MGLE01: JUMBLATT LOOKING FOR WAYS TO PUT SARG AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001916

SIPDIS

2ND C O R R E C T E D C O P Y//////CHANGE IN PARA ONE//////

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
PARIS FOR ZEYA
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: JUMBLATT LOOKING FOR WAYS TO PUT SARG AND
ITS LEBANESE ALLIES BACK ON THE DEFENSIVE

BEIRUT 00001916 001.6 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a 6/12 meeting, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
confessed to being disappointed with the June report of the
UN investigation of the Hariri assassination, the latest in a
series of events seeming to benefit the Syrian regime and its
allies in Lebanon. Lebanon may not be on the brink of civil
war, he told the Ambassador, but many (non-Shi'a) Lebanese
are "worried" about Hizballah's insistence on retaining its
arms. His "March 14" ally, senior statesman Ghassan Tueni,
had presented the National Dialogue with a "brilliant" plan,
originally drafted in the early 1970s with Imam Mousa
al-Sadr, that offered hope for a solution. Jumblatt said
that he and his "March 14" allies needed to redouble efforts
on coordinating among themselves and find ways of putting
their domestic adversaries on the defensive. End summary.

DISAPPOINTED BY UNIIIC REPORT...
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador and emboff called on Jumblatt, who was
staying in his home in Beirut's Clemenceau neighborhood (as
opposed to his palatial redoubt in the Chouf Mountains, in
which he has normally confined himself for security reasons),
on June 12. Jumblatt said he was unhappy with the "neutral"
tone of the latest report issued by the UN International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on progress
made in investigating the February 20005 assassination of
Jumblatt's ally, former Prime Minister Hariri.


3. (C) Jumblatt wondered why the latest UNIIIC report did
not mention "the two famous witnesses," Messrs. Saddik and
Hussam, and was skeptical (for reasons he did not explain)
about the report's conclusion that Ahmad Abou Adass had been
nowhere in the vicinity of Hariri's assassination. On the
bright side, Jumblatt -- balancing a printout of the report,
which he had read three times, on his knee -- approved of the
UNIIIC's stated interest in studying the political
environment and decision-making structures at the time of the
assassination -- "that's important," he said, noting that
people needed to remember that Syria was totally in control
at the time.


4. (C) Jumblatt said he was also intrigued by the UNIIIC
report's reference to 16 questions submitted to the Syrian
government, only three of which had been answered so far. He
thought the ongoing investigation of telecommunications
records -- with the report's reference to five billion
telephone call records -- interesting. As for the Mitsubishi
van believed to have served as the platform for the explosive
device that killed Hariri and others, "I want to know more
about where it came from," he said. Regarding the report's
reference to the Bank Al Madinah case, Jumblatt thought the
small amount of money that the Hariri assassination likely
cost ruled out Bank Al Madinah as a promising line of
inquiry.


5. (C) For this week's forthcoming discussion of the latest
UNIIIC report in the UN Security Council, Jumblatt suggested
that Security Council members would be justified in asking,
"who was here at the time when the crime took place?" In
other words, it made sense to point out that "the political
environment at that time was tightly controlled by the
Syrians," together with a Lebanese security apparatus that
worked in tandem with Syria's.


6. (C) Jumblatt found it ironic (comment: as do we) that
the same security apparatus that, within days, identified and
accused the alleged perpetrator in the assassination of a
Palestinian Islamic Jihad figure in Sidon in early June 2006
has been unable to reach any conclusions in a number of
assassinations and assassination attempts, the killing of
Hariri among them, that have taken place since 2004. Some
"important figures" appointed to the security apparatus by
Jamil as-Sayyed -- the former Surete-Generale
Director-General now in jail on suspicion of involvement in
the Hariri assassination -- remained in place under Sayyed's
successor, according to Jumblatt.

