MGLE01: JUSTICE MINISTER COMPLAINS THAT SINIORA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001717

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016
TAGS: CASC KDEM LE PGOV PREL PTER SY IS
SUBJECT: MGLE01: JUSTICE MINISTER COMPLAINS THAT SINIORA
IS NEEDLESSLY PICKING A FIGHT


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Justice Minister Charles Rizk voiced disappointment
with Prime Minister Siniora's apparent decision to reject
Rizk's proposed list of candidates for Lebanon's Higher
Judicial Council. Rizk maintained that Siniora is bent on
achieving a council majority that would allow him to control
the Justice Ministry through appointments and the ability to
remove any judge from office. In Rizk's opinion, the
resulting March 14-control of the Higher Judicial Council
would inevitably produce a backlash from Lebanon's Shia
political forces, particularly from Speaker of Parliament and
Amal leader Nabih Berri. In retaliation, Rizk believes Berri
would do all he could to derail the establishment of the
proposed special tribunal with international character on the
Hariri assassination. Rizk hopes that Saad Hariri will be
more reasonable than Siniora on the appointments and step in
to defuse the situation. Regarding the special tribunal,
Minister Rizk said two senior judges, Ralph Riachy and
Choukri Sader, have returned to New York for further
discussions with UN Undersecretary for Judicial Affairs
Nicholas Michel to develop a timeline for setting up the
tribunal. Additionally, Rizk characterized yesterday's vote
in Parliament condemning Syria's issuance of warrants for
Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh as a clever gift from the
Speaker to Saad Hariri. Berri, he remarked, is "a man who
never gives anything away for free." Finally, the Ambassador
re-emphasized that our government continues to demand the
expeditious return of abducted U.S. citizen Kelsey Klotz.
End summary.

PERCEPTION OF ANOTHER SUNNI POWER PLAY
--------------


2. (C) Minister Charles Rizk received the Ambassador and
poloff on May 31 at the Justice Ministry. Rizk, who had been
drifting toward the March 14 movement despite his longterm
friendship with President Emile Lahoud, criticized PM Siniora
as a "mean and small man" who has made an error of judgment
in opposing Rizk's list of candidates for the long-unfilled
positions on the country's Higher Judicial Council. Rizk
acknowledged that he had changed the list slightly (replacing
one name) from the list of individuals recommended by a panel
of Lebanon's top judges, and it was to this action that
Siniora objected. But Rizk argued that his change was
necessary, in order to preserve the independence of the
judiciary -- or at least its freedom from March 14 control.
(Note: Rizk kept saying "Sunni control" in the conversation.
But this is not technically correct: there is confessional
balance in the Council no matter whose list is adopted. It
is more a question of political allegiances, or perceived
allegiances, that is at stake. End note.)


3. (C) Minister Rizk maintained that if Siniora were
successful in "stacking" the judicial body, giving March 14
political forces blanket authority to appoint or dismiss any
judge, there would be an inevitable adverse reaction from the
Shia political elite, and most definitely from Amal leader
and Speaker Nabih Berri -- who is still smarting from a
belief that Siniora had cavilierly dismissed a diplomatic
initiative (an invitation for Siniora to go to Damascus)
engineered by the Speaker.


4. (C) Rizk defined the key to controlling the Higher
Judicial Council as the ability to influence eight of its ten
members. Under the constitution, this would allow the
controlling party to appoint and fire at will. Rizk
maintained that his minor change to the list of nominees
would prevent this from happening -- and ameliorate the
widely held view that Saad Hariri's Sunni-dominant movement
already wielded too much political power. Seven of the ten
judges would still lean toward the March 14 politics, meaning
that most decisions made by the council -- such as
disciplinary action short of actual dismissal, assignment of
judges to undesirable posts, etc. -- would remain in the
hands of the Hariri-dominated majority.


5. (C) He rhetorically asked the Ambassador why Sinora was
seeking a clash with the Shia that was both unnecessary and
potentially ruinous to the reform movement. "He doesn't know
how to pick his fights, and he's beyond stubborn," the
minister complained. Rizk continued that he refused to give
up control of his ministry, which would be the practical
consequence of Siniora getting his way on this issue.

BEIRUT 00001717 002 OF 003




6. (C) Rizk believed that Siniora actually wanted him to
resign, but he indicated he would not -- and if it came to
it, he still had a card up his sleeve. After initial
hesitance, Rizk revealed that if pushed, he would simply
"kick it upstairs" and allow the nominee list to proceed to
President Lahoud as required by the constitution. Rizk
conveyed obvious relish at the prospect of Lahoud and Siniora
engaged in a bitter battle over this issue.

THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL AT RISK
--------------


7. (C) But more important than control of his ministry,
Rizk argued, was the inevitable damage that would be
inflicted on the reform movement by Siniora's obstinance. In
Rizk's opinion, the first and most likely casualty would the
special tribunal with international character proposed for
the prosecution of those responsible for the assassination of
Rafiq Hariri, and possibly of those responsible for other
acts of political violence. Minister Rizk said Speaker Berri
and his Shia allies would obstruct and likely succeed in
blocking the tribunal's establishment. If the Shia were
successful in stopping a project so highly valued by Saad
Hariri, Rizk believes that current political progress, though
gradual, could well cease.


