MGLE01: SINIORA SEES SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001746 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH LONDON FOR TSOU PARIS FOR ZEYA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2016 TAGS: PTER KDEM MOPS KPAL KPAO LE IS SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: SINIORA SEES SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN FINGERPRINTS ON WEEKEND VIOLENCE Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a 6/1 meeting, Prime Minister Siniora told the Ambassador he suspects Syrian and Palestinian agents were behind a violent 5/28 exchange with Israel. He also said it was impossible for the attacks to have been carried out without Hizballah's knowledge, and expressed concern that Hizballah's activities jeopardized security and stability for all of Lebanon. In the next round of National Dialogue talks, "March 14" leaders would try to hold Hizballah accountable for the incident: Siniora said it created a perfect opportunity to reach out to Michel Aoun and separate him from Hizballah. Siniora was not convinced of Israeli responsibility for the 5/26 assassination of PIJ militants in Sidon, suggesting that it may have been a Hizballah "house cleaning" operation. Siniora confirmed that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hizballah security personnel are conducting separate investigations into the assassination. Siniora dismissed Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri's allegations that he, Siniora, had spurned an invitation to Damascus as "preposterous." Pulling the Ambassador aside, Siniora told him that he considered a 5/25 newspaper op-ed by Syrian Ambassador in Washington Imad Mustafa to be a personal threat. End summary. SUNDAY VIOLENCE A SYRIAN MESSAGE TO ISRAEL AND HIZBALLAH -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On June 1, the Ambassador and emboff called on Prime Minister Siniora in his office at the Grand Serail. The Ambassador asked the prime minister what his thoughts were on the violent May 28 exchange in south Lebanon. The prime minister replied that only the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and Hizballah have the operational capability to pull off a rocket attack with the range and precision demonstrated in Sunday's attack. He added that, had Hizballah not been directly involved, it would be nearly impossible to carry out the attack without Hizballah's knowledge, or at the very least their implicit consent. ¶3. (C) Siniora said that, while the range of the rocket attack was not in his view that exceptional (a view certainly not shared by all),the precision demonstrated in the attack was beyond that normally demonstrated by Hizballah or Palestinian groups. It seemed that whoever was responsible for the attacks was showing off, and wanted to provoke a strong reaction from the Israelis. Siniora pointed to the sniper attack at 1500 hours local time on May 28, which wounded an Israeli soldier, as a further provocation. It had been as if the attackers were suggesting that Israel's first response, targeting the Na'ameh tunnels and Sultan Yacoub depot, was insufficient. ¶4. (C) "Hizballah wasn't ready for such a large offensive," Siniora explained, as he described the Israeli destruction of a number of new Hizballah positions along the Blue Line. The Ambassador pointed out that Hizballah had evacuated the positions before the Israelis hit them. Even so, Siniora replied, Hizballah would not have pushed the Israelis so far as to risk the destruction of positions that they have been building over the past eight months. Siniora added that, according to UNIFIL Forces Commander Alain Pellegrini, the Hizballah positions had been utterly destroyed. The prime minister's assistant, Rola Noureddine, also noted several reports that Hizballah casualties far exceeded the one Hizballah fighter reported killed. ¶5. (C) Siniora speculated that Syria had used the PFLP-GC on May 28 to show the Israelis that they were still capable of "bloodying their nose," and to show Hizballah who "really controls south Lebanon." Siniora added that, nearly a week after the exchange, Hizballah has not claimed responsibility for the attack, and that they have not accused anyone else of doing so either, "which makes me feel that Hizballah is not agreeable to this whole thing." SIDON BOMB MAY HAVE BEEN A HIZBALLAH OPERATION -------------- - ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked Siniora if he was convinced that Israel was responsible for the May 26 assassination of BEIRUT 00001746 002 OF 003 purported Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader, Abu Hamza, in the southern Lebanese city of Sidon. Without hesitating, Siniora firmly replied, "no," and added that the Russian ambassador had categorically told him that the Israelis were not responsible. Siniora said he thought the car bombing was carried out by one or two other Palestinian groups operating in south Lebanon, both of which, he added, are linked to Hizballah. ¶7. (C) Siniora noted that both Abu Hamza and his brother, also killed in the May 26 blast, were Lebanese citizens, not Palestinians, and were members of