MGLE01: SAAD HARIRI ON IRAN, SINIORA, AOUN,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001849

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY IR RS FR
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SAAD HARIRI ON IRAN, SINIORA, AOUN,
HIZBALLAH, ELECTION LAW


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a 6/7 meeting with the Ambassador, MP Saad Hariri
spent most of the time discussing his recent travels in
Europe, which he claimed to have used to push for
international consensus on Iran and Syria. The Russians, he
claimed, were persuaded by his arguments not to abstain on
any UNSCR resolutions regarding Iran and even hinted at
military action. The Russians also told Hariri that they
would not protect Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. Regarding
the homefront, Hariri was harshly critical of the draft
election law, vowing to oppose the draft's mixed
constituencies in favor of uniform acceptance of small (qada)
districts. Responding to the Ambassador's comments that he
needed to fix his relationship with Prime Minister Siniora,
Hariri agreed. But he added ominiously that Siniora "needs
to know who's boss." Hariri dismissed rumors that he was
interested in accelerating his assumption of the premiership,
maintaining the linkage between his potential ascension to
office to President Emile Lahoud's departure -- if then.
Asked how he could maintain his political strength while
feuding simultaneously with Michel Aoun and Hizballah, he
expressed more interest and optimism in improving relations
with Hizballah than with the Aounist camp. End summary.

READ-OUT ON MEETING WITH PUTIN
--------------


2. (S) Just off the plane and in Beirut for the first time
in more than three weeks, Hariri told the Ambassador that he
had used his travels in France, Germany, Russia, and
elsewhere to try to build consensus for UNSC action regarding
Iran and Syria. He spent most of the hour-long meeting
discussing his Russian trip. "You should thank me," he said;
"I was doing your work for you." He claimed that, over more
than two hours of discussion, he convinced Putin not to
abstain on any Iran-related UNSCRs and not to repeat Russia's
abstension on Syria-related UNSCRs. Putin agreed, Hariri
insisted, that Russia is threatened by Iran's nuclear
ambitions and should not simply stand by in hopes that others
will solve the problem. As for Russia's relations with
Syria, Hariri claimed that Putin complained that Bashar had
made too many mistakes. Russia will not protect Bashar or
the Asad regime, according to Hariri.

IVANOV, SOLTANOV, AND PRIMAKOV
REASSURE HARIRI ON SYRIA, IRAN
--------------


3. (S) Hariri reported that his separate meetings with
Foreign Minister Ivanov, Deputy Foreign Minister Soltanov,
and former Prime Minister Primakov were more interesting and
detailed than with Putin, regarding both Iran and Syria.
Ivanov said that he had passed a message to the Syrians
pointing out that Russia's abstention on UNSCR 1680 should
not be confused with a veto: Russia had reasons to abstain,
but Russia expected Syria to comply fully with the
resolution. Soltanov told Hariri that Bashar al-Asad's only
choice was to follow the example of Libya and "give up the
generals," a comment that led Hariri to conclude that the
Russians have decided that the SARG is complicit in Rafiq
Hariri's murder.


4. (S) Primakov relayed for Saad a story of his experience
visiting Rafiq Hariri four days before Hariri's murder.
Rafiq asked Primakov to convey a message to Bashar that he
would protect Syrian interests in Lebanon and avoid a peace
treaty with Israel, if Bashar would agree to remove his
intelligence operatives from Beirut, redeploy the Syrian army
to the Biqa'a Valley, and let the GOL function freely and in
accordance with the Taif agreement. Bashar, Primakov said,
welcomed this message. In Primakov's view, that positive
response suggested that Bashar was not part of the plot to
kill Rafiq, even if his inner circle was involved.


5. (S) Primakov said that he included this anecdote and
analysis in a recent book he authored and also included it in
a series of interviews taped to be broadcast on a new
Arabic-language Russian television network aimed at the
Middle East. Hariri said that Primakov laughed that the
interviewer, a Syrian named Akram Huzam, was nervous that
Primakov's comments about Syrian complicity could get his
family in trouble back home. Primakov told Huzam that, by

BEIRUT 00001849 002 OF 004


the time the interview broadcasts in November, Bashar would
be out. Hariri said that he thought Primakov, while joking,
was sending him a serious message. In Hariri's view,
Primakov has so many ties to Damascus that, for him to
predict Bashar's ouster, the Russians must have fairly strong
evidence that the SARG murdered his father. Hariri said that
he was struck by the change of attitude by the Russians, who
previously would only tell him to wait for the results of the
UNIIIC.


