MGLE01--MICHEL AOUN ON HIZBALLAH DEFENSE VISION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001559

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR WERNER/ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2016
TAGS: KDEM PTER KISL KPAL PGOV PINS IS LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01--MICHEL AOUN ON HIZBALLAH DEFENSE VISION
FOR LEBANON--DON'T WORRY WE ARE STILL TALKING

Classified By: JEFFREY FELTMAN, AMBASSADOR. REASON: SECTION 1.4(b)


1. (C) Summary: On May 17, The Ambassador, accompanied by
PolChief, met with Michel Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic
Movement (FPM),to discuss USG concerns over the presentation
reportedly made by Hizballlah at the 5/16 National Dialogue
session. The Ambassador revealed pieces of the full readout
he had received of the session. We learned, he said, that
Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah had presented his
vision of Lebanon that included shared responsibility for
defense against what he saw as a permanent threat from an
Israel bent on invasion of Lebanon. Hizballah would retain
complete tactical freedom of action, without reference to
central, public accountable command. Aoun confirmed that the
Ambassador's information was correct. Aoun listened to our
concerns and tried to sound reassuring as he attempted to
explain them away. Despite Hizballah's bellicose language in
the dialogue, Aoun claimed onviction that Nasrallah has
retreated to a defensive posture with regards to Israel.
Hizballah cannot reasonably defend against attack from the
south. Aoun said that he would respond to Nasrallah, saying
that any resolution of a joint strategy had to end with
complete control of all armed elements going to the Lebanese
state.

NASRALLAH RATTLING HIS SCIMITAR;
AOUN UNCONCERNED
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador and Poloff called on Michel Aoun in his
home in the hills surrounding Beirut. The Ambassador told
Aoun that he was uneasy about the readout we received about
Nasrallah's presentation at the National Dialogue session on
5/16. Nasrallah sounded aggressive in his presentation,
threatening Israel with military action, and insisting that
the Israelis have eternal ambitions for Lebanese territory.
While willing to discuss the broad strategy of Lebanon's
defense, Nasrallah said Hizballah would retain complete
freedom of action on tactics. The Ambassador said that
Hizballah is the cause of the dangers from which it pretends
to defend Lebanon. If Hizballah did not present a threat to
Israel, Israel would have no reason for its heightened
security posture or its continuous overflight of Lebanese
territory. The Ambassador added that Aoun's constituents
would not have been happy with the tone of Nasrallah's
intervention in which he described a vision of Lebanon that
is opposed to Aoun's vision.


3. (C) Aoun parried the remark about his constituents, but
agreed with the Ambassador's presentation. "You have good
sources," he said at one point, responding to the
Ambassador's statement on Nasrallah's position. The
Ambassador explained that the USG understood that the Shia of
the south had felt either neglected or abused for
generations, at the hands of Lebanese Sunnis and Christians,
Palestinians, and Israelis. We recognize that many people
feel a genuine sense of gratitude for Hizballah's role in
forcing the Israeli withdrawal and strengthening the Shia
political and economic role in Lebanon. However, Nasrallah
is using these feelings of gratitude to maintain his weapons
and to convince people of an Israeli threat that only exists
because Hizballah provokes it.


4. (C) Aoun said Nasrallah's presentation was "coherent" (a
word he used repeatedly) and well prepared. Aoun thought
Nasrallah had retreated into a strategically defensive
posture with Israel. Aoun insisted that Nasrallah made no
mention of offensive operations against Israel, and
restricted his proposals to how best to defend Lebanon in
case of Israeli attack. The logic Nasrallah followed was:
we accept Israel as the enemy; now, how do we combine our
defensive operations to protect our territory from this
enemy. He denied that Nasrallah threatened to deploy
Hizballah's arms in response to the "regional conditions."
Aoun interpreted the remark -- which he confirmed Nasrallah
made -- to mean that Israel may use the regional situation as
a pretext for attacking Lebanon, in which case Hizballah
would respond. Aoun said Nasrallah's plan was vague when it
came to command of the defensive units.


5. (C) The Ambassador repeated that Nasrallah's position
was a perversion of the truth. Aoun agreed with the
Ambassador that Nasrallah was manipulating the Shia in
Lebanon. However, he supposed that only time would diminish
the goodwill that Hizballah accumulated in its struggle with
Israel. He pointed out that people are building homes, and
improving the land around the border now. Once their lives

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become more normal, Hizballah will be less of a presence in
their lives. Aoun said that until that day comes, the border
should be kept peaceful. He promised to do everything in his
power to maintain calm on the border. He said that he was
personally reassured because he knew Nasrallah was not crazy,
and would not attack Israel. The Ambassador insisted that
Hizballah has adopted an increasingly aggressive posture in
the border area. New positions are being built, and present
positions are being fortified and equipped with fiber-optic
communications links. Iran is paying for the weapons and for
Hizballah's social services. The Ambassador asked if
Hizballlah could maintain the freedom to refuse to act
aggressively given the influence Iran has bought with its
money.

