MGLE01: S/CT COORDINATOR CRUMPTON HEARS STRAIGHT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIRUT 001675

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016
TAGS: PREL ASEC MASS PTER KCRM KISL LE
SUBJECT: MGLE01: S/CT COORDINATOR CRUMPTON HEARS STRAIGHT
TALK, GRIM PREDICTIONS FROM JUMBLATT, HAMADEH, MURR

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Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Visiting S/CT Coordinator Crumpton had a long 5/22
conversation with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, Deputy Prime
Minister and Defense Minister Elias al-Murr, and
Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh -- three men
convinced they have been, or will be, targeted for
assassination by the Syrian regime with Hizballah's help.
The three suggested that the National Dialogue process, which
includes Hizballah ostensibly as a purely Lebanese actor,
might make incremental progress related to the Palestinian
armed presence in Lebanon. However, Nasrallah's dogmatism
about Hizballah's own arms was keeping their expectations for
the National Dialogue low. They recognized the need for the
"March 14" coalition to unify around a counter-argument to
Nasrallah's case for Hizballah's arms. At the same time,
they anticipated further attacks in Lebanon carried out by
militant groups (other than Hizballah) tied to Syria and
Iran. End summary.

DINNER WITH THREE MARKED MEN
--------------


2. (S) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt hosted visiting S/CT
Coordinator Crumpton for a dinner on the evening of May 22.
This first event on Ambassador Crumpton's schedule was
notable for the fact that Jumblatt hosted it at his residence
in Beirut's Clemenceau neighborhood. (Since the Hariri
assassination in February 2005, concerns about his physical
security have largely confined him to his castle-like
ancestral home in the Chouf mountains, and he only rarely
makes public appearances outside.)


3. (S) Besides the venue, the event was also notable for its
Lebanese guests, who were limited to Telecommunications
Minister Marwan Hamadeh and Deputy Prime Minister and Defense
Minister Elias al-Murr. Both Hamadeh and Murr narrowly
survived assassination attempts, in October 2004 and July
2005, respectively. Both are convinced that the Syrian
regime was behind the attacks, and that Hizballah played some
sort of role in them.


4. (S) Compared to Jumblatt and Hamadeh, Murr is a more
recent member of the Lebanese sovereignty cause, having been
literally blasted out of the pro-Syrian "loyalist" camp by
the car bomb that was meant to take his life. Despite some
continuing frictions with certain "March 14" figures,
particularly Prime Minister Siniora, Murr has become close to
Hamadeh, and the conversation and body language between him
and Jumblatt, while more reserved, was friendly. Hamadeh
told us privately that he was pleased that S/CT Crumpton's
visit gave him the opportunity to bring Murr and Jumblatt
closer together.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE: LOW EXPECTATIONS
--------------


5. (S) Jumblatt and his Lebanese guests expressed low
expectations with the National Dialogue process, the next
meeting of which is scheduled for June 8, with Hizballah's
armed status figuring prominently on the agenda. Jumblatt
recalled for Crumpton the uncompromising stance of
Hizballah's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, during the
last National Dialogue meeting. Then, Nasrallah had insisted
that there:

-- would be no talk of Hizballah disarmament before
"liberation" of the Sheba'a Farms area;

-- could be no integration of Hizballah forces into the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); and

-- must be no return to the state of affairs with Israel that
previously existed under the 1949 armistice, which, Nasrallah
claimed, provided no assurances of security for "the people
of the South and Lebanon."


6. (S) Nasrallah had agreed with the "March 14" National
Dialogue participants that Lebanon should "respect"
international resolutions. However, he had added that

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"respecting" international resolutions did not equate to
"abiding" by them, according to Jumblatt.

DEALING WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE
--------------


7. (S) Murr mentioned that Nasrallah had recently advised
him not to "dream" that the LAF would ever confiscate the
weapons of Palestinian militias before the "whole region's
problems were settled." Asked if Nasrallah would stand by
the National Dialogue's unanimous decision in favor of ending
an armed Palestinian presence outside the refugee camps
within a 6-month period, Jumblatt said, "theoretically, yes
-- practically, no."


8. (S) Hamadeh said that discussion related to the
Palestinian presence was time-consuming and full of
procedure, in part because Christian participants at the
table were "anxious" about the Palestinian demand for the
right to own property in Lebanon. Jumblatt said that this
was nevertheless an issue on which "we could make some
progress," providing for improved living conditions inside
the Palestinian refugee camps in return for greater control
over Palestinian arms outside the camps.

