MGLE01: WITH SYRIA AND ITS ALLIES ON THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002220 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH PARIS FOR ZEYA LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PTER KPAL ECON SY LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: WITH SYRIA AND ITS ALLIES ON THE OFFENSIVE, JUMBLATT SUGGESTS PUTTING THE PRESIDENCY BACK ON THE TABLE BEIRUT 00002220 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a 6/28 meeting -- a day before the National Dialogue was to reconvene -- Druze leader and "March 14 Forces" figure Walid Jumblatt described a "stalemate" among National Dialogue participants over the deadline they had set on disarmament of Palestinian militias outside the refugee camps. While "March 14" experienced internal difficulties (including a lack of Hariri family patronage) and stumbled in its quest to win foreign friends, Syrian President Asad appeared to be making strides. Asad's opponents in exile were also having problems, and Jumblatt detected disturbing signs that a potential leader among them, Hikmat Shihabi, might be seeking a separate peace with Asad's regime. Against this depressing background, Jumblatt suggested that it might be time to put the Syrians and their allies in Lebanon off-balance by reopening the issue of Emile Lahoud's Lebanese presidency. End summary. NATIONAL DIALOGUE AT A "STALEMATE" -------------- ¶2. (S) In a call on Jumblatt at his ancestral home in the Chouf Mountains on June 28, the Ambassador asked if he and his "March 14" allies had settled on a common position for the coming round of the National Dialogue talks, scheduled to take place the next day, June 29, Jumblatt spread his hands, chuckled, and rolled his eyes heavenwards. "Of course not," he said. ¶3. (S) The Ambassador raised one of the few substantive issues on which National Dialogue participants had reached consensus: a six-month deadline for the removal of all Palestinian arms and armed personnel to within the refugee camps. With less than three months left to go before the deadline was up, was anyone taking this seriously? "No," Jumblatt answered, there was a "stalemate." This was in part due to the hesitancy of parliamentary majority leader Sa'ad al-Hariri, who feared that holding firm to the deadline risked a violent clash with the Palestinians. Prime Minister Siniora was, if anything, more hesitant. ¶4. (S) As for Hizballah, Jumblatt said it was "covering" for those Palestinian groups that maintained an armed presence outside the camps in defiance of the National Dialogue's decisions, chief among them Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. "Something has to be done," Jumblatt said, the question was what. A start would be appointing a replacement for Hassan al-Saba'a, who resigned in February as interior minister, and in whose place Youth and Sports Minister Ahmad Fatfat has been acting. However, the Hariri camp had yet to settle on a suitable permanent replacement. (Comment: Since the position was vacated by a Sunni Muslim "March 14" minister, the decision on a replacement falls to Hariri, as the would-be leader of the Sunni community. End comment.) ¶5. (S) Beyond that, Jumblatt said, in order to tackle the disarmament of Palestinian militias outside the camps, "we need a real Palestinian Authority." The current situation, characterized by the difficulties between President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas, and the ongoing situation in Gaza, made this difficult. WARNING SIGNS ABOUT SYRIAN OPPOSITION -------------- ¶6. (S) Jumblatt described seeing Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Hikmat Shihabi, two former top officials of Syria's Ba'athist regime, now both living in exile and in opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, during a recent visit to Paris. Khaddam had complained about lack of access to, and cooperation from, some of Jumblatt's other fellow "March 14" leaders in Lebanon, notably Samir Ja'ja' and Sa'ad al-Hariri. ¶7. (S) Jumblatt said he had suggested that Ja'ja' was not in much of a position to help the Syrian oppositionists. He did not have full control over the Lebanese Broadcasting BEIRUT 00002220 002.2 OF 004 Corporation television station, for example. As for Hariri, it was likely that his foreign backers, particularly Saudi Arabia, had discouraged him from being too helpful to the likes of Khaddam and Shihabi. ¶8. (S) Jumblatt was more worried about Shihabi than Khaddam. Shihabi appeared to dropping "hints" that he would be willing to consider returning to Syria, and had even described receiving entreaties to do so from Syrian