MGLE01: S/CT CRUMPTON MEETING WITH MICHEL AOUN --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001677 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/WERNER/DORAN/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 TAGS: PTER KPAL KDEM PINS LE SY IR SUBJECT: MGLE01: S/CT CRUMPTON MEETING WITH MICHEL AOUN -- BEWARE OF HIZBALLAH Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reasons: Section 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On May 23, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Crumpton met with Lebanese parliamentary minority leader Michel Aoun at Aoun's home near Beirut. S/CT Crumpton encouraged Aoun to use his influence to make Lebanon a solid partner with the USG in the fight against terrorism. He expressed USG concerns that although Hizballah denies that it plays any role beyond Lebanon's borders, the organization continued to support terrorist activities outside of Lebanon and in Iraq. S/CT Crumpton told Aoun that because of Hizballah's transnational role in terrorism, and its obstructionist role inside Lebanon, the USG did not look favorably on Aoun's association with Hizballah. He suggested that broad agreement on a policy concerning Palestinian and Hizballah arms might be useful to bring all political sides in Lebanon together to accomplish a common goal. That unity would also put Hizballah on notice that the Lebanese leadership did not support its activities. Aoun -- insisting that his MOU with Hizballah did not constitute an alliance -- said that if the USG could provide intelligence proving Hizballah's role in supporting terror, he would use that to discredit the organization locally. HIZBALLAH AND THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE: A CHANCE FOR UNITY? -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador Crumpton, accompanied by the Ambassador and PolChief, met with Michel Aoun and Aoun aide Gebran Basile on May 23. S/CT Crumpton began the discussion by asking Aoun how he would deal with a pro-Hizballah, national defense strategy outlined by Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in the most recent national dialogue session. Aoun admitted that the Lebanese do not have many tools for dealing with Hizballah. He said he would challenge Nasrallah's strategy with a call for Hizballah to submit its arms to the authority of the Lebanese state, and to recognize the exclusive right of the state to defend itself against an external threat. Aoun said that he hoped to undermine Nasrallah's use of the threat of possible Israeli aggression as a tool to justify Hizballah's weapons. Aoun said that once the Shebaa farms are liberated or turned over to international observers, Lebanon would have to come up with a new legal framework for its relationship with resistance and with Israel. In contrast to Nasrallah's statements in the dialogue, Aoun foresaw that "some kind of a truce, or armistice" would have to be worked out with Israel at that point. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that there was a broad political consensus among non-Shia groups in Lebanon on the need to control Hizballah's arms. That consensus could be the starting point for political cooperation between the majority and the other political factions. The Ambassador suggested that Aoun and the other members of the national dialogue might produce a common position on Hizballah's arms that showed unity of purpose and put Hizballah on notice. Aoun acknowledged that the idea was sound, but added that the majority would have to make the "first call." Ambassador Crumpton told Aoun that his best tools for dealing with Hizballah could be his cooperation with other Lebanese parties to reach a common position on Hizballah's arms. HIZBALLAH IS AN IRANIAN TOOL AND NO FRIEND OF LEBANON -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador Crumpton said the USG would only be reassured that assistance to Lebanon is well-merited if there were cohesion in the Lebanese response to terrorism. He cautioned that the USG was not pleased with Hizballah's actions or with the political support they have received inside of Lebanon. He asked Aoun what he had gained by entering into an alliance with Hizballah in February 2006. Aoun corrected Ambassador Crumpton by saying that he had no alliance with Hizballah; he had signed on 2/6 an MOU with Nasrallah that covered ten specific points of policy. Aoun said Hizballah frequently protests government policies that he also questions, but they are allied with the parliamentary majority and members of the government. "I am in the opposition -- alone," Aoun said, carefully distinguishing himself from Hizballah. BEIRUT 00001677 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) While repeatedly rejecting that he was Hizballah's ally, Aoun insisted his agreement with Nasrallah had achieved two victories. First, he had achieved a rhetorical and ideological change in Hizballah. The group dropped their demand to liberate Palestine from their political discourse. Now they acknowledge that they defend the borders of Lebanon from Israeli threats. His second achievement was peace on the border with Israel. Aoun took credit for the months of relative calm on the Blue Line, and promised to keep the situation calm. Ambassador Crumpton asked Aoun why, in light of this achievement, Hizballah continued to improve its fighting positions on the Blue Line, adding sophisticated bunkers and