6. (S) On Iran, Ivanov complained to Hariri that Iran was
trying to behave as if it were a superpower, behavior the
Russians found inexplicable. After all, Ivanov said, Iran
does not have a delivery mechanism to hit either "the big
devil" (the United States) or the "little devil" (Israel).
So Iran must be trying to rearrange the regional balance, a
posture which the Russians find unacceptable. Hariri said
that Ivanov was clear that Russia will not allow Iran to
become a nuclear power, even if -- "write this down," Hariri
asked the Ambassador -- prevention requires a "surgical
intervention." Hariri said that he was convinced that Russia
will participate actively in a solution to the Iranian
nuclear issue, perhaps even to the point of participating in
a military strike.

CHIRAC WARNS HARIRI
NOT TO RETURN HOME
--------------


7. (S) Turning to France, Hariri said that, over the last
two weeks, he met with French President Jacques Chirac twice
-- once before and once after seeing Putin -- and also joined
Putin in a conference call to Chirac. Hariri said that
Chirac was pleased with his Russian diplomacy. Chirac also
warned Hariri not to return to Lebanon, out of fear that he
will be killed if he does. The Ambassador asked Hariri
whether he thought Chirac had specific threat information
against him, or whether Chirac was relying on intuition.
Hariri responded that he thought France had specific
information, although it was not shared with him. (We will
ask French Ambassador Emie about this.) But Hariri said that
he was not listening to Chirac in this regard. "I need to be
here," he said, saying that he planned to remain in Beirut
indefinitely, even after the conclusion of the June 8
National Dialogue session.

EMPHASIZING STATE-BUILDING
IN THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE
--------------


8. (C) On the National Dialogue, Hariri noted only that the
March 14 participants would meet that evening to coordinate
their positions. "The people of Walid (Jumblatt) has done an
excellent job," Hariri said, referring to a paper being
circulated among the March 14 participants that emphasizes
the need for state-building. This, according to Hariri,
would be the major argument used by the March 14 participants
in the Dialogue session to respond to Hizballah Secretary
General Hassan Nasrallah's earlier presentation. Nasrallah's
defense of the arms of the "resistance" is completely
contrary to the notion of state-building, Hariri explained,
"and the Lebanese want a state."

HARIRI OPPOSES DRAFT ELECTION LAW
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador asked Hariri's views of the draft
election law submitted recently to the cabinet. Frowning
while aggressively flicking cigar ashes into one of several
oversized crystal ashtrays surrounding his chair, Hariri
vowed to fight the draft. "I told (PM) Siniora this was a
mistake," he said. The problem is the districting: the
draft law uses for some seats proportional voting in large
(muhafaza) districts. Hariri said that he has "always"
supported relying exclusively on small qada districts. He
said that, by coming out in favor of the qada approach, he
would regain Christian support, embarrass Aoun (who would
have to recognize that the Christians generally support the
qada approach),and "screw Hizballah." Walid Jumblatt and
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir already agree with him, and
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, seeing the qada as providing
him a chance to emerge from Hizballah's shadow, will also
endorse qada-based voting.


10. (C) The Ambassador noted that the draft law does rely
on the qada for the majority of the seats, distributed across

BEIRUT 00001849 003 OF 004


the country, and that the proportional voting allowed for the
others should allow Hariri to pick up seats in places like
Zahle, which he lost in the 2005 elections. "I will win
Zahle next time," he said; "you'll see." Hariri showed no
flexibility regarding the districting question. The
Ambassador noted that the draft law contains many other
positive ideas on financing, transparency, publicity, etc.
that risk being lost if the draft law is rejecting on the
districting question. The Ambassador pushed Hariri to make
it clear that, even if he did not agree with the districting,
he supported the rest of the electoral reforms in the law.
Hariri did not respond.

THREATS AGAINST SINIORA AND HARIRI
SHOULD ENCOURAGE MORE COOPERATION
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern about the
deterioration in the relations between Hariri and PM Siniora.
He noted the 5/25 article in al-Hayat by Syria's Ambassador
to Washington Imad Mustapha; Hariri's lack of defense of
Siniora had been a disappointment. Hariri agreed that the
article was an implied threat, but he said that he was
worried about his own safety. "Look at the Syrian press," he
said. The Syrians, according to Hariri, were accusing him of
having financing the Syrian opposition meeting in London.
This, Hariri said, was a more serious threat than that posed
by the Mustapha article to Siniora. The Ambassador responded
that was all the more reason for Hariri to rebuild his
partnership with Siniora, to display solidarity in the face
of a unified Syrian campaign against March 14 leaders. To
regain the initiative both inside and outside Lebanon, the
March 14 group must be unified, starting with the PM and
Hariri.