... AND OTHER TRENDS IN SYRIA'S FAVOR

BEIRUT 00001916 002.6 OF 004


--------------


7. (C) The UNIIIC report was not the only thing bothering
Jumblatt. "That telegram...," he said, shaking his head,
referring to a fairly effusive telegram sent to Damascus by
Prime Minister Siniora on the death anniversary of Syrian
President Hafez al-Asad. As if that were not bad enough,
Siniora was still "begging" to make an official visit to
Damascus. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's
recent visit there had also left a bad taste in Jumblatt's
mouth. He asked, evidently with concern, if reports that
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal was in Tehran June 12
were true.


8. (C) In contrast, Jumblatt and Siniora's adversaries were
in ascendancy. Hizballah MP Mohammad Raad, among others, was
not hesitating to say that Lebanon's international
obligations under UNSCR 1559 and related resolutions do not
matter. Speaker of Parliament and Amal Movement head Nabih
Berri was in Cairo, presumably lobbying to "activate the
older mediation of (Arab League Secretary-General) Amr
Moussa." Former Deputy Prime Minister Issam Fares "is back"
in northern Lebanon, spending some of his enormous personal
fortune to back up the newly-announced opposition front made
up of pro-Syrian politicians like former Prime Minister Omar
Karami and Suleiman Franjieh.

NOT ON BRINK OF CIVIL WAR, BUT...
--------------


9. (C) Lebanon may not be on the brink of a new civil war,
according to Jumblatt, but "we feel tension, of course."
Rioting in the streets of Christian and Sunni neighborhoods
of Beirut by Hizballah supporters on June 1, following a
weekly television's comedy program's poking fun at
Hizballah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, was a bad
sign. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja', one of Jumblatt's
allies in the "March 14 forces," had told Jumblatt of having
to reign in some armed Christian elements so as not to
escalate the tension. Ja'ja' had been considering pointing
this out during the June 8 round of the National Dialogue --
the series of talks that puts Jumblatt, Ja'ja', and
Nasrallah, among others, around the same table -- but
Jumblatt had advised him, "don't make this mistake."


10. (C) Asked if he was aware of other groups in Lebanon
starting to re-arm in response to Hizballah's declared
determination to hold onto its own weapons, Jumblatt said
only that "people are afraid." This was certainly the case
in the country's Druze areas, for example. He referred, as
he has in the recent past, to reports of Hizballah buying up
Druze and Christian lands in southern Lebanon, supposedly to
carve out some sort of Shi'a buffer zone between the Syrian
border and the rest of Lebanon, and Hizballah attempts to lay
a more solid military telecommunications infrastructure in
place.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE: TUENI'S "BRILLIANT" PLAN
--------------


11. (C) The June 8 round of the National Dialogue saw
initial discussions of a new defense strategy for Lebanon,
with obvious implications for the future of Hizballah.
Senior statesman Ghassan Tueni (one of the representatives of
Lebanon's Greek Orthodox community in the talks) had used the
opportunity to dust off a "brilliant" plan for stabilization
of the situation in southern Lebanon. Tueni, Jumblatt
explained, had originally co-authored the plan in the early
1970s with the charismatic, populist Shi'a leader, Iman
Moussa al-Sadr. Tueni presented the plan with the argument
that it is "impossible to reconcile the state and revolution"
(a direct reference to Hizballah's earlier slogan as "the
Islamic Revolution in Lebanon").


12. (C) Since Tueni's plan bore the revered Sadr's imprint,
it was unassailable from Hizballah's side. Nasrallah -- who
tends to be fairly expressive during the National Dialogue
sessions -- was clearly not at ease during the discussion of
Tueni's plan. Nasrallah was red in the face, according to
Jumblatt, and he had "a dreadful look in his eyes." Ja'ja's
contributions to the discussion were "not that useful," and
included a "stupid" suggestion that Hizballah's rockets along
the Israeli border be replaced by "Stingers," so as to repel
supposed future Israeli helicopter assaults without posing an

BEIRUT 00001916 003.6 OF 004


offensive threat to Israel. Michel Aoun, still bending over
backwards for his Hizballah allies, had seen fit to haul out
UNSCR 194, saying there was no reason for Hizballah to disarm
until it was implemented. (Aoun had obviously not read UNSCR
194 very carefully, Jumblatt pointed out, saying that Aoun
was insisting on the "right of return" without noting that
compensation is also possible as an alternative.)

