-fire would be "precarious," principally because Hizballah was expected to withdraw and allow the LAF and UNIFIL to flow into the area south of the Litani. This process, already difficult, would be made immeasurably more so if Hizballah was able to re-supply its depleted stock of weaponry from its suppliers in Syria. For this critical reason, the Assistant Secretary noted the arms embargo language of the draft resolution and asked the Prime Minister to consider ways to strengthen the border crossing points with elements of the expanding UNIFIL force, or some other means, perhaps with technical assistance. ¶13. (C/NF) The Prime Minister stated he wanted nothing more than to see Hizballah disarmed and their supply of weaponry severed. While Siniora pointed out there would be political risks involved, he also noted that the resolution's draft language (OP-13) provided an opening for such assistance, and BEIRUT 00002601 003 OF 003 said he would consider ideas. But Siniora was reluctant to ask UNIFIL to help. COORDINATING UNIT AT UNIFIL -------------- ¶14. (C/NF) Concerning Siniora's request that someone act as a referee during the fragile interim period before the international augmentation force shows up, the Assistant Secretary noted that Nabih Berri suggested using the 1996 SIPDIS cease-fire agreement as a model for rules-of-engagement. He argued, however, that even though this was a creative approach, it would be preferable to stick with the resolution's draft language, specifically that no offensive operations would be permitted. Additionally, the pressure in the admittedly problematic interim period would be eased considerably once "UNIFIL plus" deploys in force. ¶15. (C/NF) In order to facilitate the monitoring function and telescope the deployments of LAF and "UNIFIL plus" into short a period as possible, the Assistant Secretary proposed that a "coordination unit" be immediately established at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, which would serve as a nexus where both violations and deployment issues could be coordinated and resolved. Although PM Siniora was clearly uncomfortable with the idea of IDF and LAF officers discussing issues, he accepted the argument that some form of coordination center, with UNIFIL as referee, was necessary. CLOSE, BUT NO CLOSURE -------------- ¶16. (C/NF) With helo flight constraints exerting serious pressure on the time remaining, Mohammad Chatta finally brought up the "siege" of Lebanon. With Siniora and Hariri in apparent agreement, the senior advisor stated that both the Beirut airport and the maritime ports of Lebanon had to open as soon as possible, preferably upon cessation of hostilities. Not only was it a critical necessity to re-supply the country now entering its fifth week of war, but it was a sensitive sovereignty issue that would greatly affect the perception of a just peace. ¶17. (C/NF) A/S Welch stated that he understood the ramifications, but emphasized that "verification" of cargo was an inescapable issue. PM Siniora indicated that while some form of international inspection was acceptable, the naval and air blockade of his country had to be end immediately. HOW WILL LEBANON REACT TO RESOLUTION -------------- ¶18. (C/NF) PM Siniora said that if a resolution was brought before the Security Council that night, he and Berri would study the final language and then decide whether to "accept it, or refuse all or part of it." The Siniora government plans to hold a special session of the Council of Ministers on Saturday, August 12, to discuss and presumably endorse/reject the UN resolution. ¶19. (U) A/S Welch did not review this cable, but authorized its release. FELTMAN