MGLE01: BRAMMERTZ SLOGS ON WITH UNIIIC BOUND BY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 002293 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016 TAGS: PTER KCRM PINR ASEC SY LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: BRAMMERTZ SLOGS ON WITH UNIIIC BOUND BY RED TAPE Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) According to United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Commissioner Serge Brammertz, administrative delays with the UN's bureaucracy have taken up 50 to 70 percent of his time in the last month and have significantly hindered the UNIIIC's efficacy and progress. The situation has become serious enough, Brammertz explained, that he is considering a presenting a formal briefing to the Security Council to address this issue. But he specifically asked the USG not/not to raise this on its own. Brammertz is also waiting for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to approve his leave of absence so that he can continue on as UNIIIC Commissioner through December 2006. The ICC is expected to make its decision by July 15, but Brammertz said that a good word from the USG to UN Legal Advisor Nicholas Michel, asking Michel to press the ICC, would help his case. In the meantime, the UNIIIC continues various interviews and forensic investigations, and is establishing material links between suspects through cell phone records. The Commissioner explained the level of Syria's cooperation with the investigation in some detail, but surprisingly said that some western "allies" -- we learned from another UN official he meant France -- are flatly non-cooperative with Commission requests for assistance. Brammertz is also beginning to consider potential locations for a UNIIIC rear-operating base and the international tribunal. End summary. THE COMMISSIONER'S SHORT TENURE -------------- ¶2. (C) On July 6, the Ambassador and emboff met UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz at his Monteverde headquarters. Brammertz had requested the meeting to update the Ambassador on the investigation's progress before his meetings in Washington on July 11 and 12. Brammertz repeated his request that the Washington consultations not be publicized. During the 90-minute meeting, Brammertz described a slew of administrative headaches that he claimed had taken 50 to 70 percent of his time in the past month, hindering the UNIIIC's efficacy and investigatory progress. Most of the delays appeared to be the result of a cumbersome UN bureaucracy, which seemed to affect everything from the UNIIIC's hiring procedures to housing issues and even its food supply. Asked by the Ambassador, Brammertz said that he did not/not want the USG to raise these issues now with the UN. ¶3. (C) The issue of most immediate importance, however, had to do with Brammertz's very appointment as UNIIIC commissioner. Brammertz explained that his leave of absence as the ICC's deputy prosecutor general expires on July 15, and that his future on the Commission will depend on whether or not the ICC's member nations approve his extension to remain on the international investigation through December of this year. Brammertz was hopeful that his extension would be approved. However, as a public servant working at the pleasure of the ICC, he would respect the ICC's decision on the matter. Brammertz explained that the United Kingdom and France strongly support his extension, but that other ICC member countries, including Germany, are against it. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked if there was anything the USG could to help his bid to stay on as UNIIIC commissioner. Brammertz suggested that a call on UN legal director Nicholas Michel and Larry Johnson in New York, expressing strong USG support for his work on the UNIIIC, would be helpful. Michel and Johnson could then work on ensuring the support of Germany and fence-sitting ICC countries. ¶5. (C) Even assuming that his extension request is approved, however, Brammertz said it was very unlikely that he could stay on as commissioner past December. "I'll get another five months and then that's it." (COMMENT: A widely-shared hope in Lebanon is that, by January 2007, the international tribunal charged with trying the Hariri assassination case will be in place, and that Brammertz will have assembled enough evidence to begin the prosecution, assuming the new role of chief prosecutor himself. End comment.) GROWING PAINS: TRAILER PARKS AND FOOD POISONING BEIRUT 00002293 002 OF 005 -------------- --- ¶6. (C) If his expiring tenure were not enough to keep him occupied, Brammertz also described a whole range of administrative issues that demand his constant attention and that of his staff, prying them away from the pressing business of tracking down the killers of Rafiq Hariri. Brammertz said his staff has now far exceeded the available space in the Monteverde hotel that is the UNIIIC's main operating base. The UNIIIC is trying to secure trailers to house staff on the hotel's grounds. A small "trailer park" has already sprouted on the grounds, but it is insufficient to meet the UNIIIC's housing needs. More trailers are on order, but, with UN procurement being painfully slow, the investigation is experiencing a serious housing shortage. ¶7. (C) Even worse, Brammertz said that bacterial contamination in the Monteverde hotel's kitchen is laying out four to five staff members a day with food poisoning. "Usually they are out for three or four days, some have required hospitalization. Thankfully, I haven't gotten sick yet, nor have my senior staff. That would be a real problem." CONSIDERING A REAR OPERATING BASE -------------- ¶8. (C) One possible solution to the housing issue would be to relocate some of the UNIIIC's support staff to a rear operating base outside of Lebanon. This would also have the benefit of lowering their security profile and providing a second fallback base in the event that the main operating base is targeted by a major terrorist attack (something Brammertz and his staff are obviously working to avoid, but are forced to consider nonetheless). ¶9. (C) Brammertz said