Hizballah. He pointed out that Hizballah personnel were the first responders to the blast site, and immediately began their own investigation (which they were still continuing as of June 1, while the GOL has given official investigative jurisdiction to the LAF). Siniora said he did not think that Hizballah was going so far as to conceal evidence from the blast, but he suggested that their investigation may be at cross purposes with that of the LAF. VIOLENCE IN SOUTH COULD BRING MARCH 14 AND AOUN TOGETHER... -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) When the Ambassador asked Prime Minister Siniora how last Sunday's violence would affect the next session of the National Dialogue, Siniora said that there was a developing consensus that no one single party (e.g., Hizballah) should be able to destroy stability in Lebanon and threaten the entire country's security. He said that "March 14" leaders, including Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja' and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, were working on their positions separately. He hoped they would meet before the June 8 meeting to put together a unified program to challenge Hizballah. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked if anyone from "March 14" had reached out to Michel Aoun, noting that, after last week's violence, Aoun must be deeply embarrassed by his association with Hizballah. Siniora immediately sat up and said that, to his knowledge, no one had yet contacted Aoun. This was the time to do it, however. Pointing at his senior advisor, Dr. Mohammad Chatah, Siniora said, "Mohammad, contact Aoun's people and see." He then turned back to the Ambassador and said, 'We'll do it." Siniora said that this was "the moment we've been waiting for," to reach out to Aoun and "pull him away from Hizballah and closer to us." ... BUT THE GOL NEEDS TO ASSERT ITSELF IN THE SOUTH -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) As the prime minister relished the idea of pulling Aoun back from his partnership with Hizballah, the Ambassador asked if the "March 14" alliance had any specific ideas to propose in the National Dialogue. The Ambassador suggested the full deployment of 1,000 LAF soldiers in the south, or perhaps pressuring Hizballah to commit to the disarmament of Palestinian militias. Nouredddine responded that many of the 400 LAF soldiers already deployed in the south are "administrative support" only, incapable of assuming a broader security mission. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador warned the prime minister that, following the events of the past two weeks, including the killing of an LAF corporal by Palestinian militia members, as well as the May 28 Blue Line incident, there was mounting dissatisfaction among UN Security Council members that the Lebanese government was not taking sufficient steps to guarantee security between Lebanon and its neighbors, and within its own borders. "You've let two months slip for your six-month window (on disarming Palestinian militias outside the camps)," the Ambassador said. ¶12. (C) Siniora responded that he had already sent letters to Arab League Secretary-General Amr Mousa, Saudi King Abdullah, and Egyptian President Mubarak asking for their support. He also noted that, earlier this week, Mubarak and King Abdullah had discussed Lebanese-Syrian relations seriously and in considerable detail. He admitted, however, that, in the short term, he did not expect much progress in this area. BERRI ON THE OFFENSIVE -------------- BEIRUT 00001746 003 OF 003 ¶13. (C) The conversation then turned to recent press reports that Prime Minister Siniora had spurned an invitation arranged by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri to discuss bilateral issues with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad in Damascus. Siniora dismissed the story as "preposterous," and explained that, some two weeks ago, Berri offered a window between a Saturday and a Monday when Siniora could see Asad in Damascus. Siniora said that he would be traveling to Sharm el-Sheikh on that Sunday, but that he could then travel to Damascus on Monday. He said Berri then came back DQQlQQD Minister. The Ambassador warned that, in the past, Berri had always presented an amenable demeanor when discussing the prime minister. However, in the Ambassador's last meeting with him, Berri was openly hostile and had de86vAQv -------------- ¶15. (S) At the end of the meeting, Siniora pulled the Ambassador aside and, unprompted, told him that he considered a May 25 op-ed in the pan-Arab daily "al-Hayat" by the Syrian Ambassador in Washington, Imad Mustafa, to be a personal threat against him. In referring to Siniora, Mustafa had used the same language that the SARG uses for Jumblatt, who is certain that his life is in danger. Syrian officials had also used the same language against the late former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, prior to his February 2005 assassination. Siniora urged that the USG make an effort to collect intelligence on threats to his personal security, about which the Mustafa op-ed may have been a warning. FELTMAN