TFLE01: PM SINIORA WANTS A SINGLE PHASE AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002535 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016 TAGS: IS LE MOPS PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: TFLE01: PM SINIORA WANTS A SINGLE PHASE AGREEMENT AND INSISTS SHEBAA IS THE KEY Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) PM Siniora pushed back hard against the US/FR plan to implement a cessation of hostilities and Israeli withdrawal in two phases. Worried about Israeli troops remaining inside Lebanon, Siniora prefers a single phase that combines a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory with an immediate deployment of LAF into the south -- assisted by UNIFIL, which itself would be strengthened by a nearly immediate insertion of several hundred "credible" international troops (Siniora specifically mentioned Turkish forces). Siniora is deeply concerned that an approach that relies on the passage of two Security Council resolutions, no matter how short the intervening time interval, will risk a loss of momentum and offer the unacceptable sight of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory. The Prime Minister emphasized the centrality of Shebaa Farms in any cease-fire. He proposed a "transfer" of the problematic territory to UN custody to await final resolution. Siniora stated that he has heard "indirectly" that Syria would accept this, as long as the borders were not permanently delineated. Finally, Siniora specifically suggested the U.S. military, by providing steel trestle bridges, could take the lead in expeditiously repairing the approximately 75 damaged bridges that are crippling the country's economy. End summary. ¶2. (U) A/S Welch met with PM Fouad Siniora for nearly two hours at the Grand Serail in Beirut on the evening of August ¶4. Senior GOL Advisor Mohammad Chatta and Assistant Rola Nouraddine attended the meeting, as did Ambassador Feltman and poloff (notetaker). ¶3. (C/NF) PM Siniora appreciated the Assistant Secretary's statement that the US wanted to "end this thing now." But once he mulled over the proposed US plan to cease hostilities and effect a withdrawal of Israeli forces, he pushed back hard. Siniora argued that "freezing forces in place" until an international stabilization force could be introduced would be far too risky, because IDF and Hizballah forces would be in close proximity and any cease-fire could not be expected to hold in such conditions. WANTS IDF OUT AT TIME OF CEASE-FIRE -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Although Siniora used the argument of the inherent instability of an interim period between two UNSC resolutions, it was clear from his other comments and those of his advisor, Mohammad Chatta, that what the Prime Minister really wanted to avoid was the presence of Israeli troops on "captured Lebanese territory" after the cessation of hostilities was called upon the first resolution. His remarks and observations throughout the lengthy meeting indicated that, probably even more important than the usual Lebanese obsession with Shebaa Farms, Siniora feared an undetermined timeframe with Israeli presence in parts of south Lebanon as well as the difficulties in preventing Hizballah from attacking the occupying troops. ¶5. (C/NF) Siniora repeatedly mentioned that a two-phase approach would risk loss of momentum and might result in a completely unsatisfactory "temporary" situation. He argued that he had spent an enormous amount of scarce political capital in fashioning a consensus across the wide spectrum of Lebanese politics for his 7-point plan. He maintained that if only a few of the points were achieved in the first UNSC resolution, there was no guarantee that the other points, especially concerning Shebaa, would be addressed by a second resolution. ¶6. (C/NF) Siniora recognized the irony that his present position closely resembles the initial US position of a single, comprehensive agreement that covered all the issues, and he evidenced some skepticism that the US thought it could now lead the Security Council into passing two complex resolutions in a week or two. ¶7. (C/NF) When asked to provide an outline of his own approach, he suggested that both parties withdraw from the zone of conflict, and particularly that the IDF withdraw behind the Blue Line. He then proposed the LAF immediately move into south Lebanon -- specifically that they move into former Hizballah positions. He maintained that UNIFIL BEIRUT 00002535 002 OF 003 forces, if authorized by an overarching UNSC resolution, could assist the LAF in this formidable task, since it was already operating in the general area and was an established entity. He further proposed that UNIFIL itself could be made "more robust" by the near immediate insertion of mission-ready troops from countries such as Turkey -- with whom Siniora has evidently already broached the idea. ¶8. (C/NF) Siniora