intelligence supremo (and President Asad's brother-in-law) Assef Shawkat and another Syrian intelligence official, Muhammad Nassif. As if to justify doing so, Shihabi had gone on at length about how circumstances did not make the overthrow of Asad's regime feasible. It was too strong and not facing enough pressure, he had told Jumblatt. ¶9. (S) Jumblatt suggested to the Ambassador that Shihabi might also be concerned about losing ownership of his extensive properties in Syria, as had happened to Khaddam, were he to take the risk of joining Khaddam in open opposition to Asad's regime. Adding to Jumblatt's suspicion, he had heard from Khaddam's son an account, however unlikely-sounding, of Shihabi being feted at a private dinner in Washington hosted by Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa. "MARCH 14" SLIPPING... -------------- ¶10. (S) Jumblatt's "March 14" allies were still in a difficult position. Sa'ad al-Hariri did not appear to have resolved his cash flow problems with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (comment: which reportedly owes the Hariri family's business enterprises billions of dollars). The reasons for Saudi slowness to pay were unclear, but the effects of a lack of Hariri family patronage on the "Sunni street" were both obvious and ominous to Jumblatt. ¶11. (S) There were also issues within the Hariri family that were making it difficult for "March 14," according to Jumblatt. Rafiq al-Hariri's widow, Nazik, was "stingy," he said, quoting her stepson, Sa'ad. As for Jumblatt himself, "I'm a bit squeezed," he said, referring to the resources he has available for political patronage. HARIRI AIMING TOO HIGH FOR BEIRUT I CONFERENCE -------------- ¶12. (S) Sa'ad al-Hariri is nonetheless "aiming high," Jumblatt said -- perhaps too high. Convinced of the need to "do something" in the short term, Hariri is determined to see a "Beirut I" -- or, alternatively, a "Riyadh I" -- conference of friends of Lebanon take place before the end of the year. Hariri expects to obtain USD 10-15 billion in foreign economic assistance through such a conference, according to Jumblatt, who agreed that this was a jaw-droppingly unrealistic figure. ¶13. (S) Hariri is also claiming that Hizballah has agreed to step aside and allow the so-called Elissar Project -- a massive redevelopment of the coastal southern suburbs near Beirut's international airport, analogous to the reconstruction of Beirut's central district by the Solidere Corporation that Rafiq al-Hariri founded -- to proceed. Elissar, like LENOR, a cousin planned for the northern coastal suburbs of Beirut, would provide needed economic stimulus. ¶14. (S) Hariri is therefore intent on "cooling it down with Hizballah," Jumblatt said. Jumblatt was skeptical that either Hizballah or its ally, Asad's Syria, would really want to do anything that was helpful for the Hariri-backed government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, however. In the meantime, Siniora was having a hard enough time at the hands of Hariri's apparently somewhat miserly stepmother, Nazik. While in Paris, Jumblatt had met with Nazik, who recounted the recent visit paid on her by Siniora, olive branch in hand, and his wife. Nazik had apparently been quite tough on Siniora, according to Jumblatt. GERMANY WARMING UP TO SYRIA? -------------- BEIRUT 00002220 003.2 OF 004 ¶15. (S) While still in Europe, Jumblatt met with a sympathetic EU Commissioner Javier Solana. A meeting with members of the European Parliament's socialist bloc, however, had left him uneasy. Adding to suspicions raised in Jumblatt's mind by former German Chancellor Schroeder's recent visit to Damascus, a German member of the bloc had told Jumblatt, apparently with some misgivings, that Germany's position on Lebanese sovereignty was "changing," driven by what the German MEP described as "big interests" in Syria and Iran. SA'AD FAILS TO IMPRESS RUSSIANS -------------- ¶16. (S) Sa'ad al-Hariri has also been conducting some foreign diplomacy to drum up support for a sovereign Lebanon and call attention to Syrian interference, Jumblatt noted. However, the results left something to be desired. Although Hariri supporters hyped his recent visit to Moscow, a longtime (going back to the Soviet days) contact of Jumblatt there reported that Sa'ad had in fact made a poor impression, and that no shift in Russia's frankly pro-Syrian policy was in the offing. ¶17. (S) This was typical for Hariri, according to Jumblatt. He can arrange high-level visits, perhaps with some help from French President Chirac (as appeared to be the case with the Moscow visit). He then shows up with a huge entourage