WORKING ON "MARCH 14," KHADDAM, AND THE SAUDIS
-------------- -


13. (C) A coordination meeting of the "March 14 forces"
preceded the June 8 round of the National Dialogue talks,
according to Jumblatt. It had been "useful," although Sa'ad
al-Hariri -- who remained quiet in this last National
Dialogue session -- still tended to "vacillate" too much
between a tough stand and an overly cautious stand taken out
of fear of escalated Shi'a-Sunni tension.


14. (C) Jumblatt volunteered that former Syrian Vice
President Abed al-Halim Khaddam, who last year went into
outright opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, had
telephoned him the day before, congratulating Jumblatt on a
recent speech in which he had harshly criticized Damascus.
"They will all fall down," Khaddam had told Jumblatt,
referring to Asad and his regime. "I hope so," Jumblatt
commented, chuckling. Jumblatt did not know what "evidence"
it was that Khaddam was claiming to have as proof of the Asad
regime's involvement in Hariri's assassination. He said he
planned to see Khaddam again soon, but did not say where or
when.


15. (C) Jumblatt said he also felt a need to pay another
visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia soon. Otherwise, King
Abdullah's government would continue to be excessively
cautious in putting a restraining arm on Syria and its
actions in Lebanon. Even the Sunni mufti of Mount Lebanon,
Sheikh Jozo -- a onetime accessory of the Syrian regime now
closely aligned with the Saudi Wahhabi establishment -- had
recently complained to Jumblatt about the KSA's lack of
"aggressiveness" on behalf of Lebanon.


16. (C) Jumblatt could not confirm reports that the KSA has
severely restricted Sa'ad Hariri's cash flow. However, he
contrasted the political largesse of Rafiq al-Hariri -- who
at times bankrolled Jumblatt to the astonishing tune of USD
250,000 per month, to be distributed as patronage throughout
the Druze community -- with that of his son, who has not
contributed to Jumblatt since the parliamentary elections of
May-June 2005. Now -- another reason to visit Riyadh soon --
Jumblatt had to approach the KSA, cap in hand, as a stopgap
measure to keep his patronage machine primed.


17. (C) Looking at a "March 14 forces" plan of action,
Jumblatt said that "we need to consolidate the ground" rather
than relying on external events in the region to strengthen
their position. They would continue their coordination
meetings in tandem with the National Dialogue process. In
Jumblatt's view, "March 14" needed to figure out a way to
"bring back our majority" in Prime Minister Siniora's
cabinet, appointing a permanent replacement to resigned
Interior Minister Hassan al-Saba'a (whose portfolio is
currently held by Youth and Sports Minister Ahmad Fatfat).
Finally, it made sense to "go on the offensive" against their
adversaries within the cabinet on the bread-and-butter issues
of social security and electricity. These are portfolios,
Jumblatt pointed out, that are held by Hizballah and Amal
ministers.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) While disappointed by the UNIIIC report and
concerned about the ascendency of pro-Syrian forces,
Jumblatt, while worried, was not yet alarmist about imminent
violence breaking out between Lebanon's confessions. By
contrast, Marwan Hamadeh -- traditionally one of Jumblatt's
closest advisors -- told the Ambassador earlier on the same
day that Lebanon was on the verge of renewed civil war and
had narrowly escaped that danger on June 1. Hamadeh urged
the Ambassador to start looking at everything in the context
of trying to avert civil war. Today (6/13),Jumblatt called
the Ambassador by phone to note that Sa'ad al-Hariri's
analysis was closer to Hamadeh's about the potential for

BEIRUT 00001916 004.6 OF 004


violence now. Uncharacteristically candid on the phone,
Jumblatt noted that he rejected Hariri's remedy, which he
described as abandoning all talk of Hizballah's arms until
the tensions ease. In Jumblatt's views, the tensions make it
imperative that the March 14 allies speak more clearly and
forcefully about the unacceptability of Hizballah's arms. We
see Hariri on 6/14 and will ask his views first-hand.
FELTMAN