MGLE01: BERRI IS UNDER THREAT DUE TO HIS PIVOTAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002566 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2016 TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER SY IS LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: BERRI IS UNDER THREAT DUE TO HIS PIVOTAL ROLE Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador and TDY poloff met with several Lebanese politicians of different confessions on August 8 in order to guage attitudes toward the draft UN resolution and sense whether there is a strategy for moving ahead in Lebanon following a ceasefire. In addition to Maronite former President and Kata'eb party leader Amine Gemayel (septel), meetings were with former Prime Minister Najib Mikati (Sunni),Nabih Berri aide Ali Hamdan (Shiite),and Minister of Telecommunications and Walid Jumblatt ally Marwan Hamadeh (Druze). Mikati, Hamdan, and Hamadeh all believe that Hizballah is ready for a cease-fire but that the success or failure of the cease-fire deal, as well continued as Sunni-Shia harmony, hinges on Speaker of Parliament and Amal Party leader Nabih Berri. In a worrying development, Hamdan said that his office had seen a list showing the Speaker as the number one target for assassination. In a break from his previous sentiments, Mikati said that it might be time to get rid of President Emile Lahoud following a cease-fire and LAF deployment to the South. He believes that Berri will sign on to this plan. Hamadeh gave an overview of last night's meeting of the Lebanese Cabinet which decided unanimously to deploy 15,000 LAF troops to the South upon an Israeli withdrawal behind the Blue Line. Our interlocutors gave different descriptions - ranging from a heated argument to a fraternal chat - of the August 7 meeting between Berri and visiting Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu'allim. All agreed that, once the dust has settled from the conflict, the majority of Lebanese will blame Hizballah for provoking the destruction and the party will be politically weakened as a consequence. End Summary. "SOMEONE WANTS TO SOW TROUBLE IN LEBANON" -------------- ¶2. (C) Berri's senior foreign policy adviser called the Ambassador for an urgent meeting early this afternoon. Sitting in a cafe in the Phoenicia Hotel, without lights or air conditioning due to power shortages, Hamdan motioned for poloff to stop writing and whispered to the Ambassador, "We have a list showing targets for assassination, and Speaker Berri's name is at the top," adding that others mentioned in the list include pro-Syrian MP Suleiman Frangieh and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun. He did not bring a copy with him, he said, since he did not want to remove it from the office. Hamdan does not know who generated the list, only saying that it is from "someone who wants to sow trouble in Lebanon." Noting that Berri is the critical backer of the GOL plan to deploy the LAF to the South, Hamdan said that his assassination would likely cause the plan to fail, leading to the collapse of the Lebanese government and enflaming sectarian tensions, particularly among Sunni and Shi'a. ¶3. (C) When asked about the Lebanese public's perception of Hizballah, Hamdan said that "Hizballah had peaked" as an organization sometime before the kidnapping and killing of IDF soldiers on July 12. As long as the conflict continues, people will be supportive of Hizballah fighters, but "once the dust settles, people will see" the destructive result of Hizballah's unilateral adventurism. Hamdan predicted that Amal will be in a much stronger position vis-a-vis Hizballah following the conflict. Regarding the prospect of Berri possibly lending his critical support to a constitutional move to replace President Emile Lahoud, a step which Berri has opposed in the past, Hamdan gave a guarded response, saying that Berri hoped to reinitiate the "National Dialogue" following a ceasefire and that the issue of the presidency "perhaps might be reopened in that context." Hamdan also did not give anything away regarding Berri's August 7 meeting with Syrian FM Mu'allim, saying Mu'allim had "simply expressed support for the government." MIKATI SAYS TIME MAY BE RIPE TO GET RID OF LAHOUD -------------- -------------- BEIRUT 00002566 002 OF 004 ¶4. (C) Meeting in his downtown Beirut office, former Prime Minister Najib Mikati, who in the past has held firm in his belief that Lahoud would end up serving out his three-year extension until August 2007, said that following a ceasefire may be the right time to get rid of Lahoud. "I've always thought he would stay until the end, but haraam if we need to wait a whole year to launch Lebanon on its new path!" Mikati, who is close to Berri, believes