WHAT IS HIZBALLAH'S STRATEGY?
--------------


9. (S) Jumblatt and Hamadeh said they were struck by
Nasrallah's advocacy within the National Dialogue for
maintaining a continuous "balance of terror" with Israel,
which Nasrallah had described as an existential threat.
Nasrallah had held forth on how "the Katyusha," the primitive
Soviet-designed multiple rocket-launcher that is a staple of
Hizballah's arsenal, became "a weapon of mass destruction"
when trained on certain Israeli targets (the petrochemical
facilities around Haifa, for example). Strategic bombing of
Israel, Jumblatt pointed out, was something different
entirely from Hizballah's historic strategy of guerilla
warfare to end foreign occupation of Lebanese territory.
(Comment: see reftel for a detailed account of Nasrallah's
presentation.)

WHOSE SIDE IS HIZBALLAH ON?
--------------


10. (S) While the purpose of the National Dialogue was to
allow all sides in Lebanon a forum to peacefully work out
their differences over the critical issues facing the
country, Jumblatt wondered whether Nasrallah had "a 'Lebanese
side' to begin with." Hizballah's Lebanese identity was
subject to debate because of "the theological issue," that
is, the Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of "viloyat-e faqih,"
rule of the jurisprudent, which makes Iran's supreme leader,
Ayatollah Khamene'i, Hizballah's supreme leader as well.


11. (S) The link between Hizballah's arms and regional
conflicts beyond Lebanon meant that Hizballah was exposing
Lebanon to potential destruction in the event of conflict
between Iran and the United States, Jumblatt and his Lebanese
guests agreed. At the opposite extreme -- at, curiously, at
the same time -- Nasrallah appeared to be detaching the South
of Lebanon, with its predominantly Shi'a population, from the
rest of Lebanon. Jumblatt noted that Nasrallah repeatedly
used the expression "the people of the South and Lebanon," as
if he was referring to two distinct entities.


12. (S) On this note, Jumblatt and Hamadeh expressed concern
about allegedly stepped-up Hizballah preparations in southern
Lebanon and beyond. These included the installation of
communications cables, presumably for greater information
security. Hizballah was also reportedly buying large
expanses of land from Druze owners in the Litani River valley
and from Christians in the Jezzine pocket. The eventual
goal, Jumblatt surmised, was to link the Israeli border areas
with lands to the north, creating a Hizballah-controlled
"buffer zone" between Syria and the rest of Lebanon.

RESPONDING TO HIZBALLAH
--------------


13. (S) Jumblatt and Hamadeh said that they were working on
a "political response" to Nasrallah's argument that Hizballah
must hold onto its weapons indefinitely. It would be part of

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an effort to formulate a unified "March 14" position.
Jumblatt pointed out that "one (position) is better than
several," which is what "March 14" has had until now. Beyond
the National Dialogue process, Jumblatt and Hamadeh said that
there was a need to counter Nasrallah's argument that (as
Jumblatt put it),"because I have weapons, the South is
prosperous." The "March 14" leadership needed to come up
with an alternative vision for Lebanon that Nasrallah's
audience found compelling.


14. (S) Jumblatt said that he and his "March 14" allies
needed to organize a series of events that would respond to a
Hizballah public-relations offensive expected to follow the
10-year anniversary of Israel's final withdrawal from
southern Lebanon on May 23. A "March 14" counter-campaign
could revolve around the one-year anniversary of the
assassination of journalist Samir Kassir, and also
commemorate the death of the LAF soldier who later died of
wounds sustained in a recent clash with Fatah-Intifadah
militiamen in the Biqa'a Valley.

ANY ALTERNATIVE TO HIZBALLAH?
--------------


15. (S) Asked whether Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri's
Amal Movement would continue to follow Hizballah's lead,
effectively giving Hizballah a monopoly over political
representation of the Shi'a community, Jumblatt and Hamadeh
said that Berri was "squeezed." While Berri, who reflects
"another mood of the Shi'a establishment," was personally
inclined to strike off on his own path, he was constrained by
the force of popular, Hizballah-generated sentiment in his
community.


16. (S) Berri had "hinted" to Jumblatt that he might assert
his independence from Hizballah in the event of a favorable
resolution of the Sheba'a Farms, and Hamadeh thought it
significant that Berri had recently paid a highly public
visit on Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, the most senior
exponent in Lebanon of the center of Shi'a religious learning
in Najaf (as opposed to Qom, with its historical connection
to the Islamic revolutionary regime in Tehran, and through it
to Hizballah).


17. (S) In the end, however, Jumblatt did not expect Berri
to do so short of a change in the "balance of power" in the
region. This could come in the form of a "change of
behavior" on the part of what Jumblatt preferred to call "the
Alawite regime" in Damascus, as well as "containment" of
Iran. Pressure on the SARG, Hamadeh added, offered the
potential of cutting "a major logistical supply route" to
Hizballah. The next report of the UN International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) could
potentially be the "basic weapon of mass destruction" against
SARG-orchestrated terrorism, Jumblatt suggested.


