MGLE01--MICHEL AOUN ON HIZBALLAH DEFENSE VISION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001559 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR WERNER/ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2016 TAGS: KDEM PTER KISL KPAL PGOV PINS IS LE SY SUBJECT: MGLE01--MICHEL AOUN ON HIZBALLAH DEFENSE VISION FOR LEBANON--DON'T WORRY WE ARE STILL TALKING Classified By: JEFFREY FELTMAN, AMBASSADOR. REASON: SECTION 1.4(b) ¶1. (C) Summary: On May 17, The Ambassador, accompanied by PolChief, met with Michel Aoun, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM),to discuss USG concerns over the presentation reportedly made by Hizballlah at the 5/16 National Dialogue session. The Ambassador revealed pieces of the full readout he had received of the session. We learned, he said, that Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah had presented his vision of Lebanon that included shared responsibility for defense against what he saw as a permanent threat from an Israel bent on invasion of Lebanon. Hizballah would retain complete tactical freedom of action, without reference to central, public accountable command. Aoun confirmed that the Ambassador's information was correct. Aoun listened to our concerns and tried to sound reassuring as he attempted to explain them away. Despite Hizballah's bellicose language in the dialogue, Aoun claimed onviction that Nasrallah has retreated to a defensive posture with regards to Israel. Hizballah cannot reasonably defend against attack from the south. Aoun said that he would respond to Nasrallah, saying that any resolution of a joint strategy had to end with complete control of all armed elements going to the Lebanese state. NASRALLAH RATTLING HIS SCIMITAR; AOUN UNCONCERNED -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador and Poloff called on Michel Aoun in his home in the hills surrounding Beirut. The Ambassador told Aoun that he was uneasy about the readout we received about Nasrallah's presentation at the National Dialogue session on 5/16. Nasrallah sounded aggressive in his presentation, threatening Israel with military action, and insisting that the Israelis have eternal ambitions for Lebanese territory. While willing to discuss the broad strategy of Lebanon's defense, Nasrallah said Hizballah would retain complete freedom of action on tactics. The Ambassador said that Hizballah is the cause of the dangers from which it pretends to defend Lebanon. If Hizballah did not present a threat to Israel, Israel would have no reason for its heightened security posture or its continuous overflight of Lebanese territory. The Ambassador added that Aoun's constituents would not have been happy with the tone of Nasrallah's intervention in which he described a vision of Lebanon that is opposed to Aoun's vision. ¶3. (C) Aoun parried the remark about his constituents, but agreed with the Ambassador's presentation. "You have good sources," he said at one point, responding to the Ambassador's statement on Nasrallah's position. The Ambassador explained that the USG understood that the Shia of the south had felt either neglected or abused for generations, at the hands of Lebanese Sunnis and Christians, Palestinians, and Israelis. We recognize that many people feel a genuine sense of gratitude for Hizballah's role in forcing the Israeli withdrawal and strengthening the Shia political and economic role in Lebanon. However, Nasrallah is using these feelings of gratitude to maintain his weapons and to convince people of an Israeli threat that only exists because Hizballah provokes it. ¶4. (C) Aoun said Nasrallah's presentation was "coherent" (a word he used repeatedly) and well prepared. Aoun thought Nasrallah had retreated into a strategically defensive posture with Israel. Aoun insisted that Nasrallah made no mention of offensive operations against Israel, and restricted his proposals to how best to defend Lebanon in case of Israeli attack. The logic Nasrallah followed was: we accept Israel as the enemy; now, how do we combine our defensive operations to protect our territory from this enemy. He denied that Nasrallah threatened to deploy Hizballah's arms in response to the "regional conditions." Aoun interpreted the remark -- which he confirmed Nasrallah made -- to mean that Israel may use the regional situation as a pretext for attacking Lebanon, in which case Hizballah would respond. Aoun said Nasrallah's plan was vague when it came to command of the defensive units. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador repeated that Nasrallah's position was a perversion of the truth. Aoun agreed with the Ambassador that Nasrallah was manipulating the Shia in Lebanon. However, he supposed that only time would diminish the goodwill that Hizballah accumulated in its struggle with Israel. He pointed out that people are building homes, and improving the land around the border now. Once their lives BEIRUT 00001559 002 OF 003 become more normal, Hizballah will be less of a presence in their lives. Aoun said that until that day comes, the border should be kept peaceful. He promised to do everything in his power to maintain calm on the border. He said that he was personally reassured because he knew Nasrallah was not crazy, and would not attack Israel. The Ambassador insisted that Hizballah has adopted an increasingly aggressive posture in the border area. New positions are being built, and present positions are being fortified and equipped with fiber-optic communications links. Iran is