MGLE01: SCARED OF BLOODSHED, SA'AD MUSES ABOUT

S E C R E T BEIRUT 001964 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016 TAGS: IR LE PGOV PTER SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: SCARED OF BLOODSHED, SA'AD MUSES ABOUT EXCHANGING LOWERED RHETORIC ON HIZBALLAH FOR DEAL REGARDING NAAMEH TUNNELS Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a June 14 meeting with the Ambassador and emboff at his Qorytem residence, Sa'ad Hariri expressed alarm at mounting Sunni-Shiite tensions that he believes have driven Lebanon to the brink of civil war. Citing his concern following the May 28 attack on Israel and the June 1 Hizballah riots in Achrafieh, Sa'ad described his plan to quell tensions with Hizballah while moving forward on economic, political and security reform. Essentially, Sa'ad plans to offer Hizballah a quid pro quo agreement wherein he will refrain from making any public statements criticizing Hizballah's weapons, although he will continue to press this subject in closed-door National Dialogue sessions. He will also offer Hizballah and Amal a cut on massive forthcoming "Solidere"-style development and privatization projects, while building a consensus to continue progress on "achievable" reform and political issues, including Cabinet approval for an international tribunal, as well as various political appointments. His price in return, Sa'ad explained, will be to demand that Hizballah acquiesce to the GOL's disbanding the Palestinian weapons cache in the Naameh Tunnels and to move more generally on Palestinian disarmament. The Ambassador warned that Hizballah would try to take advantage of such a strategy by taking all of Sa'ad's offers without giving anything in return, and that dropping discussion on the status of Hizballah's weapons from Lebanon's political discourse would quickly be interpreted as a political victory for Hizballah and Syria. The Ambassador reminded Sa'ad of the GOL's self-imposed deadline to remove all Palestinian weapons outside the camps by the end of summer, as well as GOL opportunities to expand its security presence in south Lebanon. Sa'ad said he would consider these ideas, but the Ambassador reiterated the importance of exacting as high a price from Hizballah as possible, if Sa'ad chose to pursue tactics the Ambassador questioned. ¶2. (S) In an earlier meeting with Druze leader Marwan Hamade the same day, Hamade confirmed the coordinated "March 14" plan to focus on the disarmament of Palestinian militias, but he emphasized that Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt will continue to play "bad cop" to Sa'ad's "good cop" by keeping some public focus and Hizballah's weapons. End summary. FEAR -------------- ¶3. (S) Sa'ad opened his June 14 meeting with the Ambassador and emboff at the Hariri family's Qorytem residence with dire predictions about the increasing potential for sectarian violence in Lebanon. Sa'ad said that following the May 28 cross-Blue Line incidents with Israel and the June 1 Hizballah riots in Achrafieh, Lebanon was closer to civil war than at any time since the 1989 Ta'ef Accords. During the hour-long meeting, he returned several times to the imminent danger of sectarian violence, warning at one point, "One more June 1st and blood will flow through the streets all over Lebanon." ¶4. (S) Indeed, fear of widespread violence, and specifically possible fighting between Lebanon's Sunni and Shiite communities, seemed to be the primary motivation behind Sa'ad's political strategy. The primary goal now, according to Sa'ad, is to decrease tensions with Hizballah, a goal he intends to achieve through patronage-style development projects, and by limiting public discussion about Hizballah disarmament. ¶5. (S) Sa'ad explained that any more public discussions on Hizballah's disarmament would push tensions past the boiling point. He said that the riots on June 1 were much more dangerous than most people realized, and that Lebanon had only narrowly avoided a national disaster. "In Tarik al-Jedid (downtown Beirut),Sunnis shot and stabbed Hizballah members. They were knifing them. We had to keep it out of the press." Sa'ad said that Hizballah was busing party members in from Baalbek (in the Biqa' Valley) to expand the fighting, and that the police just barely managed to shut everything down in time. ¶6. (S) "Now, my people are asking me for guns. Even little children. If anything like June 1 happens again, I won't be able to control my people. It will be civil war." At times, Sa'ad seemed visibly disturbed by what he obviously believes are the real prospects for widespread sectarian clashes. As he repeatedly raised the potential for sectarian violence, he also stated that the increasing tensions and violence were part of a Syrian and Iranian trap for Lebanon. "The Syrians want us to come out of the dialogue without a consensus, and they want us to fight each other," he said. Meanwhile, he said, Iran is priming Hizballah to open a Mediterranean front in a war with Israel in case fighting breaks out over Iran's nuclear program. "If Iran is attacked, all hell will break loose here. Hizballah will send thousands of rockets to Israel." Shaken by the prospects of Lebanon being drawn back into a regional or civil war, Sa'ad said that the only solution was to focus on deliverable economic and political goals, while keeping any discussions about disarmament behind the closed doors of the National Dialogue. LIKE FATHER, LIKE SON: SA'AD'S ECONOMIC PLAN -------------- ¶7. (S) Sa'ad then explained his plan for economic revitalization, a plan which seemed to be based on his father's philosophy of massive "Solidere"-style development projects. According to Sa'ad, he is meeting with a joint