that the Speaker will be on board with this initiative. "He's good," said Mikati, "He will be where we want him," mentioning that Berri exchanged heated words with Mu'allim on August 7 and lectured him on the Sheba'a Farms issue like "a professor to a student." Mikati, a former Bashar buddy who fell out with the Syrian leader last December, suspects Syria is using this conflict to "try and hold some cards" regarding the international tribunal which is being set up to try suspects in the Hariri assassination. ¶5. (C) Turning to Hizballah, Mikati estimated the group had suffered physical losses of only 25 percent. Though the group still has plenty of reserves, they are ready to find a solution to this conflict. While Mikati supports Hizballah's fighters in the current conflict, he added that he wants to see the group disarmed and hopes it will be weakened politically following a cease-fire, but suspects they will keep many of their arms even following a LAF deployment to the South. "They will make a token handover of 500 to 1000 Katyushas to the LAF, send some back to Syria, and bury the rest in underground bunkers." He said he could guarantee that Hizballah would not launch any attacks for at least six months following a ceasefire, allowing time to broker a permanent political deal. He added that whatever the outcome, Hizballah will portray itself as the victor, but noted, "on the Lebanese political scene, it is better to deal with Hizballah as a winner rather than as a loser." In reality, Hizballah will emerge from this conflict weaker both militarily and politically. ¶6. (C) Mikati, who has designs on some day regaining the premiership, said that Siniora is under a great deal of strain, as he demonstrated during his tearful August 7 statement during the Arab League ministerial. Siniora does not believe himself to be a real leader, claimed Mikati, but rather feels like a caretaker for Saad Hariri. In fact, the deal for the LAF deployment was brokered between Nabih Berri and Saad Hariri, with Siniora merely the mouthpiece. However, Saad himself is naive and easy to fool, according to Mikati, which is why Hizballah doesn't mind working with him. This highlights the lack of real, uniting, charismatic leadership of the Sunni Lebanese. In the event of a Sunni-Shi'a clash, which Mikati thinks will grow more likely as the conflict continues, the Sunnis will not be able to face up to the more united and more armed Shi'a. ¶7. (C) On the prospect of 粑 successful LAF deployment to the South, Mikati said that though the army is still weak and fragmented, it does meet a minimum operational standard and will be very well received in the South. It is important to have international support for the army. Mikati described the army commander Michel Sleiman, whom many perceive to be a Syrian stooge but who played a critical role in avoiding a violent crackdown on the huge anti-Syrian protests in Beirut in March 2005, as "a honest and good guy." Regarding humanitarian relief, Mikati expressed concern that, unless the United States and others stepped forth quickly and generously, Iranian money would fund most of the rebuilding in the South. "MU'ALLIM WAS LIKE AN ORPHAN" -------------- ¶8. (C) Meeting in the Ministry of Telecommunications building, Marwan Hamadeh described the August 7 Cabinet session which led to the unanimous vote in favor of deploying the LAF to the South. According to Hamadeh, both Hizballah ministers Mohammad Fneich and Trad Hamadi were present at the meeting, though President Lahoud did not show up. Defense Minister Murr had also not planned to attend, but Hamadeh insisted that Murr show up. "There will be no meeting on BEIRUT 00002566 003 OF 004 deploying the army without the Minister of Defense." When Murr presented the deployment plan to the Cabinet, he said that the LAF could not deploy "except in the conditions of 1992," meaning that all militias must be disarmed and dissolved. Murr said that the LAF would not accept any armed militias in the deployment area, on which point the Hizballah ministers supposedly hesitated, but, "realizing that they needed to catch this instant," ultimately they conceded. Fneich also raised the Sheba'a Farms issue, but Hamadeh did not elaborate on what was said. To avoid potential outbreaks of violence, most ministers had also wanted to cancel all protests until the end of the war, but this was vetoed by the Hizballah ministers who (without a touch of irony) said that "democratic life" should not be stopped. ¶9. (C) At one point in the session, according to Hamadeh's account, Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel asked whether the army is perhaps being tricked by certain Lebanese into deploying into the South where it could then be dragged into a