HIZBALLAH NOT A CREDIBLE
MILITARY DEFENSE OR THREAT
--------------


6. (C) Aoun was reassured, he said, by the fact that he
knew Nasrallah could not attack Israeli effectively.
Nasrallah is neither stupid nor suicidal. Aoun said he
believed Hizballah officials when they claimed Iran did not
need Hizallah's Iranian-provided weapons to defend Iran. He
said that Hizballah frequently has said they are only
interested in defending Lebanon. Pressed, Aoun admitted that
Nasrallah might be disingenuous in his comments. However,
the Christian leader said that if Hizballah were to use its
weapons in the service of Iran, it might lose local
credibility. Aoun said Hizballah places no trust in Arab
states, international guarantees of Lebanon's sovereignty, or
in the value of defending others. Hizballah believes in
self-reliance and the value of its own capabilities.


7. (C) Asked how a military professional could implicitly
support Hizballah's arms, Aoun said that Israeli withdrawal
from Shebaa farms might reassure the Lebanese and thus
undermine popular support for Hizballah's arms. The
Ambassador explained that the USG did not believe Shebaa to
be the key to Hizballah's arms. Picking up on Aoun's comment
about the need to reassure the Lebanese, the Ambassador asked
if Lebanon might be willing to recommit itself to an
armistice with Israel along the undisputed trace of the
border that runs from the village of Ghajjar to the
Mediterranean. This partial agreement would show that Israel
poses no territorial threat to Lebanon, and contradict
Hizballah's position.


8. (C) Aoun admitted that he personally does not believe
Israel would invade Lebanon if Hizballah were to lay down its
weapons. But he said that Nasrallah and his followers do
believe in the Israeli threat, and they believe the U.S.
cannot or will not deter that threat. The Ambassador asked
what the USG or others might do before the coming Dialogue
session to dismiss Hizballah's pretense of an Israeli
invasion threat. Aoun said that he hoped in teh National
Dialogue to help uncover what Nasrallah's real negotiating
positions are. "We know what his maximum is now," Aoun said.
"Now we need to find his minimum demand. We have to impose
our thinking; war is over."

GOL MUST CONTROL HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador said the Nasrallah statement, no
matter how coherent, offers nothing positive for Lebanon. As
long as Hizballah is free to act independently, Israel will
remain on alert and, concerned like any state with its own
security, will continue to violate Lebanese airspace. The
Lebanese state, forced to accept a superior power outside of
its control, will continue to be weak. The weakened
institutions of the state will be unable to fulfill the basic
demands of the people. The Ambassador warned that
cooperation between the state and Hizballah could lead people
to ask why the USG hasn't named Lebanon as a state sponsor of
terrorism. He asked if Aoun might not find a way to build
some bridges to the March 14 movement to work out a
collective response to Nasrallah. Aoun made no response to
this suggestion. The Ambassador pressed further by saying
the USG would like to see Aoun and March 14 come together to
exert a concerted effort to corner Hizballah. He stressed
that this issue of sovereignty over Lebanese territory is
fundamental to the future of the state, and more important
for what kind of state Lebanon is than the issue of who
becomes president.


10. (C) Aoun presented the position he planned to adopt on

BEIRUT 00001559 003 OF 003


June 8 in response to Nasrallah. The weapons controlled by
Hizballah would have to fall under GOL control. That control
could take many forms, including cantonment of Hizballah's
weapons in reserve. But the launching of any military action
would have to be a decision taken by the government.
Individual fighters or commanders could not usurp the power
of the state. Aoun said clearly that Hizballah could not be
integrated into the Lebanese Armed Forces if the two forces
were not sufficiently homogeneous for them to fit together.
Aoun said he favored the creation of a special unit, either a
national guard or a border guard unit, that would receive
Hizballah fighters.


11. (C) Comment: While visibly uncomfortable in parts of
the discussion, Aoun still seemed convinced that he can
negotiate with Nasrallah. But even Aoun seems to admit that
he has precious little leverage with the Shia when he bets
that time will diminish Hizballah's importance. Aoun was
joined in the meeting by his aide and son-in-law Gebran
Basile. Basile fidgeted and came across as deeply annoyed
each time the Ambassador suggested Aoun might cooperate with
March 14, or isolate Hizballah. The Hizballah-Aoun agreement
was Basile's handiwork. He is also one of the primary forces
behind the antagonism between Aoun and Hariri. At one point
in the conversation, as the Ambassador urged GOL control over
the whole of Lebanon, Basile chimed in, "if this government
controls Lebanon, who will control the government?" While
Aoun might accept some accommodation with March 14th to
achieve office, Basile appears more willing to bet on
Hizballah's support and the assistance of political figures
who are little more than odds and ends left behind by Syria.
End comment.
FELTMAN