economic team every night to work on the details of the proposal. "Listen, the Prime Minister's plan is technical, people won't understand it. You have to show people you'll do something. Achieve something on the ground." Sa'ad then described a number of development projects, including ELISAR, a "tech-city" in Dammour, and a regional airport in Akkar, that he would use to generate immediate economic growth and decrease political tensions. "Everybody wants the same thing, they want to feed their families. Nobody will be able to refuse this." ¶8. (S) The Ambassador asked Sa'ad if he would be able to bring the Shia on board for progress on the economic front. Why would the Shia want the current Hariri-dominated cabinet to succeed? Sa'ad suggested that he already did: "They are finalizing the details with our guys." He explained that the Shia bloc would benefit from the privatization of parastatal industries: telecommunications and transport, including Lebanon's state-owned Middle East Airlines (MEA). When the Ambassador asked what, legally, they could do to privatize MEA, Sa'ad exhibited a breezy confidence. "We can do it if we want," he responded. "The important thing now," he said, "is strategy. And we're going on the offensive. Our people, Ja'Ja', Jumblatt, we're working together on this." ¶9. (S) Sa'ad added that the approaching summer tourist season was no time to push the fragile political situation. "People have been looking forward to this summer for over a year. They need it." According to Sa'ad, Lebanon's best interest would be served by providing stability over the next three months so that the Lebanese economy can reap the benefit of the summer tourist season, which at this point, is expected to be the best in years. Hotels in Beirut have reportedly been booked through the summer since April. "After the summer, we can push politics. For now, we need quiet," Sa'ad explained. EASE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶10. (S) The next step in Sa'ad's plan would be to limit public and media criticism of Hizballah, while continuing to push them in private during national dialogue sessions. As he explained his plan to the Ambassador, Sa'ad, almost like an orchestra conductor, imagined each player in Lebanon with a specific role, all working in concert towards his single goal. Sa'ad said that Hizballah is in a corner on the issue of their weapons and their role in government: they are trapped between constituencies in Lebanon, Tehran and Damascus. He claimed that in the current political environment, Hizballah would be unable to disarm without Iran's assent, something that Tehran would not even consider granting, at least until the gathering crisis over their nuclear program has been resolved. Therefore, Sa'ad explained, easing public pressure on Hizballah politicians would be the only way to give them the necessary incentives and political space to cooperate on economic development, while decreasing sectarian tensions at the same time. ¶11. (S) The Ambassador warned that if Lebanon's "March 14" politicians withdrew from the public dialogue on Hizballah's arms, however, the result would be seen as a victory for Hizballah and Syria, and a de facto endorsement of the status quo. The same thing happened with March 14 efforts to remove President Lahoud, the Ambassador suggested, and then asked what would keep March 14 from reaping the same result with this strategy on Hizballah's arms. ¶12. (S) Sa'ad pointed again to his patronage-based economic plan, explaining, "My father won battles by achieving things." But he also acknowledged that the issue of Hizballah's weapons would not drop off the radar screen entirely. To keep some pressure on Hizballah, Sa'ad said that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt will "continue to play his role, although less so." That is, he will continue criticizing Hizballah's double standard regarding its weapons and state security, but not with the same volume and intensity that he has used of late. While Sa'ad realized that it would be a necessary role, however, he seemed glad to let Jumblatt play it. "I will criticize them in private," he concluded. THE PRICE FOR PATRONAGE: NAAMEH TUNNELS -------------- ¶13. (S) The Ambassador said that while Shia support for Lebanon's economic and reform plans is important, Sa'ad would be making a mistake if he dropped public pressure on Hizballah without exacting a high price. Explaining that the March 14 forces were finally beginning to achieve a real momentum in developing a principled stand on Hizballah's weapons and the importance of state control of security and borders, it would be a tragedy to lose momentum and consensus by suddenly dropping the issue from the public eye. "We won't," Sa'ad replied, "we're going to convince Hizballah to give us (PFLP Commander Ahmed) Jabril and to us give Naameh tunnels." ¶14. (S) Sa'ad explained that turning over the weapons in Naameh tunnels would be Hizballah's price for dropping discussion of their own weapons from public debate. Acquiescence on the tunnels would also be necessary for the Shia to benefit from Sa'ad's economic plan. Sa'ad was, in effect, offering Hizballah a quid pro quo: "give us Naameh tunnels and Ahmed Jabril, and we'll be quiet about your own weapons, and we'll give you a cut of MEA and the telecoms." When the Ambassador asked what he would do if Hizballah decided not to cooperate, Sa'ad replied, "Of course they will. Because I screamed my head off at them." When pressed by the Ambassador, however, Sa'ad admitted that if Hizballah refused to cooperate, he would join Jumblatt in making renewed public calls for disarmament. ¶15. (S) The Ambassador reminded Sa'ad that there were bigger issues at