TFLE01: ISRAEL HITS SOUTHERN BEIRUT HARD; AIRPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002386 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2016 TAGS: IS LE MOPS PTER SUBJECT: TFLE01: ISRAEL HITS SOUTHERN BEIRUT HARD; AIRPORT STRUCK AGAIN REF: BEIRUT 2349 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Subsequent to reftel, Israeli aircraft have bombed two small airports, a power plant, and struck hard at targets in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Two rockets were reported to have struck Haifa, but Hizballah denied responsibility and UNIFIL could not confirm that the rockets were launched from Lebanon. Press is reporting that three Lebanese civilians were killed and 50 wounded in the Israeli airstrikes on the southern suburbs. All five MEA planes left BIA by 1100 hrs. local this morning. Embassy contacts expressed frustration with Hizballah for provoking a major escalation with Israel. End summary. SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN LAST 24 HOURS -------------- ¶2. (C) The following is an update of events since reftel using UN sources and Embassy contacts, and where necessary, press reporting. All times are approximate and in local time. July 13 1500 Rumors surfaced that Israel threatened to bomb the southern suburbs of Beirut and warned residents to evacuate. A trusted Shia journalist who lives in south Beirut reported to polstaff that no one was taking the warning seriously. In fact, Shia morale in south Beirut was high, and Hizballah buses were collecting people for a 1700 demonstration. 1600 UN Political Officer Georges Nasr briefed econoff on the current situation in the south. According to Nasr, sporadic gunfire exchanges have continued throughout the day at various points along the Blue Line. A few more Israeli airstrikes were reported this afternoon. UNIFIL observed three Israeli gunboats crossing the line of buoys that represents the maritime Blue Line. Later, UNIFIL observed one gunboat off the coast just north of Naqoura and another off Tyre. The third is unaccounted for. As of 1600 hrs. local, UNIFIL had not observed any Israeli ground forces in Lebanon. 1700 Two small airports were hit by Israeli airstrikes. The first is Quleiat Airport, located 20 km northeast of Tripoli near the Syrian border, and the second is Rayak Airfield, a small utility airfield in the Biqa' Valley. (See 05 BEIRUT 4117 for background on Quleiat Airport.) An official at the Ministry of Transportation confirmed these reports. 2100 Two rockets hit Haifa, Israel. Hizballah denied that its fighters launched the rockets. UNIFIL did not observe the rockets launched from Lebanon, and has no further information to confirm or dispute Israeli claims. 2120 Israeli gunboats bombarded Beirut International Airport, setting fuel tanks on fire. July 14 0330 Israeli aircraft pounded the southern suburbs of Beirut. Explosions, sonic booms, and antiaircraft artillery fire could be heard at the Embassy. Press reported three Lebanese civilians dead and 50 wounded. Embassy contacts in the southern suburbs have left the area. In the morning, a large pillar of black smoke hung over Beirut. Early morning Israeli jets bombed power plant in Jiyye, just north of Sidon. 0430-0900 UNIFIL observed very little fighting in southern Lebanon, apart from some sporadic gunfire. 0500 Israeli jets struck the PFLP-GC base at Qussaya in the Biqa' Valley just a few kilometers from the Syrian border. (See 05 BEIRUT 1604 for background information on the PLFP-GC base.) 0800 Al Manar tlevision station claimed Israeli jets bombed BEIRUT 00002386 002 OF 003 a television antenna in the Biqa' Valley. 0822 Unconfirmed reports of Israeli gunboats shelling north of Sidon. 0825 An Israeli air raid against a major bridge of the Beirut-Damascus highway has made that bridge impassable. 0900 UNIFIL observed Israeli airstrikes near Khiam. 1030 UNIFIL reported Israeli artillery shells falling in southern Lebanon near the Blue Line. There is little to no return fire from Lebanon at this time. No Israeli ground forces observed inside Lebanon. 1030 UN Political Officer told econoff that it appears Middle Eastern Airlines will be able to evacuate its remaining five aircraft from the airport, pending UN negotiations. 1100 All five MEA planes and one private plane (belonging to former PM Mikati) successfully left BIA by 1100. PM Siniora, Central Bank Governor Salameh expressed their appreciation to the U.S. President and USG for their help on this matter. 