TFLE01: HAMADEH SEES RESOLUTION OF SHEBAA FARMS AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002511 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2026 TAGS: IR IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: TFLE01: HAMADEH SEES RESOLUTION OF SHEBAA FARMS AS MEANS TO NEUTRALIZE HIZBALLAH IDEOLOGICALLY Classified By: Classified by: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: S ection 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) On August 1, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh told the Ambassador and Emboff that there is no need to get Syrian support for a potential settlement of the Shebaa Farms issue. Hamadeh expressed confidence that any agreement for an Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa, whether or not Syria signs off on it or it is actually implemented on the ground, could remove a major plank from Hizballah's propaganda platform. Referring to the 7-point plan presented by PM Siniora in Rome, Hamadeh offered that this document, supported by the entire Lebanese Cabinet, could be used as the basis for an official GOL request for a UN resolution. On the state of the Lebanese Cabinet, Hamadeh said that there were no signs of an impending collapse of the government, noting that some Ministers were hedging their bets for a post-war, pro-Hizballah orientation. Hamadeh expressed concern that the under-equipped Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would be unable to fulfill their role in a post-conflict peace plan without significant assistance. He argued that LAF deployment to the south could begin immediately upon a cease-fire, for Hizballah would not dare to object or block it. Hamadeh also suggested moving now on a UNSCR regarding the Hariri tribunal, in order to put Hizballah off balance. End Summary. ¶2. (C/NF) On the afternoon of August 1, the Ambassador and emboff met with Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh at his office in downtown Beirut. Also sitting in on the meeting was Minister of Displaced Persons Nehmeh Tohmeh. Hamadeh offered insights into the internal strategizing occurring in the Lebanese Cabinet regarding a potential UN resolution that would be passed at the same time as a cease-fire agreement. Hamadeh stressed the need for quick action on a UN Resolution, based on the GOL's 7-point paper, presented by PM Siniora in Rome last week. Hamadeh strategized that PM Siniora could forward the 7-point plan, which already has unanimous support from the Lebanese Cabinet, to the UN in its current form without the need to bring the issue in front of the Cabinet. ¶3. (C/NF) Noting a summit of Lebanese Christian, Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze religious leaders earlier in the day which fully and unconditionally endorsed Siniora's 7-point paper, Hamadeh speculated that such wide support for the document could give Siniora adequate political coverage if it was to be forwarded to the UN Security Council. Any return of the document to the Cabinet for further discussion would not be productive, Hamadeh said, "if we go back, we will be lost in the details." In particular, Hamadeh noted that the Shi'a ministers, while agreeing to support the 7-point document as a whole, were interested in re-opening discussion on the details of point number 5, concerning the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force. LEAVE SHEBAA, NEUTRALIZE HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) The agreement for the withdrawal of Israel from Shebaa Farms, said Hamadeh, would, regardless of the outcome, go far in removing Hizballah's favorite propaganda tool. Hamadeh offered that Lebanon is, "still hostage to Syria and Hizballah" as long as the issue of Shebaa can be kept alive among the Lebanese. Speculating on the contents of a future UN Security Council resolution, Hamadeh wondered out loud if it was even necessary for the GOL to get Syria's explicit, written, and internationally-recognized blessing to negotiate an Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa. Hamadeh dismissed concerns that lacking an official, written Syrian declaration that Shebaa Farms are in fact Lebanese would allow Syria to reclaim the territory later on and potentially scuttle the cease-fire along with it. Whether or not Syria agrees to a potential UNSC resolution, said Hamadeh, is irrelevant. For Hamadeh, the resolution would need to be drafted in a way that removes any "alibi" for Syria and Hizballah to keep Shebaa Farms as a pretext for continued military action. ¶5. (C/NF) Hamadeh sees two possible scenarios resulting from a UNSC resolution, which would include an Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa. First, if Syria agrees and does not challenge Lebanese control over the Shebaa territory, Lebanese BEIRUT 00002511 002 OF 003 sovereignty would be restored, international forces could