TFLE01: SINIORA SOUNDS AN OMINOUS NOTE ON DRAFT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002542 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2015 TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER SY IS LE SUBJECT: TFLE01: SINIORA SOUNDS AN OMINOUS NOTE ON DRAFT RESOLUTION Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Prime Minister Siniora called UNSC member nations' ambassadors to the Grand Serail on the morning of August 6 for a two hour "chat" during which he outlined the GOL's main concerns with the draft UN resolution currently being discussed in New York. During the meeting, which was also attended by Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh and representatives from the P5 and Japan, Greece, Argentina, and Qatar, Siniora said that there are two issues which make the current resolution "unworkable." First, it fails to call for an immediate Israeli withdrawal, and second, it does not provide a concrete plan for the disposition of the Sheba'a Farms. Siniora pleaded with the attendees to "go the extra mile" in order to get a resolution which will empower the Lebanese government. He added that if the resolution is passed in its current form, he expects the Lebanese government will be "in trouble" and hinted at an increase in Sunni-Shia tensions. In a cryptic remark, Siniora said that if the resolution were to pass as is, "the Lebanese government will be in a position where it cannot do anything because there will be something more furious than it can handle," and he suggested also that this resolution would put Lebanon "back under the Syrian knife." (Comment: These frank remarks from Siniora came after the early departure from the meeting of FM Salloukh - a Shiite with the tacit backing of Hizballah - to receive visiting Syrian FM Walid Moallem. End Comment.) During a side conversation with Ambassador Feltman and UK Ambassador Watt after the meeting, Siniora said that a single resolution - rather than the two resolutions favored by the French - was by far the better approach, since it would include the Israeli withdrawal he sees as essential to winning cabinet backing. End Summary. A Chat Among Friends -------------- ¶2. (C) Siniora began by thanking all the UNSC members, especially the U.S. and France, for their efforts to get the current draft resolution calling for a ceasefire. But he then argued that the current resolution is unrealistic in that it would freeze the situation on the ground, leaving Israel in occupation of Lebanese territory taken in the current conflict until the adoption of a second resolution. The situation in the South would be untenable, with the likelihood of hostilities re-erupting. "You're leaving the gasoline and the fire next to each other." Siniora added that the current draft resolution also does not go far enough in proposing a fix for the Sheba'a Farms issue, specifically in not calling for the handover of the area to the United Nations for ultimate disposition. ¶3. (C) Noting that, "these points have been coordinated with the Speaker of the Parliament, who is in contact with Hizballah," Siniora laid out his plan calling for an "immediate, comprehensive, and unconditional ceasefire along with an immediate Israeli withdrawal." The LAF would simultaneously deploy 15,000 soldiers to the South and would assume all Hizballah "weapons, stores, and positions" south of the Litani. Siniora suggested that UNIFIL donor nations provide an additional 2,000 troops to assist in the LAF redeployment, and that after a month these troops would depart or be folded into a newly-mandated international force. On the Sheba'a issue, Siniora reiterated his position that the Israelis hand Sheba'a over to the UN, which would then re-examine whether the territory is Syrian or Lebanese. Towards the end of the meeting, Siniora's staff provided attendees with a GOL-edited version of the draft resolution, which Siniora suggested would be acceptable to all Lebanese parties. (Note: This GOL draft has been forwarded separately by email. End Note.) ¶4. (C) Siniora urged that his plan be given consideration as a means to empower the Lebanese government and also to bring "statehood" to the South. Reiterating that "there is complete harmony between myself and Mr. Berri," Siniora said that he needs a ceasefire deal that is marketable to extremely skeptical Arab and Muslim public opinion. "Help us to retrieve the country and put it in the hands of the moderates, not the extremists." BEIRUT 00002542 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) While Siniora did not state that the GOL would definitely reject the current draft if passed, he hinted at growing disagreement within the Cabinet over the terms of a ceasefire deal, and that his government could collapse over it. While he will not rule out taking a "creative look" at the proposal in order to make it work, he stated clearly that "Hizballah is not going to comply" with the resolution if passed as is, and that this would increase Sunni-Shia tensions while providing the pretext for continued Hizballah militancy and Syrian meddling in Lebanon. However, if a text is adopted by the UNSC in something close to its current form, Siniora said he would take it to the Cabinet for a "democratic" decision. ¶6. (C) Siniora invited comments from the assembled ambassadors. In addition to Ambassador Feltman, only the French, British, and Russian ambassadors spoke up, with all showing support for the current draft resolution, saying it is the best available option and already reflects many Lebanese concerns. A rejection of this resolution would play into the hands of hostile parties and lead Lebanon further down the path to chaos. All four ambassadors emphasized the need to bridge the gap and shorten the time span between the first and second resolutions. ¶7. (C) In a side conversation after the other ambassadors had departed, Siniora expressed to Ambassador Feltman and UK Ambassador Watt his disapproval of the dual resolution approach. "Why have two resolutions? Why not just one?" Siniora sees the logic of a single resolution creating an international force to deploy in southern Lebanon, thereby satisfying an Israeli precondition allowing for a ceasefire with a simultaneous Israeli withdrawal. In private at least, Siniora does not seem concerned that this option would require more time for negotiations and deployment, and would therefore delay a ceasefire. Both ambassadors noted that France was the main objector to a single resolution, which is why the international community is now behind the two-phase concept. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Siniora's "chat" with the ambassadors -- in which he hinted but never explicitly said that the cabinet could not accept the current draft -- concluded just an hour before Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's press conference. Citing the unacceptability of blessing something that left Israeli troops in place inside Lebanon, Berri rejected the current draft. This is ominous. If this resolution has any chance of success in being formally accepted by the Lebanese cabinet, Siniora needs Shia support. Without Berri's backing, Siniora faces difficult choices (assuming the resolution passes in something approaching its current wording). If he brings the resolution to the cabinet for acceptance, the cabinet will either split, which will increase sectarian tensions and perhaps trigger a cabinet collapse. The cabinet might reject it altogether, to avoid giving legitimacy to Israeli troops inside Lebanon. Yet if Siniora chooses not to bring the resolution to the cabinet, he gives tacit approval to the Israelis to continue to pound Lebanon and perhaps expand their targetting to GOL facilities. Put starkly, Siniora is being asked to choose between the international community and his own Shia population. It is not out of the question that Siniora might be assassinated if he is seen as selling out the Shia south to Israeli occupation. ¶9. (C) The French and British ambassadors, along with UN rep Geir Pedersen, are working with us to try to help Siniora find a way to accept this text. If we had more to show on the second resolution, for example, and could compress the time between the resolutions, that might help. (Indeed, we are telling Siniora to push for the second resolution as quickly as possible, to build momentum.) Maybe there are certain assurances that could be provided to him that he could share with the cabinet both on Israeli withdrawal and Sheba'a, to provide some useful content. We will also see if he can criticize the resolution in comments for public consumption, while telling the cabinet that, for the sake of Lebanese civilians, there is no choice but to accept it. It will be hard enough to convince Siniora -- a Sunni worried about problems with the Shia -- to put an official acceptance BEIRUT 00002542 003 OF 003 stamp on Israeli troops in south Lebanon. Speaker Berri will be an even greater problem. FELTMAN