communications equipment. Aoun said this was a defensive maneuver in keeping with Hizballah's ideology. The Ambassador asked how this new posture jibes with Hizballah's claims to be small and mobile to avoid an Israeli strike. Aoun quipped, "All the better for the Israelis. They can hit them easier." ¶6. (C) Ambassador Crumpton told Aoun that Hizballah continues to participate in terrorist attacks beyond Lebanon's conflict with Israel. He said that Hizballah provides material support for Palestinians and is training fighters who kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq. Aoun replied that he asked Hassan Nasrallah directly if Hizballah was involved in activities outside of Lebanon and Nasrallah assured him they were not. Nasrallah admitted to political support for Hamas in Israeli but no other operations. Hizballah has also repeatedly denied being controlled by Iran. Aoun said Nasrallah deputy Naiim Qassim announced publicly that Hizballlah is a Lebanese organization not an instrument of Iran. Ambassador Crumpton told Aoun Qassim was lying. He said that Hizballah is financed and controlled out of Iran and responsive to Iran's instructions. USG LOOKING FOR A RELIABLE PARTNER IN LEBANON -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador Crumpton told Aoun that the USG wants to help strengthen Lebanon so that the institutions of the state can make the republic sovereign and stable. He said the USG was prepared to provide assistance to Lebanon so that the country could defend itself against terrorist threats. However, the USG wanted to ensure the assistance was used effectively in the fight against extremism. Ambassador Crumpton said the USG was outraged at the recent killing of a Lebanese soldier by Palestinian extremists and the subsequent failure by the GOL to bring the guilty parties to justice. Aoun's aide, Gebran Basile, said that responding to the Palestinian attack was the responsibility of the GOL. The ambassador acknowledged that but said the USG wanted to express its view that Lebanon needed to act to take control of Palestinian weapons. ¶8. (C) Aoun said he would ask the GOL why there had been no action against the Palestinians guilty of attacking the LAF. He said members of the parliamentary majority claim that they are waiting for the Palestinians to come together so that they can speak with one voice. Aoun advised the GOL to approach the Palestinian groups one group at a time, rather than waiting for unity that is unlikely to develop. ¶9. (C) Basile said that Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement see Sunnis as the true terrorists, not the Shia. Ambassador Crumpton disagreed with Basile and explained that the USG had Sunni and Shia partners in the war on terror. We saw the extremists, who make up a small minority of Islamic communities, as a source of terror. It was not a question of Sunni or Shia. Aoun quickly said that he agreed with the U.S. position, and wanted to "disarm the minds" of Sunni and Shia of good will to make them allies. When Ambassador Crumpton asked who might be on his list of people of good faith, Aoun named Nasrallah, although he has to deal with extremists in his own camp. Once again, Ambassador Crumpton disagreed, saying that Nasrallah's opposition to UNSCR 1559, and his opposition to the role of the Lebanese armed forces do not appear to be the acts of a person of good faith. Ambassador Crumpton said that Hizballah needs to decide if it will be a Lebanese political organization of a tool of Iran. ¶10. (C) Aoun said that he was consistent in his support for UNSCR 1559 and disarmament of militias in Lebanon, ideas that he claimed to have supported while in exile in Paris. After his return to Lebanon in 2005, Aoun said he found the Lebanese leadership united against him, and defending BEIRUT 00001677 003 OF 003 Hizballah. This near-universal resistance to Aoun's position caused him to alter his own position, as a tactical maneuver. ¶11. (C) In drawing the meeting to a close, Ambassador Crumpton cautioned Aoun that he must be aware of the threat Hizballah poses directly and indirectly to Lebanon. Aoun said that Lebanon does not want to face the consequences for Hizballah's actions. He added that Lebanon could be a partner in the war on terror, but they were not prepared to suffer another civil war. He would try to achieve stability and peace. But Lebanon's future was influenced by the regional political situation. Aoun asked again that information about Hizballah's role in Iraq be handed over to him so that he could use it at the appropriate time. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) To Basile's evident discomfort, Aoun was uncharacteristically willing to distance himself from Hizballah in his meeting with Ambassador Crumpton. For the first time in recent conversations with us, Aoun questioned Nasrallah's veracity, and denied an alliance with Hizballah. On the subject of military cooperation and counterterrorism, the former General seemed to find his link to Hizballah a bit too confining for comfort. Much of his support here is predicated on his strength in the face of a Muslim challenge. Aoun has tried to demonstrate to his followers that he has tamed Hizballah and only the Sunni present a challenge. It would be difficult for Aoun to sustain publicly his alliance with Hizballah in the face of hard evidence of Hizballah's links to Shia militia in Iraq and beyond. End comment. FELTMAN