MGLE01: A STRATEGY SESSION WITH PRIME MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002291

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
LONDON FOR TSOU
DEPT FOR NEA/ELA AND INR/B

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PTER ECON KISL PINR SY LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: A STRATEGY SESSION WITH PRIME MINISTER
SINIORA AND HIS FRIENDS

REF: BEIRUT 2087

BEIRUT 00002291 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C/NF) The current weakness of the "March 14"
parliamentary majority -- and the deleterious effect this has
on Prime Minister Siniora's ability to govern -- has become a
matter of great concern for supporters of Siniora, such as
former Central Bank Governor Michel el Khoury. At a 7/3
dinner he hosted, Sheikh Michel el Khoury worried about
disorder within the Hariri family and the supposed weak
personality traits of majority leader Saad Hariri (who, he
claimed, may even be suffering from a narcotic addiction).
Sheikh Michel proposed that "March 14" be headed by a
(non-Hariri-associated) Secretary-General. Better
organization within "March 14" is necessary to counter a
massive flow (Sheikh Michel estimated it at USD 100 million
per month, over half from Iran) of external funding for
Hizballah.


2. (C/NF) Summary, continued: Siniora's Telecommunications
Minister, Walid Jumblatt-allied Druze politician Marwan
Hamadeh, called for using Saudi petrodollars to neutralize
Iran's financial support for Hizballah and its allies.
Hamadeh suggested that there is even a bright side to the
threat of Sunni-Shia strife in Lebanon, in that it helps to
restrain Hizballah's behavior. Prime Minister Siniora, who
eventually joined Sheikh Michel's dinner at which these
exchanges took place, expressed frustration with his
government's current "standstill," but expressed
determination to forge ahead, particularly on privatization.
End summary.

SHEIKH MICHEL CONVENES A STRATEGY SESSION
--------------


3. (C/NF) Former Central Bank governor Michel el Khoury
gathered the Ambassador and emboff at a dinner with Prime
Minister Siniora, Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh,
and Siniora's chief advisor, Mohamad Chatah. While waiting
for Siniora -- who was detained at the office by a meeting on
transportation policy that lasted well past 9 PM -- to
arrive, Sheikh Michel explained that the purpose of the
dinner was to map out strategies for bucking up Siniora's
government and the flagging "March 14" parliamentary majority
that makes up its base of support.


4. (C/NF) Sheikh Michel goes back a long way with Siniora,
himself a former Central Bank official. He insisted that
despite the slow progress Siniora's government has made and
the multiple obstacles it has faced in its nearly one year of
existence, Siniora was an "irreplaceable" leader. "I would
do anything to help him," Sheikh Michel said, "not just
because he's my friend," but because Siniora's success was
the only hope for the country.

NEEDED: CHRISTIAN SUPPORT
FOR SINIORA, "MARCH 14"
--------------


5. (C/NF) Sheikh Michel spoke of the need to translate
Siniora's personal popularity into political support for
"March 14." This was of particular importance within the
Christian community. Among Christians, Siniora remains
personally popular -- even if not at the same high levels as
initially -- while support for "March 14" had plummeted under
what Sheikh Michel described as a demagogic assault by Michel
Aoun and his supporters.


6. (C/NF) To this end, Siniora's most recent meeting with
the Maronite Patriarch had been very useful, according to
Sheikh Michel. (Comment: Siniora likewise was very positive
in describing his relationship with the Patriarch during a
separate meeting with the Ambassador, claiming that he and
the Patriarch had "agreed on every issue" in this last
meeting. See reftel. End Comment.) Sheikh Michel said that
he was working with the Patriarch and others in the Maronite
community to build grassroots support for Siniora.


BEIRUT 00002291 002.2 OF 004



7. (C/NF) One constraint on Christian political support for
Siniora has been the unpopularity of the parliamentary
majority leader, Saad Hariri. As they waited for Prime
Minister Siniora to arrive, Sheikh Michel, Minister Hamadeh,
and Dr. Chatah all expressed frustration with the
susceptibility of Christians to anti-Sunni Muslim sentiment,
much of it directed against Hariri. Sheikh Michel expressed
frustration with the fact that the same Christians who
approved Aoun's alliance with Hizballah have been ready to
entertain the worst possible suspicions about Hariri and his
Sunni Muslim supporters, seeing them as a Trojan horse for
Saudi-style Wahhabism in Lebanon.