8. (C) Despite recent criticism from Lebanon's Lawyers
Association and negative press coverage of the standoff,
Minister Rizk believes that Saad Hariri would actually
support his position vice Siniora's due to the consequences
of the perception that the Sunni elite had taken control of
yet another lever of power. Rizk revealed he had sought the
advice of Minister Marwan Hamadeh, who moves easily among
Lebanon's political classes, and had been advised to be
patient and wait for the return of Saad Hariri. Although he
had doubts about this course of action, and clearly disliked
the criticism he has been receiving, Rizk indicated he would
step back and wait for the more astute Hariri to recognize
the downside of Siniora's intransigence. He concluded, "Saad
doesn't want to battle Berri and Nasrallah over this and risk
losing the tribunal." But Rizk also observed that the entire
March 14 reform movement was amazingly prone to stumbling
into unnecessary political clashes.

MINISTRY OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK
--------------


9. (C) Minister Rizk described this week's visit of Justice
Ministry officials Ralph Riachy and Choukri Sader to the
United Nations as helpful, but not particularly important.
Both Riachy and Sader are senior judges. In fact, Rizk was
somewhat puzzled why UN Undersecretary for Legal Affairs
Nicholas Michel even went to the effort, when all that was
really needed was a UN/GOL commitment to a timeline for the
establishment of the tribunal.


10. (C) As he has in previous meetings, the Justice
Minister projected confidence that, once authorized, the
tribunal could be established in a relatively straightforward
manner. He said that in his last meeting with UNIIIC Chief
Serge Brammertz, he had learned that Brammertz intended to
work for an additional six months, and expected that the
investigation would then be essentially complete. He
therefore felt a precise timeline was needed and hoped that
Riachy and Sader would return from New York with one.

PARLIAMENT'S VOTE ON SYRIAN WARRANTS
--------------


11. (C) In Rizk's view, the previous day's vote by
Lebanon's Parliament to condemn Syria's issuance of warrants
against PSP leader Walid Jumblatt and Minister Marwan Hamadeh
was more than a justifiable statement of Lebanon's
sovereignty. It was also a shrewd political move by Speaker
Berri to obtain an IOU from Saad Hariri. Although Berri
attempted to temper the resolution's wording, his assistance
in bringing the measure to a vote (and abstaining, along with
Hizballah) put Hariri in his debt.


12. (C) Rizk noted that Berri rarely misses a chance to
gain an advantage, and can always be expected to demand
payment at some point in time. Nevertheless, Rizk believed
the parliamentary action was necessary and had drawn a
commendable line in the sand with Syria.

ABDUCTED USCIT KELSEY KLOTZ

BEIRUT 00001717 003 OF 003


--------------


13. (U) The Ambassador re-emphasized to the Justice
Minister that U.S. patience was wearing thin on the continued
inaction by GOL in returning the abducted child to US
custody. Minister Rizk conceded it was unacceptable and said
he was "shamed" that the situation was still unresolved.


14. (U) He placed an immediate phone call to ISF Director
General Rifi and instructed him to maintain maximum effort on
the task. The Ambassador also spoke with the ISF chief and
emphasized the importance of the case to the USG. Rifi, who
is on his way to Washington to discuss military cooperation,
insisted his force was doing all it could to locate and
return the child. The Ambassador cautioned Rifi that he
should expect to hear about this case in Washington.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) What may appear to outsiders to be a minor issue
has developed into a full-scale political crisis in Lebanon,
with the immediate protagonists Siniora and Rizk standing in
for March 14-vs.-March 8 (i.e., Nabih Berri and the Shia)
forces. Yet the cabinet squabbling over the Higher Judicial
Council appointments looks just childish when one looks at
the details: Siniora and Rizk agree on 9 of the 10 judges,
with only one judge (a Shia) in question. (Five of the 10
positions are automatic by virtue of the other positions
judges hold, so this controversy revolves around naming the
other five.) Rizk has Lebanon's much-abused constitution on
his side when he claims the right to put the names in the
decree, although that decree must be signed by the PM and
President. Asking the judges to give their own
recommendations was a clever tactic by Siniora to check his
minister's perogatives -- Siniora can claim he is on the side
of the independent judiciary, when in fact judges'
recommendations have no legal authority or even precedent in
Lebanese judicial history.


16. (C) We talked with two lawyer/MPs, Boutros Harb and
Robert Ghanem, about this issue. They both criticized Rizk
for trying to put in a somewhat less qualified judge in the
place of the Shia recommended by the judges and backed by
Siniora. Rizk, they claim, was trying to "make everyone
happy" by doing a deal with Nabih Berri. Rizk had not
anticipated Siniora's stubborness. But the differences
between the two judges in question is not so large as to
constitute a crisis, they claimed. Both are qualified.
Thus, at this point, with Lebanon yearning for the Higher
Judicial Council to take office, Siniora should back down,
Harb and Ghanem argue, even if principle is on the PM's side.


17. (C) Saad Hariri agrees. The Ambassador spoke to Hariri
by phone on 5/31. Hariri said that he was deeply angry with
Siniora for fighting an unneeded battle with Rizk over a
single position that wasn't all that important to the basic
approach of the Council. Rizk, Hariri said, had politically
broken with Lahoud and started to lend his support to the
March 14 movement. Siniora's undermining of Rizk's authority
risked sending the Justice Minister back in the wrong
direction. Moreover, Siniora had annoyed Nabih Berri, whose
support was essential for larger issues such as the special
tribunal. Siniora, Hariri concluded, may be right, but it is
more important to be smart. Asked by the Ambassador whether
he had conveyed his views to the PM he essentially appointed,
Hariri said that he had done so through Marwan Hamadeh. As
for direct contact, he and Siniora had not spoken in two
weeks, Hariri claimed.


18. (SBU) The Ambassador will raise this issue with PM
Siniora in a meeting today (6/1). Given the deeply
dispiriting impact it is having on the public mood, it needs
to be solved urgently.
FELTMAN