MGLE01: S/CT COORDINATOR'S MEETING WITH LEBANESE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001680 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2016 TAGS: PTER PREL MARR MOPS LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: S/CT COORDINATOR'S MEETING WITH LEBANESE ARMED FORCES G-2 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: S/CT Coordinator Crumpton and the Ambassador, accompanied by Defense Attache, met May 23 with Director of LAF G2 Brigadier General Georges Khoury. BG Khoury provided an overview of the terrorism situation from the LAF G2 perspective. He noted three distinct terrorist threat levels: a) significant events that require immediate action, b) terrorist targeting of foreign interests, and c) organized international terrorism. BG Khoury described LAF activities to counter these three threats and the need for continued cooperation and support from the U.S. Repeating a common LAF view, he voiced his concern that the ISF, in moving into counter-terrorism activities, was creating a para-miltary capability focused on supporting narrow political interests rather than the nation as a whole. BG Khoury then explained that in the LAF's recent clash with Fatah-Intifada, GOL politicians, not the LAF, made the decision not to take further military action. BG Khoury stressed that his Directorate,s definition of terrorism mirrored USG policy and stated that the LAF was ready to support all counterterrorism efforts but needed the support of the GOL and more assistance from the USG. THREE LEVELS OF THREATS -------------- ¶2. (C) After an exchange of greetings, Ambassador Crumpton explained that his visit to the region was to meet with various U.S. Embassy country teams as well as regional partners to help develop strategies to combat common regional and world threats. Ambassador Crumpton noted that his mission required our regional partners to help assess the threat and suggest ways to move forward. ¶3. (C) BG Khoury stated that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) G2 intelligence directorate broke the threat down into three categories: 1) Incidents that needed an immediate response, such as the recent string of bombings and assassinations since October 2004, 2) targeting of foreign interests in Lebanon, such as the bombing against a McDonald's restaurant in 2002, and 3) organized international terrorist groups. The first category requires immediate actions to contain damage sustained. ¶4. (C) BG Khoury explained that the LAF is currently providing active measures to protect foreign interests, such as maintaining patrols around embassies and high visibility foreign businesses. He added that the LAF considered organized international terrorism to be a direct threat against Lebanon and that his department dealt with it as such. He cited the LAF arrest of terrorists from Dinniya in northern Lebanon in 2000 as an example. BG Khoury went on to explain that the G2 was also the protection and &eyes8 for the LAF. He noted that the LAF had thirty years of counterterrorism experience to draw upon. He expressed his appreciation for past USG support for LAF G2 counterterrorism efforts and asked for increased support in the future. Ambassador Crumpton thanked him for the LAF,s partnership in addressing common threats. CONCERNS ABOUT ISF COUNTERTERRORISM -------------- ¶5. (C) BG Khoury said he did not want to bring the the Ambassador into Lebanese internal disputes, but he then went on to voice his concerns (shared by many in the LAF) about developments within the Lebanese Internal Security Force (ISF). He claimed that recent efforts by the ISF to create a para-military counterterrorism unit were not supported by Lebanese law and were by definition illegal. Ambassador Feltman questioned this point, and BG Koury reiterated that a new law would need to be passed by the GOL to make such an ISF unit legal. He stated that this situation is particularly troubling because the ISF has a political character, specifically in that it works directly for the Prime Minister. He claimed that only the LAF is working for the national interest, rather than in support of a particular political group. Khoury apologized again for bringing the issue up, but wanted advice and recommendations on the future of the LAF in counterterrorism, especially in light of its 30 years of experience in this arena. (Note: This is basically a bureaucratic turf issue. End note.) BEIRUT 00001680 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Khoury stressed that the LAF is working to strengthen itself by training and maintaining an appropriate distance from all political parties, and trying to isolate the force from societal (read confessional) pressures. He noted that the LAF is using assistance from various USG offices to enhance its effectiveness. He also stated that in the wake of the April 2005 Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, the LAF