MGLE01: JA'JA' FRUSTRATED BY FAILURES, SEEKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001521 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/WERNER/DORAN/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINS LE SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: JA'JA' FRUSTRATED BY FAILURES, SEEKS BETTER RELATIONS WITH SUNNI ALLY Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason Section 1.4(b) ¶1. (C) Samir Ja'ja', leader of the Lebanese Forces political movement, received the Ambassador and Polchief on May 12 for lunch in his home in the mountains of northern Lebanon. The meeting was a broad tour d'horizon with Ja'ja' expressing concern over the May 10 "labor" demonstrations in Beirut. He also voiced his continued frustration with Saad Hariri's unwillingness to listen to Christian advice, and his equal frustration with the inability of the March 14 movement to achieve its goal of removing Present Lahoud (although he expressed some hope for the future). Ja'ja' reminisced about lost opportunities for redemption for all parties, including Emile Lahoud, after the murder of Rafiq Hariri. Touching on Lebanese Forces' business, he said the party would slowly take control of the daily operations of television station LBC. Ja'ja' was joined by his wife, parliamentarian Setrida Ja'ja', for the meeting with the Ambassador. MAY 10 DEMONSTRATIONS A MISTAKE -------------- ¶2. (C) Ja'ja' said he had heard the demonstration of May 10 was the major subject at the subsequent cabinet meeting. Hizballah and Amal members of the government had spent their time in the meeting justifying their seemingly contradictory roles as both government critics and cabinet members. For Ja'ja' the demonstration was a net loss for Michel Aoun, whose Christian supporters turned out in reportedly small numbers with Hizballah for the event. Aoun's stated goal of overturning the government could never be achieved by so small an event. Ja'ja' said he was perplexed at Hizballah's part in the demonstration. Neither Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah, nor Amal's Nabih Berri, seemed intent on challenging Siniora seriously on May 10. Had they been serious about attempting to overturn the Siniora government, Hizballah could have turned out a much larger demonstration than the 200,000 people who participated. The Ambassador pointed out that PM Siniora had not backed away from his reform program. However, Siniora saw that it would be difficult to pass an entire reform package. He preferred to discuss the package as a means of inspiring a national debate on reform. Then, when opportunities presented themselves, he would implement reforms piece by legislative piece. Ja'ja' confirmed that Siniora had made the same tactical proposal to the March 14th movement during an organizational meeting. SAAD HARIRI STILL IGNORING CHRISTIAN ALLIES -------------- ¶3. (C) Saad Hariri sees Hizballah as a problem, but has no vision as to how to deal with Hizballah, according to Ja'ja'. Saad hopes that through dialogue he could sway Hizballah to eventually give up its arms. Ja'j'a does not agree with this approach. Worse, he fears Hariri, inexperienced in Lebanese affairs, when left alone with Nasrallah, will lose more ground than he gains and will succeed only in appeasing Nasrallah at the cost of March 14th's strategic goals. He grimaced as he thought back on the six-hour Nasrallah-Hariri conversations, and their frequent talks together. "Our conversations together last maybe 30 minutes," Ja'ja' said of his own private talks with Hariri. To illustrate Hariri's lack of talent as a negotiator, Ja'ja described a meeting between the Nasrallah and Hariri to discuss possible presidential candidates. Hariri had begun the meeting by saying that they could discuss anyone but Aoun. This allowed Nasrallah to continue without giving away his own misgivings about Aoun as a candidate, with Hariri thus seen as the spoiler by Aoun (who of course was informed immediately by Nasrallah of Hariri's view). In another example from the national dialogue, Saad apparently agreed quickly to Nasrallah's position labeling Shebaa farms as Lebanese territory without demanding a quid pro quo from Nasrallah. When Ja'ja' took Saad aside and told him of his tactical error, Hariri replied naively, "Well it (the land) is Lebanese." ¶4. (C) The idea that an intra-Muslim conflict must be avoided at all costs keeps Hariri hesitant to displease Nasrallah, Ja'ja' said. Ja'ja' was certain that Hizballah would never use its weapons inside of Lebanon. To do so would reveal them to be the militia that they truly are. But Ja'ja' was concerned about other developments with Hizballah. He reported that the group has built religious centers in predominantly Sunni Beirut and in Tripoli. The center in Sunni-dominated Tripoli is a Shia mosque funded by Iranian and Hizballah