TFLE01: PM SINIORA UPBEAT ON CEASE-FIRE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002489 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016 TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: TFLE01: PM SINIORA UPBEAT ON CEASE-FIRE POSSIBILITIES BEIRUT 00002489 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) In a July 28 meeting with the Ambassador, PM Fouad Siniora was in buoyant spirits following what he saw as a major political victory in last night's (July 27) meeting of the Council of Ministers. Siniora said after several hours of tense argument, he finally told the Council that either they support his 7-point approach to cease-fire negotiations, or he would stop negotiations. By a unanimous vote, the Ministers -- including those allied with Hizballah -- voted to fully support Siniora. Concerning potential roadblocks with the Israelis, Siniora said he realized his approach regarding the "UN International Force" (which as written appears to be merely a strengthened UNIFIL) was a long way from GOI's position, but he insisted that he had "gone to the brink." Siniora maintained that sufficient leeway existed in his 7-point language for the UN Security Council to create a capable stabilization force with an effective mandate, but he could not explicitly spell it out prior to a cease-fire understanding. He also understood the GOI would have difficulty with the stipulation that the international force would be restricted to south Lebanon -- and therefore unable to prevent the resupply of weaponry from Syria. But again, the Prime Minister maintained that at this stage of discussions, it was as far as he could go without splitting his government. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The meeting on July 28 with the Ambassador and poloff took place against a backdrop of other political developments in Lebanon. Speaker Nabih Berri, who on July 27 ruled out any international force, backtracked and stressed in an interview on Al Jezeera that PM Siniora, as head of government, represented all Lebanese and he fully supported the approach the Prime Minister was taking in his discussions. Meanwhile, Hizballah MP Hassan Fadlallah reportedly told LBC television that Hizballah did not object to the government's authority throughout Lebanon. A KEY POLITICAL VICTORY -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) PM Siniora recounted that Thursday evening's Cabinet meeting was long, difficult, but ultimately rewarding, both in immediate terms and possibly, for longer timeframe objectives. Siniora said winning unanimous authorization to negotiate on the basis of his Rome statement required him to go to the edge -- and implied that it had been a close call. But with the successful Cabinet vote in his pocket, he can now enter into serious discussions on the final form of the cease-fire. More than that, Siniora stated that the cease-fire was now within reach, and would be durable and comprehensive. ¶4. (C/NF) The Prime Minster went through the 7 points he presented in Rome. He admitted the first paragraph, which proposed an "undertaking" to release prisoners on both sides through the offices of the ICRC, was not a breakthrough and most likely unacceptable in any form to Israel, but he felt that Hizballah was becoming more pliant on the matter. He believed the second point, the return of the IDF behind the Blue Line, was almost a given and should not prove difficult for the GOI to accept. Similarly, he did not believe the landmine maps were a problem. ¶5. (C/NF) Siniora said he understood the complications of the third point, dealing with the transfer of Shebaa Farms to UN jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty were settled, particularly due to the fact that the UN still regarded Shebaa as Syrian territory. Siniora also recognized that the GOI did not want to concede the one issue that Hizballah had since 2000 used as one of its main reasons to exist. But Siniora said that by initially transferring Shebaa to UN jurisdiction, it was putting distance between the lightning rod issue and Hizballah. Siniora underscored that assembling a successful package requires something on Shebaa Farms. ¶6. (C/NF) The criticality of the fourth point - the government's authority over all of Lebanon as exercised through its own "legitimate armed forces" -- was emphasized. Siniora said he hoped GOI would recognize that this was the key to its own security, in that it would force Hizballah BEIRUT 00002489 002.3 OF 002 from its sanctuary and base. And he pointed out that its implementation on the basis of Ta'if made it far more likely to succeed. Responding to the Ambassador's expressions of skepticism about the GOL's abilities, he acknowledged the LAF was presently not capable of extending its control over the south by itself, but with the deployment of the UN international force (fifth point) at the time of the cease-fire, the constitutional responsibility of the LAF could be accomplished in phases. Siniora noted that his language was preferable to any formula by which only a "buffer zone" was created in southern Lebanon, as his language was applicable across the whole country. ¶7. (C/NF) Siniora realized the phrasing of his statement regarding the UN international force would be unacceptable to GOI in two ways: its limited operating area, and the connotation that the Government of Lebanon was simply proposing a UNIFIL on steroids. To counter this argument, the Prime Minister noted that his statement included the words "...supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate, and scope of operation." Siniora maintained that such wording would allow the UN Security Council to basically completely overhaul the peacekeeping force and authorize it to be fully capable of carrying out its objectives of security, stabilization, and reconstruction. "You have to understand," Siniora said, "I'm going as far as I possibly can." ¶8. (C/NF) Siniora informed the Ambassador that at this point "he could offer no more." He stated that Hizballah, through its intermediaries (Nabih Berri and the government's Shia Ministers) kept asking what his language meant, but he expressed confidence that once the Security Council created the force, Hizballah would have make the crucial choice: accept its deployment or reveal itself for what it is. ¶9. (C/NF) According to Siniora, the sixth point dealing with mutual acceptance of the Armistice Agreement of 1949 should pose no serious problem to GOI, but said he did realize its lack of clarity on a full resolution of bi-lateral relations was less than optimum. But here the Prime Minister emphasized that the cease-fire must not be seen as leading to a full peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. "We simply are not there yet," he remarked, but he did state his belief that the cease-fire could open many regional opportunities. As he has before, he urged that the Armistice Agreement be used as the "destination point." ¶10. (C/NF) Concerning his final point on international assistance to help rebuild Lebanon, he said its inclusion was very important in that reconstruction would help restore stability and reduce confessional tensions. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C/NF) Prime Minister Siniora was noticeably more positive that at any time since hostilities began on July 12. The Prime Minister acted like he sees the end in sight and believes his Rome statement -- and the success at finally achieving consensus in his motley Council of Ministers -- provides the basis for a just and durable solution. He is anticipating his next meeting with SecState and is hopeful that GOI sees what he believes is the key to its own security. End comment. FELTMAN