TFLE01: PM SINIORA HOLDS FAST ON SHEBA'A, INSISTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002545 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2016 TAGS: IS LE MOPS PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: TFLE01: PM SINIORA HOLDS FAST ON SHEBA'A, INSISTS THAT LAF (ASSISTED BY UNIFIL) IS UP TO THE TASK Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) A/S Welch's second meeting with PM Siniora in 24 hours clarified Lebanon's preferred sequence of events at cease-fire. But the Prime Minister would not budge from his "requirement" that the IDF withdraw from all Lebanese territory, including Sheba'a. Siniora argued hard that unless the Israeli occupation of Sheba'a ends -- even if the initial transfer into UN custodianship extends into years -- the conflict will continue. He flatly stated, "there will be no deal without Sheba'a." Siniora also urged the U.S. not to allow Syria into the Sheba'a equation by forcing the issue of "border delineation" into the agreement. PM Siniora defended the adequacy of deploying LAF into the south at the time of the cease-fire, as long as the LAF was assisted at first by an augmented UNIFIL, and later by a multi-national stabilization force. Concerning the immediate deployment of LAF to the south, Siniora said Minister of Defense Murr had confirmed the army would be ready to move early next week. And he reiterated his claim that a mission-capable element of several hundred foreign troops would also be ready to deploy within days of the cease-fire. As the meeting concluded, Siniora produced a map that showed relatively conservative boundaries for what Lebanon considers Sheba'a in an attempt to demonstrate the reasonableness of their demands. PM Siniora also commented in passing on the kidnapped IDF soldiers. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) A/S Welch and the Ambassador met with PM Fouad Siniora for nearly two hours at the Grand Serail early in the afternoon of August 5. As with the previous day's meeting, senior Siniora advisors Mohammad Chattah and Rola Nouraddine attended the meeting, as did poloff (notetaker) and Jonathan Schwartz from L. The meeting took place immediately following the Assistant Secretary's meeting with Speaker Nabih Berri. ¶3. (C/NF) PM Siniora expressed keen interest in the reaction of Speaker Berri to the US/FR proposals presented by the Assistant Secretary earlier in the day. When informed that Berri was engaged, professional, and had even indicated some flexibility on timing with regards to Sheba'a, Siniora expressed relief that Berri was still on board with the 7-point approach. BOILS DOWN TO TWO ISSUES -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Although he professed that each of the 7 points dealt with an important cause of the current hostilities, PM Siniora stated that the negotiations would go nowhere unless his Government could achieve two unalterable goals: the "immediate" withdrawal of IDF forces south of the Blue Line upon cease-fire, and a firm commitment on Sheba'a that would remove Israeli presence. INSISTS LAF IS READY TO MOVE 15,000 TROOPS SOUTH -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) PM Siniora stated that his Minister of Defense, Elias Murr, had assured him that 15,000 LAF troops would be ready to deploy to the south in a "matter of days." Murr had assured the Prime Minister that the army was united and the officer corps ready to (finally) fulfill their constitutional responsibility. Siniora countered some skepticism by insisting that the LAF was not the "ragtag" outfit some experts have alleged. According to Siniora, the principal reason it had never moved south was political, specifically Syrian interests during the Syrian occupation, and since then, the political leverage of Hizballah. ¶6. (C/NF) Concerning his proposal that an "augment force" of several hundred mission-capable troops would strengthen UNIFIL, which would be assisting the deployment of the LAF, Siniora said he has already been in touch with the Governments of Malaysia and Indonesia, in addition to Turkey. He believes he has their commitment to send troops for a short-term mission. But he also acknowledged that the presence of "non-Muslim" contingents (he mentioned Spain, Italy, and even Russia) would be of great value -- especially as the Muslim contributors would be from Sunni countries, and BEIRUT 00002545 002 OF 003 the area of deployment was largely Shia. His immediate objective is to win commitments for approximately 2,000 mission-capable troops to augment UNIFIL. ¶7. (C/NF) In response to an inquiry on whether Hizballah would simply move aside as the combined LAF/UNIFIL force moved in, PM Siniora pointed to Amal leader Nabih Berri's recent statement that he would be "riding in the first military vehicle" into the south, implying Berri would never stick out his neck so far without knowing Hizballah's actual intentions. SHEBA'A FARMS REDUX -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Following a review of Israeli concerns with including Sheba'a in the cease-fire agreement, PM Siniora paused for effect, and then stated flatly that without Sheba'a there would be no deal. He characterized the Israeli position as being close to blackmail and then emotionally declared that the Government of Israel "could bomb Lebanon for another month" if it refused to deal with the disputed territory. ¶9. (C/NF) Each time the Assistant Secretary posed a possible alternative treatment of the Sheba'a issue, the Prime Minister grew impatient and somewhat agitated. He insisted the "international community is getting what it wanted (presumably referring to UNSCR 1559) at a heavy cost to the people of Lebanon." He argued that every party came out ahead: the international community with a stable, democratic Lebanon; the pro-reform people of Lebanon received a disarmed Hizballah -- and the people of Israel a northern border at peace. He completed his exposition with the charge that if the Government of Israel does not leave Sheba'a now (initially turning it over to the UN, per his 7-point plan), it would never do so. ¶10. (C/NF) Following his somewhat emotional argument, Siniora fell back into an appeal to the U.S. and the international community not to allow Syria (and Iran) back into a controlling position in Lebanon. He maintained that if Sheba'a continues to remain in Israeli hands, Syria will always control the situation. He continued that if the international community put the land into the care of the UN, Syria would have to behave in a responsible manner -- it could no longer point to Israeli "occupation." Obliquely referring to the inevitable moment when the international community loses interest in Lebanon, the Prime Minister warned, "If you leave Lebanon in the claws of Syria, eventually it will crush us." THE ILLEGALITY OF HIZBALLAH'S ARMS -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) Concerning the critical element of Hizballah's arms after the cease-fire, PM Siniora said that if the agreement was drafted in accordance with the 7 points, only the arms of the Government of Lebanon (LAF) or those it authorized (UNIFIL and the multi-national stabilization force) would be permitted in the south -- all other weapons would be "illegal." ¶12. (C/NF) When asked why should this give the Government of Israel any confidence -- indeed, what was different? -- Siniora responded that the war had changed everything: the Lebanese people were now filled with "bitterness" and would not permit a return to the status quo, the international community was responding with a powerful stabilization force, and the cease-fire agreement would be perceived as comprehensive and just. Siniora implored that the time was finally right, like a "hammer hitting hot, malleable metal." COMMENTS ON IDF PRISONERS -------------- ¶13. (C/NF) Although PM Siniora stated unequivocally he did not know where the two abducted IDF soldiers were, he realized that it was very important to establish whether they were alive. He acknowledged that on July 12, he had heard what he considered credible information that they "were out of the south" -- but that was the last word he had heard. PM Siniora promised to ask (presumably Nabih Berri, who in turn would have to ask others) about their condition. BEIRUT 00002545 003 OF 003 ¶14. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Welch. FELTMAN