LEBANON: SINIORA DISCUSSES LATEST DRAFT RESOLUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002588 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016 TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER LE SY IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA DISCUSSES LATEST DRAFT RESOLUTION REF: A. BEIRUT 2583 Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) PM Siniora and senior advisers Mohammad Chatta and Rola Noureddine met with Ambassador Feltman and poloff (notetaker) on the morning of August 10. Ambassador Feltman reviewed the latest U.S. draft resolution with Siniora (Note. Siniora had a meeting immediately afterwards with French Ambassador Emie to review the latest French draft, which differs on some points with the U.S. version. End Note). While not committing the GOL to anything, Siniora and Chatta reviewed the various concerns to do with the following issues: a beefed-up "UNIFIL-plus" under Chapter VII, the timetable for the various deployments and withdrawals, the rules of disengagement during the critical time period between the passing of a resolution and LAF/"UNIFIL plus" deployment, arms smuggling, the blockade of Lebanon, coordination between the LAF and IDF via UNIFIL, the conditions for a permanent ceasefire, and Sheba'a Farms and border delineation. Siniora promised to study the issues and discuss with the Cabinet and meet with the Ambassador later today to give a more fulsome GOL position. End Summary. CHAPTER VII -------------- ¶2. (C) Referring to preliminary paragraphs 9 and 11, Ambassador Feltman stressed that the U.S. proposes a first resolution under Chapter VII authority, whereas the French want to hold that until a second resolution. But, either way, Lebanon faces the Chapter VII issue. Siniora said that the essential Lebanese issue with Chapter VII concerns Lebanon's sovereignty. Siniora worries that Chapter VII would allow a UNIFIL-plus force carte blanche in undertaking operations in its area of operations, without referral to the GOL. Siniora prefers that there be a "consensual relationship" whereby the GOL would have to consent to any operation. Siniora asked whether language might be added to the resolution in order to formalize this "consensual relationship" so that there could be "no independent, proactive action" by the UN. Shatta suggested specifically the following: "The work of the force and its operations will be with the consent of the Lebanese government." Siniora noted that Hizballah and the Syrians have said they would be against a force under Chapter VII authority, even if it were under the UNIFIL rubric, which meant that it would be difficult to get the Cabinet on board with this idea. However, if language were added to make the force more "consensual," then Siniora promises he "will try to sell it" in the Cabinet. He also asked for more "balance" in OP11, by making explicit what is implicit about UNIFIL-plus also monitoring and verifying the Israeli withdrawal. TIMETABLE AND INITIAL DEPLOYMENT SIZE -------------- ¶3. (C) Siniora noted that the "cessation of hostilities" called for in OP1 would be followed by a "precarious period" before the deployment of LAF together with UNIFIL-plus. Siniora wants to have a clear understanding in the resolution of what action would be considered a violation of the terms of the cessation of hostilities during the interim period, and under what mechanism would these be monitored. "We want to be specific about what action is a vioaltion and what action would not cause a collapse in the arrangement, and who would be the referee." Siniora, in a subsequent phone call to the Ambassador, was more specific. He said that he worries that the Israelis will have a far different definition of what constitutes "defensive action," and the Israelis will, essentially, continue activities that would provoke Hizballah rocket fire. What, Siniora asked, stops the Israelis, "who will say that everything is 'defensive'"? ¶4. (C) Understanding that, according to the U.S. draft, Israel and Hizballah would withdraw more or less simultaneously with the joint deployment of the LAF and UNIFIL-plus (Note. The French draft proposes an initial LAF deployment on top of the current UNIFIL force triggering an initial, largely-symbolic IDF withdrawal. End Note),Siniora BEIRUT 00002588 002 OF 003 also asked for a precise statement regarding the timetable and troop numbers. Siniora asked how many UNIFIL-plus and LAF troops would need to be on the ground for the Israelis to begin their withdrawal. While saying that the LAF will be deploying in sizable numbers, Siniora mused about whether an initial deployment of 3000 LAF troops would be enough to trigger the Israeli pullback. As for timing, Siniora said that the initial LAF deployment should "not take more than a couple of days", but that, when the time coems for