18. (S) Otherwise, Berri would remain Hizballah's "captive,"
said Jumblatt. "You can feel it at the Foreign Ministry,"
where Fawzi Salloukh, a member of the Shi'a elite who is much
more on Berri's ideological wavelength than Hizballah's,
seems to realize that his tenure in office is at the pleasure
of Hassan Nasrallah, not that of Prime Minister Siniora or
Speaker Berri. (Comment: This prescient remark foreshadowed
a hostile reception the next morning, seemingly scripted for
Hizballah consumption, given to Ambassadors Crumpton and
Feltman by Salloukh, reported septel. End comment.)


19. (S) Murr added grimly that there was "no chance" of
weakening Hizballah by any domestic means. Other potential
Shi'a leaders had been "taken hostage," and this situation
would not change for at least another two years.
DEALING WITH SYRIA AND IRAN
--------------


20. (S) Expanding on this, Hamadeh urged that U.S. policy
seek to "disconnect the Eastern Mediterranean from Iran."
This would have the effect of cutting Hizballah's logistical
supply lines, helping to pacify northern and central Iraq,
giving "the Syrian people a chance," and stopping the ongoing
destabilization of Lebanon.


21. (S) It was doubtful, Hamadeh continued, that President
Asad's regime could ever be "domesticated." He and Jumblatt
suggested that the USG take a careful look at alternatives to

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Asad's regime, even ones that included the Muslim Brotherhood
as a component. A "national unity government" in Syria was
more feasible in Syria than it was in Iraq, Hamadeh asserted.
A more representative regime in Syria, with its
Sunni-majority population, would "give hope" to Sunni Muslims
and make militant Islam less attractive to them, he added.


22. (S) Jumblatt said that all indications were that the
SARG viewed "March 14," and the Siniora government that it
supported, as a "coup d'etat against it." The SARG was
therefore determined to do anything to destroy them, Jumblatt
said, to Hamadeh and Murr's nodding in ascent.

HIZBALLAH'S "KILLING PROBLEM"
--------------


23. (S) There was "no solution" for Hizballah in the near
term, Murr said. The only realistic goal was to put an end
to Hizballah's apparently Syrian-directed "killing problem."
According to Murr, Imad Mughaniyeh was currently "very
active" in Beirut, working with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps on the one hand and Syrian intelligence supremo
(and President Asad's brother-in-law) Asef Shawkat on the
other. "If we don't with Syria and Iran, there is no
solution for Hizballah," Murr said.

WARNING OF MORE ATTACKS TO COME
--------------


24. (S) Murr predicted that the coming months would see
further assassinations, more activity on the part of
Syrian-aligned Palestinian rejectionists, and more visibility
of al-Qa'ida-like (but Syrian-manipulated) Sunni militants.
All of this was a matter of "Syrian manipulation with Iranian
benediction," and it was geared towards forcing the United
States and other countries to shift course in Lebanon, Murr
said.


25. (S) Ironically, Syria's withdrawal of its military
forces and overt intelligence personnel had made things more
complicated, according to Murr. Syria continued to have an
"army" of sorts in Lebanon, but one that carried "Lebanese
identification" (that is, Hizballah and Syria's other
remaining allies in Lebanon). It made for a "very dangerous"
situation in the coming months, one in which international
interests could find themselves targeted as well, both inside
and outside Lebanon.


26. (S) As a sign of things to come, Murr pointed to what he
portrayed as escalated militant activity in the Palestinian
refugee camps. Allegedly from May to June of 2005, 900
would-be suicide bombers had been sent for "training" in a
number of camps, including the large Ayn al-Hilweh camp near
Sidon. Murr alleged that Hizballah was providing at least
some of this training. It was the only example, he said, of
Shi'a militants training Sunni militants.


27. (S) Murr said that Nasrallah told him once that Sunni
militants had been behind the attack on his, Murr's, life.
With a degree of candor about Syria that Nasrallah does not
show in public, Nasrallah had added that he could not assure
Murr that the SARG had not somehow been behind those Sunni
militants, however. In private, Nasrallah normally "gives
you a straight answer," Jumblatt added.

THE "ANJAR GROUP" AS AN EXAMPLE
--------------


28. (S) Murr referred to the so-called "Anjar group" of
Sunni militants, which was supporting the foreign-fighter
pipeline to Iraq and allegedly plotting attacks on foreign
interests in Lebanon before being broken up by the Lebanese
authorities, under Murr as then-Interior Minister, in
September 2004. In the course of investigating the "Anjar
group," Murr claimed, Lebanese authorities under his
supervision had discovered links between them and nine
terrorist cells active in Europe. This was a surprising
discovery, according to Murr, because the "Anjar group" had
been "fully handled by Hizballah," which provided training,
and by Syrian military intelligence, which provided financing
and protection.