stake than just Naameh, including the government's pledge to remove all Palestinian arms outside the camps by the end of this summer. He said that at the very least, Sa'ad should insist on disarmament in Naameh and noted that the government only has three months left to achieve its goal of eliminating Palestinian arms outside the camps. Sa'ad said that he was aware of the goal, but refused to commit himself to complete disarmament of all the camps. He said they would start with Naameh and then take it step-by-step from there. This would be important, Sa'ad explained, because it would allow him to pick his battles with Hizballah and Syria on his own "turf." "Look at the issues in front of us: Hizballah's weapons, the borders, economic reform, the Palestinians. The Syrians want us to fight with Hizballah so they can come in and pick up the pieces. This way, I pick the location of the fight. It's on my terms. And this way, Aoun can't fight us either. He'll be finished." CUTTING "THE GENERAL" DOWN TO SIZE -------------- ¶16. (S) At several points during the meeting, Sa'ad claimed that his combined plan for economic development and neutralizing sectarian tensions would destroy Michel Aoun's support base and political aspirations. Sa'ad seemed to consider Aoun, whom at one point he loathingly referred to as, "what's his name ... the General," as an implacable nemesis, his ultimate foe. Indeed, by the way he kept mentioning the importance of destroying Aoun's political aspirations, it seemed clear that Aoun is Sa'ad's primary target, even more then the Palestinian militias or Hizballah. ¶17. (S) Sa'ad explained that by focusing on achievable goals with Hizballah, including an economic platform, privatization and government appointments, he would corner Aoun by cutting him out of the reform agenda upon which he has placed his political credibility. Sa'ad would also show that he could achieve results with Hizballah, making Aoun look like he was duped in own February "agreement" with Hassan Nasrallah. The Ambassador asked what would keep people from assuming that he had made a deal with Hizballah just like Aoun. Sa'ad momentarily bristled at the comparison, rejoining, "because I won't sign a deal with them. No way." The Ambassador suggested that Sa'ad could only be sure to avoid any comparison with Aoun as long as he can exact a high price from Hizballah, something that Aoun was never able to do. EXPANDING DEPLOYMENTS IN THE SOUTH -------------- ¶18. (S) The Ambassador also suggested to Sa'ad that, in addition to restricting Palestinian arms outside the camps, the Government of Lebanon could improve the security situation in the south by working with UNIFIL to expand security deployments to reach the full authorized 1,000-man contingent of the Joint (LAF-ISF) Security Forces. The GOL could start, he said, by responding to the UNIFIL Commander's request to form a joint planning committee with UNIFIL. Sa'ad said this was a good idea, and admitted that French Ambassador Bernard Emie had suggested the same thing to him earlier that afternoon. Sa'ad said that he would look into it, adding that Hizballah would have no reason to complain, suggesting innocuously that, "we're only forming a committee." PROTECTING THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶19. (S) Sa'ad also said he would need Hizballah's support to guarantee cabinet and parliament approval of an international tribunal to try suspects in his father's slaying. Sa'ad noted that pro-Syrian politicians such as Omar Karami and Suleiman Franjieh were complaining about the price of a tribunal, saying it would cost billions of dollars. "We'll need Hizballah's support here. They have a little space." He expressed concern over the pro-Syrian Karami crowd, however, and claimed that their ultimate goal was to bring down the government. RELATIONS WITH SINIORA; DELIVERING THE "ACHIEVABLES" -------------- ¶20. (S) When the Ambassador asked Sa'ad about his lunch with the Prime Minister last week, Saad flashed a sharp reply, "I said what I had to say, and he signed the papers (authorizing appointments) for the Higher Judicial Council." Saad then quickly changed the subject and turned to his own plans for an economic revitalization program, apparently developed without coordination from the Prime Minister. HAMADE CONFIRMS "MARCH 14" COORDINATION, TACTICS -------------- ¶21. (S) In a meeting with Druze minister Marwan Hamade that immediately preceding the Ambassador's call on Sa'ad, Hamade offered a preview of Sa'ad's position. Hamade confirmed that Jumblatt and Sa'ad had agreed to assume two different roles in their public approach to Hizballah's weapons. Hamade stressed the "March 14" strategic goal of focusing on Palestinian weapons, although this issue almost seemed an afterthought for Sa'ad, whose overriding concern was preventing the outbreak of civil war through a strategy that combined appeasement and specific political demands. COMMENT -------------- ¶22. (S) Hariri came across as genuinely worried about the possibility of widespread Sunni-Shia violence, and we believe that his tactical approach is based upon fear. But we are not comfortable with what he told us. On the economic side, Siniora aims at systematic, comprehensive reform; Sa'ad seems to prefer massive patronage projects a la Rafiq's downtown Beirut Solidere reconstruction. More broadly, we did not detect that he was convinced by his own argument that Hizballah will help the GOL take over the dangerous Palestinian military base of Naameh. We will meet with others, including Jumblatt and Siniora, and report further on what seems to be Sa'ad's questionable tactical shift away from publicly cornering Hizballah regarding its arms. FELTMAN NNNN