the critical deployment/withdrawal phase, there needed to be a "zero hour" for starting the clocks ticking (Comment. Siniora's estimate of the time needed for the LAF deployment is more realistic than that offered by Defense Minister Murr in his meeting with A/S Welch yesterday (reftel). End Comment). COORDINATION WITH IDF VIA UNIFIL -------------- ¶5. (C) In this context, the Ambassador urged that the LAF should begin coordinating on an operational level with UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, with UNIFIL coordinating in turn with the Israelis. If army chief Michel Sleiman were to meet with UNIFIL chief Alain Pellegrini to present the LAF deployment plan in detail, and were to ask UNIFIL to pass the information on to Israel, this would go a long way to convincing the Israelis of the GOL's seriousness. Israel needs to have confidence that the LAF is a competent, professional organization. Siniora said that Defense Minister Murr had already met with Pelligrini, adding that he would consider the Ambassador's suggestion to begin operational coordination and share the LAF deployment plan with UNIFIL. CEASEFIRE -------------- ¶6. (C) Siniora also wants to have a clear reference in this resolution to implementing a permanent ceasefire, rather than the current mention in operative paragraph 13 that a "later resolution" will consider "steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire." He added that he envisions that the simultaneous deployments/withdrawals will be the trigger for a permanent ceasefire, and wants something to this effect in the resolution. "This has to be stated clearly in this resolution, not referred to a later resolution." Siniora called the Ambassador two hours after the meeting to stress this point again and suggested adding a clause under OP 11 that UNIFIL-plus will assist in monitoring this ceasefire. ENDING THE BLOCKADE/ENSURING AGAINST ARMS SMUGGLING -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Siniora said that he wants the Israeli siege of the ports and airports to be lifted immediately following the "cessation of hostilities." However, Siniora still has trouble with the wording in operative paragraph 5 of the draft, particularly the word "verifiably" since this seems to impose a supervisory authority over Lebanon. He approves of the language in OP 11 (e) since this would be at the GOL's "request." The Ambassador stressed that the Israelis will not lift the blockade without an effective mechanism in place to stop arms smuggling, and suggested there are commercial firms that can help with monitoring. Siniora said that this is again a sovereignty issue and that "we have to be careful not to break things." He added that the seaports and airports would not be such an issue - "one can make arrangements" - but that the "informal land crossings" (Comment. Siniora is likely referring to the much debated military roads linking Syria and Lebanon. End Comment) are the greatest concern. Avoiding a clear answer, Siniora promised to talk with MoD Murr and "think creatively" to find out what is "palatable from a sovereignty point of view." SHEBAA FARMS -------------- ¶8. (C) Siniora noted that nothing had changed in the Sheba'a Farms language in OPs 7 and 9, and suggested again that the resolution instead ask SYG Annan to put the territory under UN trusteeship pending delineation of the border. The Ambassador explained the political and BEIRUT 00002588 003 OF 003 procedural impossibility of getting Israel to agree to such a formulation now. Shatta urged that this would not be a commitment one way or another, but would make the direction on Shebaa a little clearer and "flag it out." Siniora asked whether the USG could provide a side letter regarding Sheba'a. OTHER CONCERNS -------------- ¶9. (C) Siniora, reviewing his handwritten notes taken while reading the U.S. draft, suggested again adding another clause under OP 11 that UNIFIL-plus will monitor Israel's withdrawal. While he understands the mention of resolutions 425 and 426 in OP 11 is an implicit reference to this, Siniora prefers an explicit reference that this is part of the mandate of the force. ¶10. (C) Siniora still objects to the mention under OP7 to respect for the "territorial integrity of Israel," since for the Lebanese this implies recognition of the State of Israel. The Ambassador pushed back that this was not the implication of the text. Siniora argued strongly that the first bullet under OP7 be dropped altogether, as the second bullet on respecting the Blue Line is sufficient and would not set him up for criticism. ¶11. (C) Shatta is concerned by the referral in OP13 of a later resolution which may consider "further enhancements to the mandate" of UNIFIL-plus. He wants to know if these enhancements could include allowing UNIFIL-plus to act without the consent of the GOL. FELTMAN