deploy to the region until such time as the Lebanese Army could mobilize to replace them, and Hizballah would have no territorial pretext for maintaining its "resistance." In the second scenario, if Syria rejects the resolution and claims the territory as Syrian, Israel would stay in Shebaa, the international force would not deploy, and Hizballah would still lose its pretext for continued resistance to Israeli occupation of "Lebanese" territory. For Hamadeh, both potential outcomes would serve to corner Syria and Hizballah politically. Hamadeh added that if Hizballah were to reject this potential resolution, the party would lose face and feel greater pressure from public opinion, particularly amongst the Shi'a. ARM THE LEBANESE ARMY NOW -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Hamadeh indicated that there would be no difficulty in implementing a UN sponsored cease-fire. Once the LAF is sent to the South, Hamadeh explained, Hizballah will not confront it. Hamadeh did express reservations about the capability of the LAF, due to their limited ammunition supplies and reliance on old and marginally-serviceable equipment. Hamadeh offered that support for the LAF is an equally important part of the eventual post-conflict stabilization of Lebanon as the make-up of the international peacekeeping force. If the LAF is to be called on to deploy, said Hamadeh, the LAF has immediate material needs that need to be met. Hamadeh suggested that supplies and equipment could be rapidly transferred to the LAF from NATO reserve units. Hamadeh stressed that, "the time for high diplomatic maneuvering is now. The time to strengthen the army is now." LEBANESE CABINET STILL WORKING TOGETHER -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Hamadeh denied rumors that the Cabinet was nearing collapse, noting that most of the ministers were "playing (the situation) correctly." Hamadeh said that, "the Cabinet is solid," and noted that there is a general view that there is a need for the government to remain in place for the sake of the cease-fire negotiations and the implementation of any UNSC resolutions related to the cease-fire. On the surprising decision to send Greek Orthodox and pro-March 14th Minister of Culture Tarek Mitri to represent Lebanon at the UN, instead of the Shi'a, Hizballah-sympathizing FM Fawzi Salloukh, Hamadeh flatly offered that Berri had agreed to the arrangement, noting a need for a more polished presentation in New York. Hamadeh described a significant change in Minister of Defense Elias El-Murr's demeanor, characterizing him as playing both sides. Hamadeh said that El-Murr believes the Hizballah will "win" in the current conflict and is trying to save himself politically for the post-conflict sorting-out of the political scene here. Hamadeh recounted that Siniora was furious at El-Murr at a recent cabinet meeting for his comments to the media to the effect that, "the 7 points (of Siniora's paper) do not exist". ¶7. (C/NF) Other ostensibly "pro-Syrian" members of the cabinet have been surprisingly quiet, Hamadeh said. Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, an erstwhile ally of President Emile Lahoud, has been, "playing it better than Elias (El-Murr)," offered Hamadeh. Rizk has even been pushing forward the Cabinet's work on the establishment of an international tribunal to try suspects in the crimes under the purview of Serge Brammertz's UNIIIC. According to Hamadeh, Rizk has made great progress, appointing "two good judges." Hamadeh stressed that they should take advantage of Rizk's openness to work on this issue. For Hamadeh, now is the time to pass a resolution to establish the tribunal, as this would serve to "keep Syria quiet" on the current Lebanese-Israeli conflict as well as further contain the Syrians in the long run. Hamadeh was confident that the passage of such a resolution would not be difficult at the current juncture. IRANIAN FM MOTTAKI IN BEIRUT -------------- ¶8. (C) Hamadeh quoted French Ambassador Bernard Emie characterizing the visit of the Iranian FM Mottaki to Beirut as "useful, but not helping a resolution." For Hamadeh, Iran sees the current events in Lebanon as part of the wider crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions. Hamadeh said that Iran is clearly angry with UNSCR 1696 adopted this week. Iran is "closed" on the Lebanon issue, with all matters BEIRUT 00002511 003 OF 003 except for a cease-fire said to need political consensus for implementation. Hamadeh described the Iranian opposition to the 7-point paper presented by PM Siniora in Rome. Hamadeh characterized Mottaki as taking particular issue with the GOL's stance on the resolution of the Shebaa Farms issue and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in the South, adding that the Iranians "are not happy with (Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih) Berri." FELTMAN