SOLUTIONS START AT (THE HARIRI) HOME
--------------


8. (C/NF) In part, Sheikh Michel and his Lebanese guests
agreed, this has much to do with poor organization within
"March 14," and within the Hariri family as well. For a
start, Saad Hariri's relationship with Siniora has been
rocky, although Hamadeh suggested that there had been
improvements recently. Beyond that, Saad Hariri arguably has
political responsibilities equal to those of his father,
Rafiq Hariri, with all the financial implications -- given
the importance of patronage in Lebanon -- that that entails.
Yet Saad had only a fraction of the wealth that Rafiq had to
draw upon, as Rafiq's fortune had been divided up, following
his assassination in February 2005, among a number of family
members, with Saad, Rafiq's second-born son, being only one
among them. Other family members, such as Saad's reputedly
miserly stepmother, Nazek, were unresponsive to the patronage
needs of the Hariri-led Future Current and its "March 14"
allies.

DANGER: IRANIAN MONEY, "SHIA-IZATION"
--------------


9. (C/NF) All the while, Iranian money continues to pour
into Lebanon, funding the political and social activities of
Hizballah and, according to some reports, those of
pro-Hizballah, pro-Syrian groups in predominantly Sunni areas
of the country, such as the rural and impoverished Akkar
region in the North. Sheikh Michel, citing contacts in
Lebanon's banking sector, claimed that the amount of revenue
Hizballah brings in from abroad each month equals
approximately USD 100 million. Of this, some USD 60 million
comes from Iran; the remainder comes from other external
sources, such as pro-Hizballah fundraisers in West Africa.

CAN "MARCH 14" NEUTRALIZE IT WITH SAUDI HELP?
--------------


10. (C/NF) As a result, we are seeing the "tashyi'i"
("Shia-ization") of many predominantly Sunni parts of the
country, Hamadeh complained. (Comment: Another term used to
describe this seeming surge of Iranian influence -- one that,
from all appearances, annoys Hizballah Secretary-General
Hassan Nasrallah to no end -- is "tafris," "Persianization."
End Comment.) Hamadeh could not explain Saad Hariri's
ongoing cash-flow problem with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
the royal family of which reportedly has been slow to pay
Hariri-owned business enterprises the billions it owes them.
Even so, the only antidote to Iran's relentless policy of
cash-for-"tashyi'i" was to neutralize it with an equal flow
of Saudi petrodollars, Hamadeh said. This had been a topic
of discussion when he and Druse leader Walid Jumblatt met
with Saudi King Abdullah in Jeddah recently.


11. (C/NF) Hamadeh said that he and Jumblatt had emphasized
to King Abdullah that they were not asking for money for
themselves. Rather, they wanted the KSA to play a direct
role in alleviating poverty, supporting economic development,
and bolstering its friends on the Lebanese political scene.
Part of this could be accomplished by donations for
charitable institutions, but part of it also had to be
"political money," Hamadeh said. He expressed confidence
that Lebanon could absorb an influx of Saudi cash while
keeping it out of the hands of radical Sunni Muslim groups.

CONCERNS ABOUT SAAD HARIRI
--------------


12. (C/NF) Patronage aside, Sheikh Michel and his Lebanese

BEIRUT 00002291 003.2 OF 004


guests saw Saad Hariri as no match for Nasrallah politically.
The Hizballah leader took advantage of the young, reluctant
politician's inexperience and seemingly weak personality. In
an aside with the Ambassador, Sheikh Michel also expressed
concern about the possibility that Hariri's judgment might be
impeded by some kind of narcotic addiction. He understood
that Hariri had used drugs as an undergraduate at Georgetown
University to the extent that it seriously impaired his
studies. He wondered whether Hariri had ever actually quit.
(Comment: If so, this might explain some of the personality
traits that we have noticed in our interaction with Hariri,
such as a very short attention span. End Comment.)