he would prefer that the location of the rear operating base serve as the location for the international tribunal as well. "I've discussed this with my staff, and they prefer Spain or Italy, of course. But these may be good options. They have military bases we could use as secure locations." Brammertz added that they are considering Cyprus as well. The main difficulty, however, would be to convince another country to agree to host a UNIIIC base and an international tribunal, something that would surely raise concern about retributive terrorist attacks. STAFF SHORTAGES -------------- ¶10. (C) In the meantime, however, Brammertz said his work is being slowed down by insufficient staff numbers and a slow, inefficient UN hiring process. Brammertz said that he has selected 15 new investigators who have been stuck in limbo since May, many waiting for medical clearances. Brammertz is also having an ongoing dispute with the UN about hiring people at the "correct" grade. "I want to hire a qualified person at a certain position, but they tell me I can't because they are at a lower grade. I find other people who want to come on for other positions, and they tell me I can't because that person would be overqualified." ¶11. (C) "They tell me that I would get in trouble if my administrative practices were reviewed by a UN panel, but I'd rather complete my mission than worry about meeting all of their bureaucratic requirements," Brammertz said. He explained that, if he were in the process of establishing a permanent UN office, it would make sense to focus on so many administrative details. However, with a temporary commission established to carry out a specific, highly time-sensitive goal, it is "insane" to hinder progress for the sake of the fulfilling self-imposed bureaucratic requirements. "What's the point of waiting five months to hire someone when the Commission only has five months to do its work?" Brammertz complained. ¶12. (S) Translators are another sensitive problem, as Brammertz is trying to fill 10 new positions for foreign translators. Brammertz said that, shortly after he took charge of the UNIIIC, he concluded that most of the leaks that occurred under the tenure of his predecessor, Detlev Mehlis, came from the UNIIIC's four locally-employed translators. As a result, Brammertz has restricted them from access to any sensitive information (COMMENT: the leaks have now stopped too),but now he has a backlog of several hundred BEIRUT 00002293 003 OF 005 pages of Syrian and Lebanese documents for translation, and only one trusted, non-Lebanese translator to do the work. "At the present rate, it would take three months for us just to get through the backlog, never mind the new material that is coming in all the time." Brammertz said that he is trying to hire 10 new foreign translators, but that, like his investigators, the new arrivals are being held up in the UN's glacial hiring process. ¶13. (C) Overall, administrative problems have become so severe that Brammertz intends to send a deputy to New York to discuss how they are impeding the investigation. Brammertz said that he would like to go himself, but that it would be impossible for him to travel to New York unnoticed, raising all kinds of speculation about the investigation. Still, the situation is seems to be serious enough that Brammertz is considering raising the issue with the Security Council, at least through a deputy, if not himself. YET, THE INVESTIGATION CONTINUES -------------- ¶14. (S) Despite his administrative headaches, however, Brammertz reported that he was making progress on substantive areas of the investigation. He said that the UNIIIC has collected hundreds of phone numbers from the calling records of six Tripoli cell phones associated with the February 14, 2005, assassination of Hariri. They are now establishing calling patterns and conducting interviews with individuals associated with certain numbers. Brammertz said he thought this would be a productive line of inquiry. ¶15. (S) He also said that the UNIIIC is conducting interviews with members of the "Naba cell," Sunni militants detained by the ISF in May. Brammertz said that the detained suspects still have not been formally charged by Lebanese authorities. As a result, they have had no contact with defense attorneys. The UNIIIC has questioned them about 14 other bombing cases on which the UNIIIC is assisting the Lebanese authorities, not the activities that led to their arrest by the ISF. "As long as we restrict our questioning to these areas, we can use the information in an international court," Brammertz explained. THE LEGACY PROJECTS -------------- ¶16. (S) Brammertz said that much of his work, though, is focused on completing three "legacy projects," final appraisals of the testimony provided by Zuhair Mohammed Saddik, Hussam Hussam, and "X", a "protected witness located in a Nordic country." As he prepared his final evaluation of each witness, Brammertz said he could discount most of the testimony from all three. Maybe 20 percent of Saddik's testimony was based on fact, Brammertz suggested, but his credibility as a witness is so low that none of his testimony would stand up in court. He described Hussam Hussam also as an unreliable witness, but suggested that he probably does have important information. The Ambassador reminded Brammertz of the photo showing Hussam at the scene of George Hawi's assassination only minutes after the attack. Brammertz agreed that Hussam was probably involved somehow, but now he had to sift through a whole layer of lies and half-truths to get to any worthwhile information. ¶17. (S) Brammertz said that the UNIIIC is also pursuing links related to the Abu Adass video tape, the unidentified remains of a "27th man" found at the scene of the Hariri blast, and the 14 other bombings that have taken place since October 2004. Regarding the 14 other cases, Brammertz said that the UNIIIC is also now interviewing survivors like Marwan Hamade and May Chidiac, as well as the surviving family members of victims like Samir Kassir and Gebran Tueni. Again raising the issue of his staff shortages, Brammertz