responded to skepticism over the term "immediate" by assuring the Assistant Secretary he could call on "friends" who could provide several hundred mission capable troops in "three or four days." He maintained that the combination of LAF and an augmented UNIFIL could hold the line until a more capable multi-national stabilization force could be formulated and deployed to south Lebanon. ¶9. (C/NF) It was clear that Siniora wanted two valuable "optics" at the time of cease-fire: he wanted IDF troops to withdraw behind the Blue Line, and he wanted the Government of Lebanon to take control of the south in the form of an immediate LAF deployment. THE CENTRALITY OF SHEBAA -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) As he has in previous meetings, PM Siniora argued that a just resolution of the Shebaa Farms issue significantly helped both the Government of Israel and the Government of Lebanon -- and created an enormous problem for Hizballah and its Syrian/Iranian sponsors. Siniora said he understood the ambiguity of the area and the fact that Israel did not want to "reward" Hizballah's inexcusable actions. But he countered that the reward, if that was the right word, would accrue to a democratic Lebanon, not to Hizballah. Siniora said it was the one issue that had to be addressed by any comprehensive cease-fire, otherwise instability would continue, Syria would maintain its leverage, and Israel would always have a dangerous border. ¶11. (C/NF) Consistent with his 7-point plan, Siniora proposed that Shebaa, "40 square kilometers of marginal land with no villages nor any people," be transferred to UN custodianship pending the delineation of its borders and sovereignty of the land. He confided that the UN may be there "one year or 100 years" -- it did not matter as long as the Lebanese people witnessed the departure of Israeli troops from the last parcel of occupied Lebanese land. Siniora said the IDF withdrawal didn't even have to be immediate, but it was his conviction the issue had to be settled. ¶12. (C/NF) Toward the end of the meeting, Siniora made an impassioned argument that Israel, even with its treaties with Egypt and Jordan, had never enjoyed secure and stable borders. But with the end of its "occupation" of Lebanon (i.e. Shebaa),it could assure itself of peace along its northern border. BUT WILL HIZBALLAH GO ALONG -------------- ¶13. (C/NF) In answer to the inquiry of whether Hizballah would adhere to a cease-fire, Siniora argued that if the agreement was indeed comprehensive and equitable Hizballah really only had two choices: adhere to its long-stated goals and end its "resistance" once the last piece of Lebanese territory had been returned, or continue hostilities and expose itself to the Lebanese people and the region as a mere proxy of the Iranian and Syrian regimes. Siniora believed that Hizballah would follow the first option. ¶14. (C/NF) Here, he remarked, was where Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri came into play. Berri, with his excellent connections and deep ties in the Shia community, was the only person in Lebanon who could not only carry a message to Nasrallah, but could also influence him. Siniora failed to fully explain why Nasrallah would agree to a cease-fire, but insisted his 7-points had such wide support in Lebanon that even Nasrallah would have to accept them, if they were adopted as the basis of the agreement. AN UNEXPECTED REQUEST -------------- ¶15. (C/NF) While discussing the extent of the damage inflicted by IDF air strikes and ground incursions, PM Siniora straight-forwardly asked if the "US Army," presumably BEIRUT 00002535 003 OF 003 the Army Corps of Engineers, could rebuild the more than 75 bridges that had been damaged or destroyed over the past three weeks. He said the methodical destruction of the road system in Lebanon by the IDF threatened the recovery of his country more than any other single factor. He implied that only a proven engineering entity, with access to items such as steel trestles, could do the job quickly. (Note: Although there are numerous complications, a highly visible program such as this may help counter the high level of anti-American sentiment that has built up over the course of the war. End note.) NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶16. (C/NF) PM Siniora was aware of the Assistant Secretary's upcoming meeting with Nabih Berri. He advised SIPDIS that Berri would be difficult, but he assured the Assistant Secretary that Berri was still in full support of the 7-point SIPDIS plan. Siniora confided that Berri has been under tremendous pressure to back away from this support, particularly by the Iranian Foreign Minister who had visited Beirut this past Wednesday, but he had stood firm. Siniora indicated he would have more definite positions once the Berri meeting was concluded. ¶17. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Welch. FELTMAN