SUNNI-SHIA CONFLICT: A POTENTIALLY USEFUL THREAT
-------------- --------------


13. (C/NF) Those present at the dinner noted that one reason
behind Saad Hariri's caution in dealing with his opponents is
a sincere belief that Lebanon is in danger of experiencing
Iraq-style sectarian strife between Shias and Sunnis.
Hamadeh suggested that Shia-Sunni conflict was in fact a
two-edged sword. While it frightens the country's foremost
Sunni leader, Hariri, it surely must also frighten the
foremost Shia leader, Nasrallah. As such, Hamadeh argued,
the threat of Shia-Sunni conflict could be used to pressure
and restrain Hizballah; it did not make sense to try to wish
the threat away.

"MARCH 14" NEEDS MORE STRUCTURE
--------------


14. (C/NF) Sheikh Michel suggested that one thing "March 14"
needed was a better organizational structure. The
appointment of a Secretary-General for the movement, one with
real authority, could help in this respect. In order to
deflect paranoia and anti-Hariri sentiment in the Christian
community, it would be important that whoever filled this
position not be a Sunni Muslim from the Hariri-led Future
Current political party, Sheikh Michel said.

SINIORA REMAINS DETERMINED
--------------


15. (C/NF) Prime Minister Siniora finally arrived after 10
PM, a little worse for the wear after an exhausting day, but
still displaying confidence and energy. While his government
was working to make progress on several fronts, he admitted
that things were currently at a standstill. Even so, he was
determined to forge ahead, particularly on privatization.
Here, he was targeting the largely state-owned Intra
Investment Corporation, which he derided as a "symbol of
corruption."


16. (C/NF) When the Ambassador and emboff described the
concerns of international elections experts about the draft
electoral law recently submitted to Siniora (reported
septel),Siniora was unfazed. If there were problems with
the draft, they could be worked out in due time, he insisted.
He gave the impression of being receptive to comments on the
draft law from IFES and other international elections
experts.


17. (C/NF) Siniora cautioned Sheikh Michel and his guests
that he had to pick his battles carefully. At one point in
the dinner conversation, one of the guests pointed out that
General Georges Khoury, chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces'
intelligence wing, was less than reliable. This was true,
Siniora replied, but Khoury was also very close to the
Maronite Patriarch, an ally whom Siniora could not afford to
antagonize.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C/NF) Fears of Sunni militancy have combined with
suspicion and resentment of the Hariri family and its wealth,
particularly in the Christian community. Consequently, a
great deal of Christian opinion about Hariri and "March 14"
is skewed to the point of irrationality. Aoun can strike an
alliance of convenience with Hizballah and yet be perceived
among a sizeable portion of Christians, probably still a
majority, as the most effective defender of communal
interests. Christian politicians who align with "March 14,"

BEIRUT 00002291 004.2 OF 004


on the other hand, find themselves upbraided as sellouts and
"inauthentic" representatives of their own community. In
this situation, Sheikh Michel -- son of Lebanon's first
president, Beshara el Khoury, and a Maronite patrician --
deserves praise for the unconditional backing he is giving
the Sunni Muslim Siniora.


19. (C/NF) Comment, continued: Even so, Hariri, Siniora's
government, and "March 14" seem never to miss an opportunity
to increase Christian fears about a militant Sunni threat.
The past few weeks have witnessed the sudden, inexplicable
legalization of the ultra-extreme Hizb ut-Tahrir, which had
been banned since the early 1960s (and which has been banned
more recently in the United Kingdom on security grounds). On
June 30, Mahmoud Qul Ahgasi (also known as Abu al-Qa'qa),
leader of Ghuraba al-Sham, a mysterious Syrian-based Sunni
Muslim group that is at once jihadist and pro-Asad regime,
appeared on a television broadcast from the Beirut studio of
the pan-Arab "al-Arabiya" channel, his back to a picture
window in the studio that, embarrassingly, looked out on
Siniora's offices in the Grand Serail. Given all this,
opening the valve of a massive Saudi petrodollar pipeline --
assuming one really exists -- would not be without risk.
Still, we agree with the basic thrust of this dinner
conversation: given the patronage system that still prevails
in Lebanon, and given the evidence of huge amounts of
incoming Iranian money, "March 14" needs to find some funding
sources of its own, with Hariri and/or the Saudis still the
most likely source. End comment.
FELTMAN