MGLE01: JUMBLATT LOOKING FOR WAYS TO PUT SARG AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001916 SIPDIS 2ND C O R R E C T E D C O P Y//////CHANGE IN PARA ONE////// SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH PARIS FOR ZEYA LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL KDEM LE SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: JUMBLATT LOOKING FOR WAYS TO PUT SARG AND ITS LEBANESE ALLIES BACK ON THE DEFENSIVE BEIRUT 00001916 001.6 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a 6/12 meeting, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt confessed to being disappointed with the June report of the UN investigation of the Hariri assassination, the latest in a series of events seeming to benefit the Syrian regime and its allies in Lebanon. Lebanon may not be on the brink of civil war, he told the Ambassador, but many (non-Shi'a) Lebanese are "worried" about Hizballah's insistence on retaining its arms. His "March 14" ally, senior statesman Ghassan Tueni, had presented the National Dialogue with a "brilliant" plan, originally drafted in the early 1970s with Imam Mousa al-Sadr, that offered hope for a solution. Jumblatt said that he and his "March 14" allies needed to redouble efforts on coordinating among themselves and find ways of putting their domestic adversaries on the defensive. End summary. DISAPPOINTED BY UNIIIC REPORT... -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador and emboff called on Jumblatt, who was staying in his home in Beirut's Clemenceau neighborhood (as opposed to his palatial redoubt in the Chouf Mountains, in which he has normally confined himself for security reasons), on June 12. Jumblatt said he was unhappy with the "neutral" tone of the latest report issued by the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on progress made in investigating the February 20005 assassination of Jumblatt's ally, former Prime Minister Hariri. ¶3. (C) Jumblatt wondered why the latest UNIIIC report did not mention "the two famous witnesses," Messrs. Saddik and Hussam, and was skeptical (for reasons he did not explain) about the report's conclusion that Ahmad Abou Adass had been nowhere in the vicinity of Hariri's assassination. On the bright side, Jumblatt -- balancing a printout of the report, which he had read three times, on his knee -- approved of the UNIIIC's stated interest in studying the political environment and decision-making structures at the time of the assassination -- "that's important," he said, noting that people needed to remember that Syria was totally in control at the time. ¶4. (C) Jumblatt said he was also intrigued by the UNIIIC report's reference to 16 questions submitted to the Syrian government, only three of which had been answered so far. He thought the ongoing investigation of telecommunications records -- with the report's reference to five billion telephone call records -- interesting. As for the Mitsubishi van believed to have served as the platform for the explosive device that killed Hariri and others, "I want to know more about where it came from," he said. Regarding the report's reference to the Bank Al Madinah case, Jumblatt thought the small amount of money that the Hariri assassination likely cost ruled out Bank Al Madinah as a promising line of inquiry. ¶5. (C) For this week's forthcoming discussion of the latest UNIIIC report in the UN Security Council, Jumblatt suggested that Security Council members would be justified in asking, "who was here at the time when the crime took place?" In other words, it made sense to point out that "the political environment at that time was tightly controlled by the Syrians," together with a Lebanese security apparatus that worked in tandem with Syria's. ¶6. (C) Jumblatt found it ironic (comment: as do we) that the same security apparatus that, within days, identified and accused the alleged perpetrator in the assassination of a Palestinian Islamic Jihad figure in Sidon in early June 2006 has been unable to reach any conclusions in a number of assassinations and assassination attempts, the killing of Hariri among them, that have taken place since 2004. Some "important figures" appointed to the security apparatus by Jamil as-Sayyed -- the former Surete-Generale Director-General now in jail on suspicion of involvement in the Hariri assassination -- remained in place under Sayyed's successor, according to Jumblatt. ... AND OTHER TRENDS IN SYRIA'S FAVOR BEIRUT 00001916 002.6 OF 004 -------------- ¶7. (C) The UNIIIC report was not the only thing bothering Jumblatt. "That telegram...," he said, shaking his head, referring to a fairly effusive telegram sent to Damascus by Prime Minister Siniora on the death anniversary of Syrian President Hafez al-Asad. As if that were not bad enough, Siniora was still "begging" to make an official visit to Damascus. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's recent visit there had also left a bad taste in Jumblatt's mouth. He asked, evidently with concern, if reports that Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal was in Tehran June 12 were true. ¶8. (C) In contrast, Jumblatt and Siniora's adversaries were in ascendancy. Hizballah MP Mohammad Raad, among others, was not hesitating to say that Lebanon's international obligations under UNSCR 1559 and related resolutions do not matter. Speaker of Parliament and Amal Movement head Nabih Berri was in Cairo, presumably lobbying to "activate the older mediation of (Arab League Secretary-General) Amr Moussa." Former Deputy Prime Minister Issam Fares "is back" in northern Lebanon, spending some of his enormous personal fortune to back up the newly-announced opposition front made up of pro-Syrian politicians like former Prime Minister Omar Karami and Suleiman Franjieh. NOT ON BRINK OF CIVIL WAR, BUT... -------------- ¶9. (C) Lebanon may not be on the brink of a new civil war, according to Jumblatt, but "we feel tension, of course." Rioting in the streets of Christian and Sunni neighborhoods of Beirut by Hizballah supporters on June 1, following a weekly television's comedy program's poking fun at Hizballah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, was a bad sign. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja', one of Jumblatt's allies in the "March 14 forces," had told Jumblatt of having to reign in some armed Christian elements so as not to escalate the tension. Ja'ja' had been considering pointing this out during the June 8 round of the National Dialogue -- the series of talks that puts Jumblatt, Ja'ja', and Nasrallah, among others, around the same table -- but Jumblatt had advised him, "don't make this mistake." ¶10. (C) Asked if he was aware of other groups in Lebanon starting to re-arm in response to Hizballah's declared determination to hold onto its own weapons, Jumblatt said only that "people are afraid." This was certainly the case in the country's Druze areas, for example. He referred, as he has in the recent past, to reports of Hizballah buying up Druze and Christian lands in southern Lebanon, supposedly to carve out some sort of Shi'a buffer zone between the Syrian border and the rest of Lebanon, and Hizballah attempts to lay a more solid military telecommunications infrastructure in place. NATIONAL DIALOGUE: TUENI'S "BRILLIANT" PLAN -------------- ¶11. (C) The June 8 round of the National Dialogue saw initial discussions of a new defense strategy for Lebanon, with obvious implications for the future of Hizballah. Senior statesman Ghassan Tueni (one of the representatives of Lebanon's Greek Orthodox community in the talks) had used the opportunity to dust off a "brilliant" plan for stabilization of the situation in southern Lebanon. Tueni, Jumblatt explained, had originally co-authored the plan in the early 1970s with the charismatic, populist Shi'a leader, Iman Moussa al-Sadr. Tueni presented the plan with the argument that it is "impossible to reconcile the state and revolution" (a direct reference to Hizballah's earlier slogan as "the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon"). ¶12. (C) Since Tueni's plan bore the revered Sadr's imprint, it was unassailable from Hizballah's side. Nasrallah -- who tends to be fairly expressive during the National Dialogue sessions -- was clearly not at ease during the discussion of Tueni's plan. Nasrallah was red in the face, according to Jumblatt, and he had "a dreadful look in his eyes." Ja'ja's contributions to the discussion were "not that useful," and included a "stupid" suggestion that Hizballah's rockets along the Israeli border be replaced by "Stingers," so as to repel supposed future Israeli helicopter assaults without posing an BEIRUT 00001916 003.6 OF 004 offensive threat to Israel. Michel Aoun, still bending over backwards for his Hizballah allies, had seen fit to haul out UNSCR 194, saying there was no reason