paying for the weapons and for Hizballah's social services. The Ambassador asked if Hizballlah could maintain the freedom to refuse to act aggressively given the influence Iran has bought with its money. HIZBALLAH NOT A CREDIBLE MILITARY DEFENSE OR THREAT -------------- ¶6. (C) Aoun was reassured, he said, by the fact that he knew Nasrallah could not attack Israeli effectively. Nasrallah is neither stupid nor suicidal. Aoun said he believed Hizballah officials when they claimed Iran did not need Hizallah's Iranian-provided weapons to defend Iran. He said that Hizballah frequently has said they are only interested in defending Lebanon. Pressed, Aoun admitted that Nasrallah might be disingenuous in his comments. However, the Christian leader said that if Hizballah were to use its weapons in the service of Iran, it might lose local credibility. Aoun said Hizballah places no trust in Arab states, international guarantees of Lebanon's sovereignty, or in the value of defending others. Hizballah believes in self-reliance and the value of its own capabilities. ¶7. (C) Asked how a military professional could implicitly support Hizballah's arms, Aoun said that Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa farms might reassure the Lebanese and thus undermine popular support for Hizballah's arms. The Ambassador explained that the USG did not believe Shebaa to be the key to Hizballah's arms. Picking up on Aoun's comment about the need to reassure the Lebanese, the Ambassador asked if Lebanon might be willing to recommit itself to an armistice with Israel along the undisputed trace of the border that runs from the village of Ghajjar to the Mediterranean. This partial agreement would show that Israel poses no territorial threat to Lebanon, and contradict Hizballah's position. ¶8. (C) Aoun admitted that he personally does not believe Israel would invade Lebanon if Hizballah were to lay down its weapons. But he said that Nasrallah and his followers do believe in the Israeli threat, and they believe the U.S. cannot or will not deter that threat. The Ambassador asked what the USG or others might do before the coming Dialogue session to dismiss Hizballah's pretense of an Israeli invasion threat. Aoun said that he hoped in teh National Dialogue to help uncover what Nasrallah's real negotiating positions are. "We know what his maximum is now," Aoun said. "Now we need to find his minimum demand. We have to impose our thinking; war is over." GOL MUST CONTROL HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador said the Nasrallah statement, no matter how coherent, offers nothing positive for Lebanon. As long as Hizballah is free to act independently, Israel will remain on alert and, concerned like any state with its own security, will continue to violate Lebanese airspace. The Lebanese state, forced to accept a superior power outside of its control, will continue to be weak. The weakened institutions of the state will be unable to fulfill the basic demands of the people. The Ambassador warned that cooperation between the state and Hizballah could lead people to ask why the USG hasn't named Lebanon as a state sponsor of terrorism. He asked if Aoun might not find a way to build some bridges to the March 14 movement to work out a collective response to Nasrallah. Aoun made no response to this suggestion. The Ambassador pressed further by saying the USG would like to see Aoun and March 14 come together to exert a concerted effort to corner Hizballah. He stressed that this issue of sovereignty over Lebanese territory is fundamental to the future of the state, and more important for what kind of state Lebanon is than the issue of who becomes president. ¶10. (C) Aoun presented the position he planned to adopt on BEIRUT 00001559 003 OF 003 June 8 in response to Nasrallah. The weapons controlled by Hizballah would have to fall under GOL control. That control could take many forms, including cantonment of Hizballah's weapons in reserve. But the launching of any military action would have to be a decision taken by the government. Individual fighters or commanders could not usurp the power of the state. Aoun said clearly that Hizballah could not be integrated into the Lebanese Armed Forces if the two forces were not sufficiently homogeneous for them to fit together. Aoun said he favored the creation of a special unit, either a national guard or a border guard unit, that would receive Hizballah fighters. ¶11. (C) Comment: While visibly uncomfortable in parts of the discussion, Aoun still seemed convinced that he can negotiate with Nasrallah. But even Aoun seems to admit that he has precious little leverage with the Shia when he bets that time will diminish Hizballah's importance. Aoun was joined in the meeting by his aide and son-in-law Gebran Basile. Basile fidgeted and came across as deeply annoyed each time the Ambassador suggested Aoun might cooperate with March 14, or isolate Hizballah. The Hizballah-Aoun agreement was Basile's handiwork. He is also one of the primary forces behind the antagonism between Aoun and Hariri. At one point in the conversation, as the Ambassador urged GOL control over the whole of Lebanon, Basile chimed in, "if this government controls Lebanon, who will control the government?" While Aoun might accept some accommodation with March 14th to achieve office, Basile appears more willing to bet on Hizballah's support and the assistance of political figures who are little more than odds and ends left behind by Syria. End comment. FELTMAN