HARIRI SUGGESTS SINIORA DOESN'T LISTEN
-------------- == --------------


12. (C) Hariri said that he knew the problems had to be
fixed between him and Siniora, and he noted that he had
spoken by phone with Siniora recently for the first time in
weeks. He said that the two of them would sit down together
after the Dialogue, to coordinate positions and agendas. But
Siniora, Hariri said, "needs to know who's boss." Siniora
"doesn't listen to what I want," Hariri complained, referring
back to the draft election law and raising the (increasingly
tiresome) controversy surrounding the appointments to the
Higher Judicial Council. The Ambassador responded that
Siniora is the Prime Minister of Lebanon and probably resents
being talked to as if he is a servant. Hariri claimed not to
get involved in the day-to-day management of the government.
"I give Fouad space," he said, only intervening of issues of
great importance. The Ambassador argued that they needed a
genuine partnership, for the sake of Lebanon and for the sake
of Hariri's political strength. "We'll work it out," Siniora
insisted, "but Fouad has to remember who I am."

SAAD RULES OUT EARLY PREMIERSHIP
--------------


13. (C) The Ambassador asked Hariri what the alternatives
were to restoration of a genuine Hariri-Siniora partnership.
Picking up the Ambassador's meaning, Hariri said that, rumors
to the contrary notwithstanding, he will not assume the
premiership himself until Emile Lahoud has left the
presidency. While some people argue that Hariri should take
it now rather than risk becoming irrelevant by the time
Lahoud leaves office, Hariri said that taking the premiership
now is a bigger trap. Lahoud will block his initiatives,
making him look weak and ineffective. Better to wait until
he can implement his agenda, which requires waiting for a new
president. Besides, Hariri said, "I'm not all that eager to
become Prime Minister. Maybe I'll never take it. Why do I
need this pain?"

HIZBALLAH AN EASIER SELL THAN AOUN
--------------


14. (C) The Ambassador emphasized again the need for Hariri
to rebuild the partnership with Siniora. Now, the Ambassador
pointed out, Hariri is feuding with his PM, he has no contact
with Michel Aoun, his March 14 Christian allies do not trust
him, and he has come to realize the futility of trying to
build a partnership with Hizballah. It is impossible, the
Ambassador said, for Hariri to maintain power and influence
with so many enemies. Sighing, Hariri vowed again to fix the

BEIRUT 00001849 004 OF 004


relationship with Siniora and said that he was addressing the
Christian concerns (which he found exaggerated and annoying)
in a variety of ways. He expressed confidence that the
Christians would soon be back with him. When the Ambassador
urged him to try to build bridges to Aoun at least on shared
tactical interests, Hariri said that he would be able to
rebuild cooperation with Hizballah first. The Ambassador
expressed astonishment and consternation, noting that
Hizballah is a foreign front organization with a worrying and
dangerous agenda for Lebanon far different than that of
Hariri. "Aoun is a bigger Iranian agent than Nasrallah,"
Hariri growled. He complained of Aoun's "constant lies about
me."

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) We know that some of Saad's closest advisors -- who
earlier participated in the Siniora-bashing that had been
sadly too prevalent in the Hariri "royal court" -- now
recognize that there is no choice: Saad and Siniora must
rebuild their partnership. Saad should not speak to Siniora
as if the latter were a hired hand, and Siniora must not
patronize Saad as if he is indulging an inexperienced little
boy. The French, British, Russian, Saudi, and Egyptian
Ambassadors are all joining us in making the same point to
Saad. With Siniora now back from an official trip to Turkey,
we will continue to try to work with both men to promote a
genuine reconciliation.


16. (C) Besides sounding as though he was treating Siniora
as a servant, Saad made two additional comments in this
meeting that disturbed us. First, he was, in our view, too
quick to dismiss the election law draft drawn up by a
blue-ribbon panel of experts. The districting question that
he raised is the highest-profile issue in the draft, but it
is not the most important. We will continue, along with our
partners in the NGO and international community, to press
Lebanon's political leaders to retain the draft's
transparency, media, and financing rules, even if politics
require a change in districting. The other disturbing
comment Saad made concerned Hizballah. Whatever Aoun's
faults are -- and they are many -- Hizballah's are worse. To
the extent that he is willing to build bridges, Saad needs to
reach out to Aoun before trying anything with Hizballah.
And, of course, he needs a solid bridge to his PM first of
all.
FELTMAN