that his hosts find off-putting. Only a few people likely to be found in the entourage (MP Bassem al-Saba'a, media executive Hani Hammoud, and former MP Ghattas Khoury) bring any substance to the table. Sa'ad himself is "charming," but has no sense for the follow-up these visits require in order to have an impact, Jumblatt said. ...WHILE ASAD ADVANCES -------------- ¶18. (S) In contrast, President Asad appeared to be making strides in building up international support. Jumblatt expected Asad to attend an upcoming Non-Aligned Movement summit in Cuba. (Jumblatt's confidante, fellow Druze, and Minister of Information Ghazi al-Aridi would also attend, if for no other reason than to keep on eye on what Asad was up to.) There was a possibility that President Asad would continue from Cuba to Argentina and Venezuela. ¶19. (S) Visits by Asad to these countries would be unhelpful, in Jumblatt's view, because both have sizeable Lebanese and Syrian immigrant populations that could presumably be drawn out in a public display of support for Asad. (Comment: We would assume that the Lebanese immigrant communities in question are predominantly Shi'a and pro-Hizballah.) Venezuela's President Chavez made Jumblatt uneasy -- he was both "crazy" and had ample amounts of petrodollars at his disposal, and his anti-American orientation might well lead him to throw support behind Asad in unhelpful ways. COUNTERATTACK VIA THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE? -------------- ¶20. (S) In light of all these unappealing developments, Jumblatt thought it was worth considering re-opening the issue of the Lebanese presidency. This would involve again challenging the legitimacy of President Emile Lahoud, whose term in office received a made-in-Damascus extension of three years in 2004. The hard part would be finding a candidate around which he and his "March 14" allies could unite around, without alienating all the other would-be presidential candidates on the "March 14" side. (Comment: This means practically every Maronite within "March 14," except perhaps Samir Ja'ja'.) ¶21. (S) As far as potential replacements for President Lahoud go, Lahoud's cousin and political rival, former MP Nassib Lahoud, is "the best," Jumblatt said. With the "March 14" majority in Parliament short of the votes necessary to cancel Emile Lahoud's extension in office and elect a successor, Nassib Lahoud's chances were virtually nil, however. Other contenders within "March 14," such as MP Boutros Harb, were considerably less appealing to Jumblatt. BEIRUT 00002220 004.2 OF 004 ¶22. (S) The second-best candidate, in Jumblatt's view, might well be Justice Minister Charles Rizk. The Maronite Rizk is a personal friend of President Lahoud and not a member of the "March 14" coalition -- this would presumably help his chances with getting the necessary votes from the opponents of "March 14" in Parliament: the blocs of Michel Aoun, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and Hizballah. At the same time, Rizk had, surprisingly, "made a good impression" on Nazik al-Hariri. While Rizk was close to Lahoud at a personal level, he had no known relationship with Syria. Rizk, Jumblatt argued, had done more than anyone in "March 14" to promote the "special tribunal with international character" to try Hariri murder suspects. ¶23. (S) In any case, Jumblatt said, the question was what "price" Hizballah would demand in return for getting rid of Emile Lahoud. This price might well be too high, particularly with regards to Hizballah's obligation to disarm under UNSCR 1559. Jumblatt and his fellow "March 14" leaders needed to figure out Hizballah's price, figure out how to keep it as low as possible, he said. ADVICE FROM A FRIEND: "TAKE CARE" -------------- ¶24. (S) One promising development for Jumblatt and "March 14" had been the publication, the day before -- and just in time for the upcoming round of the National Dialogue -- of Jumblatt's plan for an alternative national defense strategy in Beirut's daily "as-Safir." Such an alternative strategy, emphasizing the need to build a strong state, would not rely on Hizballah remaining an indefinite paramilitary presence on the border with Israel. Nuhad al-Mashnuq, a longtime confidante of the late Prime Minister Hariri and a writer for "as-Safir," had facilitated its publication. Even this step forward had its downside: Mashnuq (who, following Rafiq al-Hariri's assassination, publicized his firsthand impressions of President Asad's abusive treatment of Hariri) had advised Jumblatt, for the first time, to "take care." Jumblatt said that he took Mashnuq's warnings quite seriously. FELTMAN