LEBANON: MURR SAYS LAF CAN DEPLOY TO SOUTH IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002583 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016 TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER LE IS SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: MURR SAYS LAF CAN DEPLOY TO SOUTH IN EIGHT HOURS REF: BEIRUT 2553 Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an August 9 meeting with A/S Welch, Ambassador Feltman, Deputy Legal Adviser Jonathan Schwartz, and poloff, Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr said 15,000 LAF troops could deploy to southern Lebanon within eight hours and assume security there along with a beefed-up "UNIFIL plus" force of 10-12,000 troops in conjunction with an Israeli withdrawal behind the Blue Line. Murr said that there is complete unity within the LAF's ranks and officer corps for this plan provided that, once deployed to the South, they receive needed military equipment from the Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. Understanding that the move to establish a "UNIFIL plus" force would require a written request from the GOL, Murr hopes that PM Siniora can bring it to a Cabinet decision by the afternoon of August 10. He said that Siniora could not ask for this force to be under Chapter VII, and suggested that UN SYG Annan himself make this recommendation, with the Israelis and U.S. keeping mum publicly on the subject. Although saying that he needed to consult with others before giving a definitive answer, Murr said that he is prepared to begin coordinating with UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura on the logistics of the deployments and the Israeli withdrawal. He also supports a UNIFIL presence in support of the LAF along the Lebanese-Syrian border as well as delineation of the border as a means of resolving the Shebaa issue. End Summary. CARGO SHIPS TO TYRE -------------- ¶2. (C) Murr assured A/S Welch that the 15,000-strong LAF contingent could deploy to the South within eight hours of the order. Since the land link to the South has been severed and it would take too long to fix the bridges, Murr says he has arranged cargo ships to transport all the troops to the southern Lebanese city of Tyre, from where they would fan out throughout the South. Murr said that when the shipping company owner learned that his cargo vessels were to be used to carry the LAF into the south, he refused to accept any payment for the privilege. During the few days following the troop deployment, the LAF would put up bridges in order to bring heavy equipment into the region. Murr, not getting into specific areas of deployment, as he had in a previous meeting with Ambassador Feltman two days ago (reftel),said that the role of the LAF would be to "secure the Blue Line, secure any rockets, and stop any Hizballah or Palestinian militant infiltration in the region." ¶3. (C) Murr stressed that he has complete LAF buy-in for this plan. According to Murr, not a single Shi'ite LAF soldier has defected to the Hizballah militant ranks during the current conflict. He claimed that Shi'a make up 36 per cent of the LAF, down from 58 per cent just a few years ago. Contrary to rumor, the LAF has not once assisted Hizballah with firing rockets into northern Israel, and has in fact interdicted three shipments of rockets at army checkpoints. Furthermore, Murr said, he had spoken to LAF officers of all confessions and has received their universal support. Admitting that he went to the Lebanese cabinet with his plan before checking with the army command, he nevertheless has their full support on two conditions: first, that Hizballah militants clear out of the deployment zone entirely; and second, that once deployed, the LAF receive the technical and material support it needs to secure the area effectively. ¶4. (C/NF) Regarding the first of these conditions on Hizballah militants being out of the region, Murr said that since Hizballah agreed to the plan during the August 7 Cabinet meeting, it seems that the group at this point accepts that there is to be no other armed entity in the deployment zone in addition to the LAF and UNIFIL. On the second condition on resource support, Murr admitted that the LAF is "naked" and would need significant provisions within a couple of weeks of deployment in order to have "full, BEIRUT 00002583 002 OF 003 technical power on the ground." Asked if this meant additional training, Murr said that the LAF already has the manpower and highly-qualified special units, but he hopes that the "Saudis and Gulfis" can provide equipment. He asked specifically if the USG could work on convincing these countries to help. "You have to help us with the Gulf countries. They have a great deal of equipment they don't use." Murr (as he has before) promised to provide Ambassador Feltman with a list of LAF needs. Responding to A/S Welch's question, Murr clarified that deployment to the south does not depend on getting the new equipment -- it can be done now -- but that the new equipment is needed to keep the LAF effective in the south. ¶5. (C) Murr does not believe that Shi'a acceptance of the LAF deployment plan is an indication that the military could be led into a trap whereby it is dragged into a conflict with Israel in the South. Claiming that "Nabih Berri is praying in his heart to be free of Hizballah politically," Murr said that Berri would never agree to a scheme to trap the army in the South. (Note: Most of the Shi'a in the LAF are followers of Berri's Amal party. End Note.) Murr is more worried that Hizballah and Syria will recede into the background only to ally with the "new al-Qaeda" - Sunni jihadi groups in northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley - to support attacks on the LAF in those areas. Again, with the right equipment, Murr believes he can face down that challenge while ensuring security in the South. SUPPORTS A MODIFIED UNIFIL -------------- ¶6. (C) Murr said he supports augmenting the UNIFIL force numbers in conjunction with the LAF deployment and added that UNIFIL should also deploy along the Lebanon-Syria border in order to assist the LAF in interdicting the movement of arms to militant groups. He is particularly concerned that there be a UN presence to monitor any potential exchange of fire across the border with Syria. He is ready to begin coordination with the UNIFIL command in Naqoura. Saying that he only needs to speak to the Prime Minister - as a courtesy, he stressed, not for a "green light," - in order to begin this coordination, Murr tried to call Siniora during the meeting, with no answer from the PM. ¶7. (C/NF) Murr admitted that he does not know Berri's or Siniora's stance on these issues, but said he wants to propose to the Lebanese Cabinet that UNIFIL troop numbers in the South be increased from 2,000 to 12,000, with the aim of gaining a Cabinet compromise for 8,000. The Cabinet would then have to agree on the text of a letter to SYG Annan requesting the UNIFIL augmentation. For domestic consumption, Siniora will have to phrase the letter in such a way that the force is needed to "protect Lebanon from Israeli aggression" and to "help people return to their villages." Murr said the letter would not request a Chapter VII force, since Hizballah would never agree to such language in a GOL request, but suggested that upon receiving the letter UN SYG Annan would ask that the force come under Chapter VII since he could portray it as necessary for the security of the UN troops. "Let Kofi ask for it. He could phrase it like, 'I can not send my men there without any protection.'" Murr stressed, however, that both Israel and the USG should remain publicly mute on the Chapter VII issue so as not to provoke a Hizballah rejection. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Murr is known for telling people what they want to hear. He nevertheless appears genuinely committed - whether out of a sense of history or of duty is not clear - to making the LAF deployment plan work. His confidence in gaining Cabinet approval for a letter requesting a beefed-up UNIFIL force may be too optimistic, particularly in having UNIFIL observers stationed along the border with Syria. Whatever the cause, Murr clearly feels this is his time for action, and we recommend the USG do all it can to support the LAF deployment plan. In particular, once we receive Murr's wish list of military equipment, we suggest contacting our Saudi and Gulf partners to provide the needed material to the LAF BEIRUT 00002583 003 OF 003 as soon as possible. End Comment. ¶9. (U) A/S Welch did not have the opportunity to clear this cable. FELTMAN