TFLE01: LEBANESE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR PUSHES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002551 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS USTR TREASURY FOR MNUGENT USDOC FOR 4250/ITA/MAC/OME NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016 TAGS: PGOV EFIN ECON EINV LE IS SY SUBJECT: TFLE01: LEBANESE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR PUSHES FOR ALLEVIATION OF BLOCKADE Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In an August 7 meeting with Ambassador Feltman and TDY poloff, Central Bank of Lebanon (CBL) Governor Riad Salameh said that the Lebanese financial situation had so far avoided disaster through some creative "financial engineering" and other confidence-building measures such as a $1 billion loan from the Saudis. However, Salameh stressed to the Ambassador that the situation is not sustainable, and that public confidence would soon dwindle if the conflict continues. Salameh said that several factors in particular would erode confidence: the continued blockade of Lebanon and the resultant hardships for the Lebanese (Comment: On the roads en route from the Embassy to the CBL, cars were seen lined up for several blocks outside of gas stations. End Comment),as well as the prospect of further Israeli attacks on critical Lebanese infrastructure, particularly gas depots and power plants. In this context, Salameh welcomed the efforts to ship in fuel to power plants, as well as a plan to truck in gasoline. He said he could even get the Lebanese business community to support stationing UNIFIL forces to monitor points of entry if it would allow for these to be re-opened. Regarding the reconstruction of Lebanon after the hoped-for ceasefire, Salameh said that prospective donors would not trust any Lebanese government agency to handle and distribute assistance funds and to make decisions on projects. Instead, Salameh plans to recommend to PM Siniora that an independent mutual fund be set up and controlled by the donors. The GOL and Lebanese organizations such as the Council for Development and Reconstruction and the Fund for the Displaced could present project proposals to the donors who could then decide on the allocation of funds. End Summary. TWO-PHASE RESOLUTION HAS A CHANCE -------------- ¶2. (C) Salameh touched first on his assessment of the political situation, which he described as "one big poker bluff," with the Shi'a -- for whom Nabih Berri is the front man -- posturing as if they intend to block the resolution and leave the government in the hopes of getting a more favorable ceasefire deal. Salameh does not believe this will lead to a sectarian conflict. "There is no money for a civil war." Rather, he believes that with the passage of a first resolution, there will follow a traditional period of Lebanese sectarian haggling, with Berri in particular hoping to reassert his Shi'a primacy over Hizballah. In the end, noone will want to be seen as the obstacle to a ceasefire that would bring an end to the suffering of the Lebanese people. "The Shi'a do not have the leverage to quit the cabinet. But if a second resolution does not come, then all of Lebanon will be with them." While these internal discussions are going on, the international community would be working toward a second resolution authorizing the stabilization force and calling for the Israeli withdrawal. So in this sense, according to Salameh, the oft-criticized tendency of the Lebanese confessional system to work at a snail's pace may in fact make the two-phased resolution process workable. ¶3. (C) Salameh expressed disgust at the feeble maneuverings of Lebanon's "political class," from President Lahoud on down. He decried in particular the "lack of muscle," including on the part of PM Siniora, which allows Hizballah to dictate its terms to the Lebanese people. Unable to disguise his own presidential ambitions, Salameh (a Maronite) felt that the passage and successful implementation of a second resolution would weaken Syria and thus President Lahoud so that he might be deposed. Asked about a future career for Lahoud, Salameh responded, "he could do TV talk shows." As for a future president, he needed to be someone "not from either side" (i.e., neither pro-Syrian nor from March 14) who can balance the two trends in Lebanon. BEIRUT 00002551 002 OF 003 KEEPING THE LIRA STEADY -------------- ¶4. (C) Turning to the financial situation, Salameh lamented that, "Nasrallah lied. He said he would not do anything to hurt the economy during the summer." Since the rug has now been pulled out from what many had hoped would be a booming tourist season, Salameh now seeks to keep the lira under control and the banking sector stable, particularly as people begin to default on bank overdrafts. Salameh admitted that in the first fifteen days of the conflict, the CBL lost over 890 million dollars. In addition, dollarization had increased from 72 to 75 per cent which meant that over 1.5 billion dollars had left the country. However, though this is decidedly gloomy news, public confidence is better than it was in the period following the Hariri assassination in 2005, when the CBL used up much of its dollar reserves in order to stabilize the lira. One reason for this confidence, according to Salameh, is that people believe the strategy in 2005 worked and so have faith in the CBL. ¶5. (C) According to Salameh, there are additional factors contributing to this confidence and keeping the situation steady. Saudi Arabia only today confirmed a 1 billion dollar deposit into the CBL's coffers, while discussions are continuing with the Kuwaitis for a further 500 million dollars. The Saudis and Kuwaitis have made loans in the past and have always been repaid with interest and are thus comfortable that the CBL will not default. The CBL is also buoying dollar reserves by forcing Lebanese banks which need Lebanese lira to hand over U.S. dollars in exchange. If the banks then come looking for U.S. dollars, Salameh is accepting Lebanese treasury bonds and giving the banks 3-year U.S. dollar CDs. Salameh noted that interest rates have not changed. "Lift the Blockade" -------------- ¶6. (C) Salameh stressed that these were only stopgap measures based upon the hope that the conflict will end soon. "We cannot sustain this for long." The government deficit is in a "very bad situation" but might be improved if a permanent solution were found to the conflict. Lebanese confidence may start to slip if the Israeli blockade does not let up and people begin to feel the pinch of shortages. Salameh wasd also worried about an escalation of the conflict, especially the possibility of attacks on power plants. He said that the "stupidest thing" the Israelis had done was to bomb the Jounieh Casino bridge on August 4, rather than restricting their strikes to the South. ¶7. (C) Salameh added that any measures which would alleviate the shortages, including the planned delivery of gasoline and diesel fuel by land and by sea in the coming days, would buttress public confidence and stave off any further capital flight. Salameh pleaded for the reopening of the airport and ports, and said he could get the business community to pressure the government to allow UNIFIL forces to monitor the points of entry to interdict any possible resupply of Hizballah. The Aftermath -------------- ¶8. (C) Salameh urged that the international community step in quickly to assist with reconstruction of the South. He warned that if Iran does the lion's share of the rebuilding, they will make people sign an "allegiance for life." Arguing that any GOL-directed assistance effort would undercut donor confidence, Salameh said that he will suggest to Siniora that an independent agency be established, headed by the donors, to review proposals and disburse funds. Unfortunately, Salameh remarked, "I'm sure it won't be accepted." Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Salameh no doubt painted a rosy picture of the BEIRUT 00002551 003 OF 003 Lebanese financial situation for our consumption, and his concerns about the blockade of Lebanon and further bombardments of infrastructure were clearly foremost in his mind. This is a common refrain among the Lebanese with whom we are meeting, and we believe that it is in the USG interest to continue to support initiatives - and help to coordinate with the Israelis - in order to relieve the psychological burden of the blockade. We also suggest that we do all we can to prevent the Israelis from launching any seriously debilitating aerial attacks on Lebanese power plants and remaining fuel depots. FELTMAN