for Hizballah to disarm until it was implemented. (Aoun had obviously not read UNSCR 194 very carefully, Jumblatt pointed out, saying that Aoun was insisting on the "right of return" without noting that compensation is also possible as an alternative.) WORKING ON "MARCH 14," KHADDAM, AND THE SAUDIS -------------- - ¶13. (C) A coordination meeting of the "March 14 forces" preceded the June 8 round of the National Dialogue talks, according to Jumblatt. It had been "useful," although Sa'ad al-Hariri -- who remained quiet in this last National Dialogue session -- still tended to "vacillate" too much between a tough stand and an overly cautious stand taken out of fear of escalated Shi'a-Sunni tension. ¶14. (C) Jumblatt volunteered that former Syrian Vice President Abed al-Halim Khaddam, who last year went into outright opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, had telephoned him the day before, congratulating Jumblatt on a recent speech in which he had harshly criticized Damascus. "They will all fall down," Khaddam had told Jumblatt, referring to Asad and his regime. "I hope so," Jumblatt commented, chuckling. Jumblatt did not know what "evidence" it was that Khaddam was claiming to have as proof of the Asad regime's involvement in Hariri's assassination. He said he planned to see Khaddam again soon, but did not say where or when. ¶15. (C) Jumblatt said he also felt a need to pay another visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia soon. Otherwise, King Abdullah's government would continue to be excessively cautious in putting a restraining arm on Syria and its actions in Lebanon. Even the Sunni mufti of Mount Lebanon, Sheikh Jozo -- a onetime accessory of the Syrian regime now closely aligned with the Saudi Wahhabi establishment -- had recently complained to Jumblatt about the KSA's lack of "aggressiveness" on behalf of Lebanon. ¶16. (C) Jumblatt could not confirm reports that the KSA has severely restricted Sa'ad Hariri's cash flow. However, he contrasted the political largesse of Rafiq al-Hariri -- who at times bankrolled Jumblatt to the astonishing tune of USD 250,000 per month, to be distributed as patronage throughout the Druze community -- with that of his son, who has not contributed to Jumblatt since the parliamentary elections of May-June 2005. Now -- another reason to visit Riyadh soon -- Jumblatt had to approach the KSA, cap in hand, as a stopgap measure to keep his patronage machine primed. ¶17. (C) Looking at a "March 14 forces" plan of action, Jumblatt said that "we need to consolidate the ground" rather than relying on external events in the region to strengthen their position. They would continue their coordination meetings in tandem with the National Dialogue process. In Jumblatt's view, "March 14" needed to figure out a way to "bring back our majority" in Prime Minister Siniora's cabinet, appointing a permanent replacement to resigned Interior Minister Hassan al-Saba'a (whose portfolio is currently held by Youth and Sports Minister Ahmad Fatfat). Finally, it made sense to "go on the offensive" against their adversaries within the cabinet on the bread-and-butter issues of social security and electricity. These are portfolios, Jumblatt pointed out, that are held by Hizballah and Amal ministers. COMMENT -------------- ¶18. (C) While disappointed by the UNIIIC report and concerned about the ascendency of pro-Syrian forces, Jumblatt, while worried, was not yet alarmist about imminent violence breaking out between Lebanon's confessions. By contrast, Marwan Hamadeh -- traditionally one of Jumblatt's closest advisors -- told the Ambassador earlier on the same day that Lebanon was on the verge of renewed civil war and had narrowly escaped that danger on June 1. Hamadeh urged the Ambassador to start looking at everything in the context of trying to avert civil war. Today (6/13),Jumblatt called the Ambassador by phone to note that Sa'ad al-Hariri's analysis was closer to Hamadeh's about the potential for BEIRUT 00001916 004.6 OF 004 violence now. Uncharacteristically candid on the phone, Jumblatt noted that he rejected Hariri's remedy, which he described as abandoning all talk of Hizballah's arms until the tensions ease. In Jumblatt's views, the tensions make it imperative that the March 14 allies speak more clearly and forcefully about the unacceptability of Hizballah's arms. We see Hariri on 6/14 and will ask his views first-hand. FELTMAN