1125 Israel dropped four bombs on the two runways at BIA, according to Civil Aviation DG Hamdi Chaouk. REACTIONS TO ISRAELI STRIKES -------------- ¶3. (C) Speaking with emboff on July 13, former Information Minister Michel Samaha characterized the ongoing Israeli reaction as a "normal" one. Based on his reading of public Israeli statements, he did not expect "real escalation." No Israeli military action was capable of changing the internal situation in Lebanon. Only internal Lebanese dialogue can make that happen. This is the task that lies ahead once the situation calms down. Rather than the national dialogue, he advocated the formation of trilateral negotiations among MP Saad Hariri, Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, and MP Michel Aoun. This arrangement was necessary to "cook" a solution before the broader National Dialogue process started up again. (Comment: Samaha may be taking inspiration from the Syrian-brokered Tripartite Agreement of the 1980s, which brought together the LF, Amal, and the PSP, and in which he played a major "fixer" role. End comment.) ¶4. (C) Samaha did not argue with the suggestion that the ongoing crisis has diminished Aoun's credibility, but insisted that the Lebanese still need to build on the "bridge" that Aoun extended to Nasrallah. The idea is to get the Maronite and Sunni communities jointly to "contain" Hizballah. The only alternative is "civil war with Hizballah." The immediate task, Samaha said, is to find a way to get Saad Hariri back to Lebanon, in order to get 3-way talks started. ¶5. (C) Separately on July 13, Aounist MP Farid el-Khazen told emboff that Lebanon was in a "terrible situation," and that he did not "see a way out." He saw Hizballah's kidnapping of Israeli soldiers as a "carbon copy" of what provoked the ongoing crisis in Gaza, and worried about the implications of Israeli retaliation. He was also furious at what he saw as Nasrallah's lies at the national dialogue promising to keep the Blue Line quiet this summer. He admitted that Aoun's agreement with Hizballah is becoming hard to defend. SHIA JOURNALIST FLEES SOUTH BEIRUT; VIEWS HIZBALLAH STRATEGY -------------- ¶6. (C) On July 13, Ali al-Amin, columnist for the Arabic language daily al-Balad and son of Shia "third way" leader Sheikh Mohammad Hassan al-Amin, told emboff that he had taken his family out of Beirut's southern suburbs because of reports that the Israelis had called on the civilian population to evacuate. Amin noted that, were Israel actually to launch attacks on Beirut (which it later did), his family would be in a fix, since moving to their village home in southern Lebanon is no longer an option, either. ¶7. (C) Offering his analysis of why Hizballah provoked the violence by kidnapping two Israeli soldiers, Amin described Hizballah as being made up of two wings: a military/security BEIRUT 00002386 003 OF 003 wing, and a political wing. The military/security wing held decision-making authority, with Imad Mughaniyeh as one of the central figures. In recent years, especially following Syria's withdrawal, however, a large portion of Hizballah's membership took interest in a more "political" direction, and had seen that doing so could lead to benefits (such as participation in a cabinet for the first time). In this spirit, Hizballah officials revived discussion of the "Elisar" land development project, for example, talking about turning that area into a major tourism zone. While "some were betting on this new trend," according to Amin, Hizballah's military/security wing decided to re-assert control. Taking into consideration Iranian calculations (such as in the Persian Gulf and the nuclear issue) and the situation in Gaza, they decided to launch the July 12 attack on the Blue Line, and, in so doing, "open a battle" with Israel. ¶8. (C) The hostage-taking of July 12 had been planned for some time, according to Amin. It was fair to say that Hizballah, in the lead-up to July 12, had taken advantage of recent steps that suggested it was going in the opposite (that is, a more "political") direction, such as the February 6 agreement with Michel Aoun. Amin suggested that some in Hizballah -- presumably in the military/security wing -- share an interest with the Israelis in the kind of destruction that would set Lebanon back, as some Israeli officials have reportedly threatened, 20 years or so. ¶9. (C) Amin said there were two possible outcomes to the current situation, and he was worried about both. If Hizballah wins, this would mean that the project of building a Lebanese state had failed decisively. If Hizballah loses, this would portend even greater sectarian strife in Lebanon. Regarding the second possibility, Amin said that most Lebanese Shia see Hizballah not as "the resistance," and not in terms of confrontation with Israel, but rather as the most powerful defender of Shia communal interests against threats from other Lebanese communal groups. Amin suggested that it was difficult to imagine that Lebanese Shias pushing for a political "third way" independent of both Hizballah and Amal would be able to make much progress in the current situation. FELTMAN