IRGC PLANNING SNIPER ATTACKS?
--------------

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29. (S) Murr went on to claim that there were 500
"professionals" of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) in Lebanon. They occasionally use the Iranian Embassy
in Lebanon as a base for preparations, as they did
Hizballah-controlled areas of Lebanon. He said he had
recently seen a report that Mughaniyeh, together with the
IRGC was involved in preparing sniper attacks in Lebanon, an
alternate modus operandi to suicide bomb attacks.

PFLP-GC TOO MUCH FOR LEBANESE ARMY TO HANDLE?
--------------


30. (S) Jumblatt mentioned the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC),whose base
near the coastal town of Na'ameh, in his view, is too
formidable to be dealt with by military means. Besides the
PFLP-GC presence there, there were hundreds of Syrian
"workers" in the area. if only half could be mobilized to
fight an attack on Na'ameh, the LAF would not be able to
cope. Murr described Na'ameh as a particularly dangerous
terrorist arsenal, one out of the reach of the Lebanese
authorities, a place where "you could keep 300 trucks on
standby, ready to use" in car-bomb operations in Beirut and
elsewhere. The PFLP-GC was linked to Syria by way of
Hizballah, he said.

WHY NO ATTACKS RECENTLY?
--------------


31. (S) Asked why there had been no attacks recently (since
the December 2005 assassination of MP Gebran Tueni),Murr
suggested two reasons:

-- the SARG is cautiously waiting for the results of the next
UNIIIC report, due in June; and

-- Saudi King Abdullah had been "very clear" in his most
recent meeting with President Asad, telling him, in Murr's
words, "if you want us to protect your regime, stop the
killing in Lebanon." King Abdullah had made this point twice
to Asad in their last meeting, according to Murr. (Jumblatt
said he had heard the same account of this meeting from
Egyptian President Mubarak and Egyptian intelligence chief
Omar Suleiman.)

LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ARE CONSTRAINED
--------------


32. (S) Jumblatt and his Lebanese guests had little
confidence in the ability of the Lebanese government to deal
with this "killing problem." Hamadeh pointed out that the
investigation of the attempt to assassinate him had revealed
nothing so far. When Murr had tried to launch an
investigation immediately after the attack, Hamadeh noted,
what files there were disappeared "within hours." Murr
grimly predicted that "we will never catch anybody" behind
the string of assassinations, assassination attempts, and
terrorist bombings that preceded and followed the Hariri
assassination. The reason was because "those behind them
live between us," apparently referring to Hizballah and other
pro-Syrian Lebanese actors.


33. (S) Jumblatt, Hamadeh, and Murr were also unhappy with
the way Prime Minister Siniora's government had handled the
recent LAF-Fatah-Intifadah clash. Murr said he doubted that
the government had the political will to resolve the problem
of Palestinian arms outside the camps. He noted that Siniora
-- skirting the chain of command -- had called the LAF
commander, General Suleiman, to order that LAF forces sent to
the scene of the incident stand down.

NEED TO "ENCOURAGE" SINIORA
--------------


34. (S) Jumblatt said that Siniora was worried that any
crackdown on these Palestinian rejectionist militias would
expose him to accusations of persecuting the Palestinian
refugee population. Siniora feared growing hostility from
the refugee camps themselves. Of course, that was clearly
not the case, said Jumblatt: these armed elements were not
the same as noncombatant refugees living in the camps.
Siniora needs to be "encouraged" to act more firmly, he said.
While Sa'ad Hariri was more inclined to be firm, problems of

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"communication" between him and Siniora were hindering more
effective government action. "We need to work on this,"
Jumblatt said.

A CASE FOR HELPING THE LEBANESE
ARMY: IT'S NOT 1975 ANYMORE
--------------


35. (S) On the bright side, Murr insisted that the
Christian-Muslim divide the led to the breakup of the LAF
shortly after the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in 1975
was no longer a factor. Jumblatt pointed out that parts of
the country that were once staunch centers of support for the
civil war-era National Movement (the combination of leftist,
Islamist, and Palestinian groups of which he and his late
father, Kamal Jumblatt, were leaders, and which fought the
LAF among others) were now seeing demonstrations in favor of
the LAF as it attempted to hold the line against the likes of
the PFLP-GC and Fatah-Intifadah.


36. (S) Murr added that there was no danger of foreign
technical support and donated equipment being diverted from
the LAF (to Hizballah, for example). Assistance that was
cost-effective from the point of view of the donor -- such as
the provision of used equipment -- would boost LAF morale,
including among the LAF's many Shi'a members.


FELTMAN