in general, and specifically the G2, has conducted a massive internal reform, with large-scale changes in personnel. Additionally, he claimed that the LAF G2 has provided actionable counterterrorism intelligence to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen. LAF COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERORISTS -------------- ¶7. (C) BG Khoury noted that the current aim of international Islamist extremists is to attack foreign interests, especially the U.S. This is because these extremists want to target those who are trying to promote change, and the U.S. is the leading force for positive change in the region. The extremists accept political authority only in relations to their view of God, and therefore see democracy, establishing the authority of the people, as illegitimate. The extremists seek to impose Sharia law and target those who promote democracy, especially the U.S., since again the U.S. is the leading force for democratic change in the world. ¶8. (C) The LAF G2 is working to eradicate extremist influence in Lebanon. BG Khoury claims that his directorate is working with moderate Salafists to deal with the issue from an Islamic viewpoint. He explained that the G2 Directorate is also trying to penetrate extremist Salafist cells in order to break them apart from the inside. ¶9. (S/NF) In reply to Ambassador Crumpton,s question about information concerning extremists linked to Iraq, BG Khoury noted that his directorate immediately passes such information to the USG. He noted that his Directorate has and continues to provide information to the U.S. concerning movement of extremists, either to or from Iraq, as he receives it. BG Khoury said that the G2 shares the U.S. view of Al-Qaeda and the U.S. definition of terrorism. Terrorism is the enemy of both countries and success would be achieved only though continued partnership, especially with the U.S. Lebanon suffered through 30 years of terrorism and will need continued U.S. support to fight it successfully in the future. CREATING A COMMON LEBANESE VIEW ON TERRORISM -------------- ¶10. Ambassador Crumpton stressed the importance of the LAF G2 helping to inform GOL decision makers about the terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaeda and other Sunni extremists. Ambassador Feltman highlighted the fact that the Lebanese Parliament pardoned the Dinniya terrorists in 2006, negating G2 efforts against that group. BG Khoury noted that this decision was politically bound up with the release of Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and was a purely political decision. Ambassador Feltman reiterated the need for the G2 to help translate threat information into positive GOL policy decisions. BG Khoury explained that until right now there is no government consensus concerning the definition of terrorism versus &resistance.8 He said that he reports directly to the LAF commander, but on terrorism issues he sends reports directly to the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister as well. He noted that his directorate provides analysis and suggested courses of action. RECENT LAF CLASH WITH FATAH-INTIFADA -------------- ¶11. (C) BG Khoury outlined the string of events leading up to the attack by elements of Fatah-Intifada against the LAF durng the past week. Several days prior to the clash the Palestinians erected a tent in a new position which the LAF then took down. The Palestinians put up another tent and fortified the position. The LAF was attacked when its troops went to deal with this second position. The LAF did take over the site and brought in reinforcements to better secure the area. The GOL, not the LAF, made the decision to limit the LAF response for fear of jeopardizing the National BEIRUT 00001680 003 OF 003 Dialogue. BG Khoury confirmed that the Palestinians were receiving reinforcements and resupply from across the border. He noted that in the future the reinforcements might be Syrian troops, not just Palestinian fighters. ¶12. (C) Ambassador Crumpton stressed his disappointment at the lack of response by the LAF and the GOL concerning this issue. He reiterated PM Siniora,s words from his visit to the U.S. that the GOL must help itself, and get help from others. Ambassador Crumpton noted that getting USG decision makers to assist Lebanon is made that much more difficult if the GOL does not appear willing to help itself. ¶13. (C) BG Khoury concluded by thanking the USG for its support, and repeating his request for additional technical assistance in patrolling the border. He cited U.S. help to Jordan for its border patrol operations as an example of the kind of support necessary to secure Lebanon,s 350km land border. Ambassador Crumpton thanked BG Khoury for his support and cooperation and, noting the strong support of President Bush for Lebanon, promised that the USG would seriously consider all future requests for assistance. FELTMAN