TFLE01: A/S WELCH MEETS WITH SPEAKER BERRI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002541 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016 TAGS: IS LE MOPS PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: TFLE01: A/S WELCH MEETS WITH SPEAKER BERRI Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) a nd (d). ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: On August 5, NEA Assistant Secretary Welch, Ambassador, and PolOff met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, accompanied by Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Hamdan, at his office in Ain al-Tinneh, Beirut. A/S Welch explained to Berri the two-phase resolution being proposed to end the violence. While professional and engaged throughout, Berri described the resolution as favoring Israel. Berri believes that if the Israelis do not withdraw from Shebaa, he cannot pressure Hizballah to relinquish their arms. He indicated that prisoner exchanges can be discussed later. Berri strongly disagreed with having Israeli soldiers remain in Lebanon after a cease fire pending deployment of a stabilization force. As long as there are Israeli troops in Lebanon, Hizballah will fire on them, which will further the violence and sectarian strife. Berri recommended that Israeli troops withdraw to the Shebaa farms and remain there until the implementation of the second phase of efforts to resolve the conflict. He emphasized the importance of having Shebaa as something tangible to induce Hizballah to stop fighting and disarm. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C/NF) A/S Welch opened the discussion by stressing to Berri that the United States agrees that the time to stop fighting is now. The future of Lebanon is at stake and Berri's role is critical. A/S Welch explained to Berri the two-phased strategy, with two resolutions, being proposed to end the violence. He emphasized that the first phase would end the violence, freeze the Israeli forces in their present southern Lebanon positions, and open the door toward the delineation of Shebaa Farms. The second phase, to be implemented as quickly as possible after the first, would withdraw Israeli forces, deploy an international stabilization force, and offer a role for the UNSYG to provide options on Shebaa Farms. ¶3. (C/NF) Berri recognized that the U.S. is working hard to achieve a peace. He explained that he could put pressure on Hizballah to stop fighting if the circumstances were acceptable. However, he needs not only to convince Hizballah but to be convinced himself first. Based on the A/S's description, Berri said that he is not ""personally convinced"" with what is being offered. He described the proposal as ""giving Israel everything and giving Lebanon nothing."" Shebaa Farms -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Berri stressed that the Israeli refusal to return Shebaa farms to Lebanon in the first phase is a signal that Israel does not want to ""close the door on the conflict."" Berri believed that if the Israelis do not withdraw from Shebaa, he cannot pressure Hizballah to relinquish their arms. He told A/S Welch that the resistance will have a right to remain as long as Israel is present in Lebanon. ¶5. (C/NF) A/S Welch told Berri that Israel would not agree to withdraw from Shebaa Farms in the first stage because such a step would appear to be surrendering land to a terrorist organization. Berri noted that he and the entire Arab world are convinced that the USG can convince Israel to withdraw from Shebaa Farms now. A/S Welch offered that in Prime Minister Siniora's seven points, there is a specific reference to Shebaa Farms, and in the resolution draft the first phase will address delineation and the second phase there is a role for the UNSYG to provide options that the GOL would consider. ¶6. (C/NF) The Ambassador then explained that the role of the UN is a common factor between PM Sinora,s seven points and the proposal. The seven points call on the UN to address Shebaa Farms while the resolution gives the UN Secretary-General a major role in the process. Soldier Exchange -------------- ¶7. (A/NF) A/S Welch told Berri that the soldier issue is a problem that will be solved on the side. The Israelis are not giving up on their soldiers but this issue will not be a part of the current process. Berri explained that he understood PM Olmert,s view not to exchange soldiers. He reflected on past soldier exchanges in which thousands of Arab fighters were exchanged for a few Israeli soldiers. This time, however, the exchange would be two Lebanese fighters for the two Israeli fighters. Nonetheless, he agreed that this could be discussed later, and he gestured to put the issue aside. A/S Welch informed Berri that the U.S. would not be involved in the soldier exchange issue. Israeli Soldiers In Lebanon -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Berri recommended that in the first phase, Israeli soldiers should withdraw and 10,000 soldiers from the Lebanese Army would deploy to the south. In what was an unprecedented statement for a Lebanese Shia leader, Berri vowed that he would lead the army to the south, driving a jeep in front of the tanks. A/S Welch cautioned that the Lebanese Army is not seen by Israel as sufficiently strong to stop Hizballah from firing rockets into Israel and that a complementary international force is needed. Berri responded by saying that the Lebanese Army is capable and has been highly regarded in this debate until now. ¶9. (C/NF) Berri expressed deep concern about the resolution's assumption that Israeli occupying troops will be frozen in place until the deployment of the stabilization force. He advised that as long as there are Israeli troops in Lebanon, Hizballah will fire on them. Responding to A/S Welch's suggestion that the time be compressed as much as possible, Berri said that it does not make a difference if the duration between phase one and phase two is one day or one month. When fighting breaks out, Berri will have to take a position against the UN and the resolution. In addition, if there are Israeli troops in Lebanon the hundreds of thousands of diplaced Shia will not go home. He warned that if the U.S. cares about avoiding sectarian strife in Lebanon, Israeli soldiers must withdraw. ""If the Shia remain outside their area for more than one month, then I can't secure unity in Lebanon,"" he counseled. ¶10. (C/NF) Berri stated that he will rebuild the south again, but could not do so with Israeli forces there. ""What I built in 22 years they have destroyed in 22 days,"" he lamented. However, he stated that he is adamant to lead the Shia back to the south when Israeli troops leave, just as he claimed to do after previous times of strife. A/S Welch assured Berri that the U.S. would be a partner in rebuilding Lebanon with emphasis on the south. Berri Recommends Inclusion of Siniora's Seven Points -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) A/S Welch affirmed to Berri that to bring an end to this conflict GOL must act on this resolution quickly. Berri asked for clarification on the two phases and gestured to his aid to take notes. A/S Welch explained the two phases again and Berri replied, ""it won't work."" Instead, he recommended that six or seven of PM Sinora,s seven points be included in the resolution, that the number of UNIFIL troops be increased, and that deployment of the Lebanese Army immediately follow the ceasefire. ¶12. (C/NF) Berri then said that he would support Israeli troops withdrawing to the Shebaa farms and remaining there until the implementation of Phase Two. He argued that it is important for both sides to have something tangible. In his view, Israel will have 10,000 Lebanese Army soldiers in the south protecting the borders and Hizballah will have the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the south. By having something tangible he can pressure Hizballah to stop fighting. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C/NF) Berri took strong issue with the proposed formula on Shebaa Farms, which he found too ambiguous, and the idea that Israeli troops would occupy parts of Lebanon until the stabilization force moved in. But he also remained deeply engaged and professional, signaling that he wants to play a role. Berri's role is key in making sure that there is Shia buy-in to any cease-fire plan. And, while Berri instructed his ministers to vote with Siniora's 7-point plan, he may not give the same instructions if a resolution that he finds unacceptable on Shebaa and IDF withdrawals comes before the cabinet. ¶14. (U) Assistant Secretary Welch has cleared this cable. FELTMAN