said that the other 14 bombing cases are being investigated by three European investigators, all of whom are expected to leave the investigation between August and September. ¶18. (C) Nonetheless, Brammertz said it was obvious, from an analytical if not purely material perspective, that the 14 bombings are linked to the Hariri assassination. "You have enough links," Brammertz explained, "same modus operandi, same explosives, similar targets." Phone numbers that had turned up in the Hariri investigation had turned up in some of the 14 other cases as well. Piles of cigarettes found at BEIRUT 00002293 004 OF 005 the scenes of some of the bombings might provide a link as well, he said. "SATISFIED" WITH THE SYRIANS -------------- ¶19. (C) The Ambassador asked the Commissioner what his feelings were on Syrian cooperation with his investigation. Brammertz acknowledged that he said he had been "generally satisfied," with Syria's cooperation in his last report, although this meant that Syria had yet to achieve full cooperation. Brammertz described Syria as cooperating in form if not always in function. He experienced no problems gaining access and interviews. However, on two occasions, two senior Syrian officials he interviewed were uncooperative and were clearly lying. After Brammertz complained to the SARG, the disposition and cooperation of the two Syrians markedly improved in later interviews. ¶20. (C) The Ambassador then mentioned a recent interview in the pan-Arab daily "al-Hayat," where Syrian President Bashar al-Asad said that any Syrian officials implicated in the Hariri assassination would be tried in Syrians courts. The Ambassador asked Brammertz if he thought that Damascus was starting to realize they might be held accountable for Hariri's murder. Brammertz rejected the possibility of trying suspects in Syria, and explained that he was interested only in putting individuals on trial, not entire nations or governments. "You know," Brammertz explained, "Syria has five different state security apparati. I can't imagine that an order came down from the President and worked its way through all the security services and until they killed Hariri. If anything, you probably had one security service involved, and the order came from on high .... and, how high, we'll have to figure out." NOT SO SATISFIED WITH OTHERS -------------- ¶21. (C) Brammertz confessed, however, that not all of his allies were showing the same level of cooperation as the Damascus regime. He mentioned "one particular EU country, one we have good relations with and that I lived in for some time." After Brammertz asked this country's ambassador in Lebanon for access to interview a suspect in that country's territory, the ambassador came back with all kinds of conditions about how the interview would take place, how the testimony could or could not be used, in order to comply with EU standards. Brammertz said, "I told him, if you were Syria, I would write in my report that you refused to cooperate with the investigation. He was shocked, of course, but it's true. I've had better cooperation from Syria than some of the EU countries." THE TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶22. (C) Looking forward, Brammertz said that, while he is considering a location for the tribunal, he is also working with the Lebanese to make sure that their methods and procedures for handling evidence and witness testimony would hold up in international courts. This, he said, will be especially challenging if the international tribunal tries any of the other 14 bombing cases that have taken place in Lebanon since October 2004. ¶23. (C) Brammertz also admitted that the Lebanese and the international community have to come to a decision on how they are going to hear the other 14 cases. "If we do it right, this would be a model for trying international terrorist cases. But how long will this go on? Are we looking at an open-ended trial? Do we give it a time limit of five or ten years?" Brammertz argued that the international tribunal should only hear cases that can be materially linked to the Hariri assassination, but that many other important modalities still need to be worked out. THE FOUR GENERALS -------------- ¶24. (S) Finally, Brammertz and the Ambassador discussed the fate of the four Lebanese security chiefs held in Lebanese custody on suspicion of involvement with the Hariri assassination since August 2005. Brammertz said that all four are being held on basis of discounted testimony by BEIRUT 00002293 005 OF 005 Zuhair Mohammed Saddik, and that the Lebanese government has failed to prepare any prosecution case against them. In the meantime, the attorneys for Jamil as-Sayyid and Ali Hajj have contacted Brammertz a number of times, asking that he call on the GOL to release them. Brammertz's reply was that such a matter is entirely beyond his jurisdiction and needs to be addressed to the Lebanese Ministry of Justice, a position that he says the defense attorneys have incorrectly interpreted as his support. "I wouldn't get anywhere near this case," Brammertz said. "It's no-win either way." ¶25. (S) Brammertz explained that, if any sort of international legal standards were applied, the four generals would be released immediately. At the same time, however, he acknowledged that doing so would be an political disaster for Lebanon. The Ambassador pointed out that the Lebanese should have sufficient evidence, even outside of Saddik's testimony, for them to pursue a prosecution. For example, there is no question that Ali Hajj tampered with the crime scene and tried to conceal evidence right after the blast. ¶26. (C) Brammertz admitted as much, but suggested that, in order to prosecute Hajj this specific charge, criminal intent would have to be proven. "It easily could have been criminal, bulldozing the crime scene right after the blast. But it could have been sheer incompetence as well. Sometimes in Lebanon it's hard to tell the difference." Brammertz emphasized that, even if the generals were released, that would not prove their innocence. They could still be indicted and tried later. FELTMAN