war with Israel. Hamadeh described Trad Hamadi's reaction to this question as "primitive, saying the army would become a part of the resistance." The cooler Fneich appeared embarrassed by Hamadi's outburst, and "had to shut him up." Judging from the reaction of the Hizballah ministers, Hamadeh wonders whether Gemayel's question was in fact right on target and worries the Iranians and the Syrians may be setting a trap for the LAF. Hamadeh agreed that Nabih Berri would not be part of any game to trap the army, which Berri has traditionally supported. ¶10. (C) Describing Mu'allim's visit to Lebanon, Hamadeh said that Berri was "very frank" during their meeting and that Mu'allim met with a cold reception at the Arab League foreign minister's luncheon. "He was like an orphan yesterday. Nobody came over to say hello at the luncheon, so he left early, claiming he had a long road home." While the Arab ministers ignored Syria on the issue of showing support for Hizballah in the final communique, there were also Lebanese protestors outside Mu'allim's hotel and Mu'allim was told he was not welcome in the Lebanese coastal town of Jbeil, forcing him to move his meeting with Lebanese FM Salloukh. According to Hamadeh, Mu'allim left Lebanon "very mad." ¶11. (C) Regarding the draft UN resolution, Hamadeh hopes that the text can be "Lebanized" and the French prevailed upon to accept relatively tough language regarding the mandate of an international stabilization force. Hamadeh said he would tell Siniora to push the French to accept, while also getting assurances from Hizballah, via Berri, on whether they would accept the stabilization force. Hamadeh said that the time for the resolution is now, while Hizballah could still save face. If the IDF advances to the Litani River, then Hizballah may just decide to fight it out. While acknowledging that Defense Minister Murr may have a hidden or mixed agenda, since it is well known he has been dining secretly with his ex-father-in-law Lahoud, Hamadeh believes SIPDIS that Murr sees himself playing "a historic role" in leading the LAF back to the South, and can be counted on. Hamadeh also noted that Amr Moussa had been a surprisingly positive force during his recent visit to Lebanon, telling some ministers not to stand against the international community in rejecting a resolution. ¶12. (C) As an close ally of Walid Jumblatt, Hamadeh has been on the anti-Lahoud bandwagon for some time. He thinks Berri is now ready to support this effort, and that Michel Aoun might also be brought on board if his Free Patriotic Movement were offered positions in the new government. Hamadeh stressed, however, that Aoun would not be offered the Presidency. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C/NF) Several common themes emerged from our meetings with Hamdan, Mikati, and Hamadeh, and also from our discussion with Amin Gemayel (septel). It is clear that all view Nabih Berri as the lynchpin holding this tenuous agreement together and bridging the gap between Siniora and BEIRUT 00002566 004 OF 004 Hizballah. Without him, the whole plan could collapse, with the potential for a violent Sunni-Shi'a conflict and escalation in the Hixballah-Israeli fighting. In this context, the possible assassination of Berri would present a nightmare scenario of government collapse and sectarian strife, with Hizballah, having the most arms and best organization, stepping in to fill the vacuum. ¶14. (C/NF) There was also full agreement that, in the event of a ceasefire, Hizballah would emerge from this conflict in a weakened political position, which Hamadeh and others vowed to exploit. While a proposal to deploy 15000 LAF troops to the South would have been unimaginable on July 11, it is now the unanimously-accepted position of the Lebanese government. This would be a significant feather in Siniora's cap, and the government could take the lion's share of the credit for negotiating a ceasefire which strengthens Lebanon, whereas Hizballah would bear the brunt of the blame for provoking a conflict which has left over a thousand dead and millions of dollars of damage to Lebanon's infrastructure. ¶15. (C/NF) Finally, general feeling could swing towards removing Emile Lahoud following a ceasefire. Again, Speaker Berri would be the critical player in this, as the addition of his Amal bloc to the March 14 MPs would provide the two-thirds parliamentary vote needed to remove the President. However, Berri will not move in this direction unless he feels stronger vis-a-vis his fellow Shi'a in Hizballah, who have leaned on Berri in the past to maintain unity in support of Lahoud. Berri may gain this leverage if he is able to successfully implement the planned LAF deployment and achieve a lasting cease-fire. FELTMAN