funds. Although the centers are not of a BEIRUT 00001521 002 OF 003 military nature, Ja'ja' said anything that Hizballah constructs could be martial. According to Ja'ja', the opening of the Hizballah center in the Tariq Jadida Sunni neighborhood of Beirut inspired Sunni residents to petition Hariri for weapons for self-defense. The Sunni-Shia divide is the most important factor in Hariri's dealing with Hizballah, Ja'ja' said. "He is careful with the Shia, but not with us," Ja'ja' observed. ¶5. (C) Ja'ja' repeated his complaints that Saad Hariri is looking out for his Sunni constituency to the detriment of his Christian allies. He gave three examples of Saad's alleged one-sided patronage. At Lebanese University, Saad's people appoint deans of the various departments. The present President, loyal to Hariri, has said he wishes to appoint people based on objective criteria. Ja'ja', reading between the lines, fears this means appointing only those loyal to Hariri who meet such objective criteria. Recently, the Ministry of Education was petitioned to give accreditation to several small institutes of higher learning in Lebanon, among them predominantly Christian centers. The accreditation panel, after deliberations, recommended awarding accreditation to one school associated with the pro-Syrian Ahbash party and a second to the Hariri College. None of the Christian institutions were approved. Ja'ja' found it incredible that none of the Christian schools considered could meet the standard for accreditation. More importantly, Ja'ja' said, he cannot understand how Hariri and his people could ignore the negative political optic of denying accreditation to Christian schools while awarding it to Muslim schools, given the divide in the country today. He described these actions as being, in effect, gifts to Michel Aoun, who rallied Christian supporters to him by blasting Hariri's Sunni bias. Saad's agent Wissam Hassan controls recent appointments to the Internal Security Force (ISF) anti-terrorist unit. Hassan, acting on Saad's orders, is filling the force with Sunni officers. Ja'ja' was undecided as to whether Hariri's attitude was the result of political naivete or unenlightened self-interest. ¶6. (C) Ja'ja' said that he has discussed his concerns with Hariri. In the case of the ISF, Ja'ja' appointed George Adwan to meet with Hassan on the issue of ISF appointments. The two men sat down together for more than four hours and worked out a plan acceptable to both sides. Ja'ja' said that the plan, still fresh, will take up to two weeks for full implementation. He will withhold judgment on the goodwill of Hariri's group until he sees how the plan is managed. He said that even Druse leader Walid Jumblatt understands the tactical errors Hariri is making. He tries frequently to nudge Hariri in what Ja'ja' thinks is the right direction. Ja'ja' expressed an open admiration for Jumblatt. He said that the Druse leader had broken with Syria in full pursuit of retribution for the murder of his father Kamal Jumblatt. That break has required him to break with Hizballah as well. Initially, Jumblatt felt that he could influence Hizballah, and having failed at that, he is "after them" now. Reflecting on Jumblatt's role after the death of Rafiq Hariri, Ja'ja' gave Jumblatt credit for breaking the rhetorical taboo against open discussion of Hizballah's weapons. He opined that if Jumblatt had been murdered, and Hariri had been left behind, political reform in Lebanon would probably have failed. Ja'ja' found Jumblatt a very disorganized man, he said. NATIONAL DIALOGUE FINISHED BUT WILL LIMP ON -------------- ¶7. (C) When the national dialogue recommences on May 15, Ja'ja' said he anticipates that it will take up where it left off, with discussions of the presidency and Hizballah's weapons. He is sure that all discussion of the presidency will fail to arrive at any conclusion. Aoun is not prepared to negotiate without the presidency in his hand. Hizballah will not vote with the majority. Ja'ja' interprets the constitution to dictate that two-thirds of a quorum is needed to change the constitution. That quorum would be 65 of the 128 deputies. Even with this interpretation, Ja'ja' said there are no legal recourses for getting rid of Emile Lahoud before the end of his mandate. He wondered aloud if March 14 might use the street to drive Lahoud out. But he added that the other side, Nasrallah and Aoun, have learned that the street is dangerous and could backfire on them. Then, Ja'ja' added quietly, "Who knows, in politics anything is possible." Ja'ja' recalled the time just after the Hariri assassination when Emile Lahoud might have repudiated his Syrian ties, and won an unchallenged and peaceful BEIRUT 00001521 003 OF 003 presidential term. Instead, the president missed the opportunity to redefine himself, and the opposition missed the chance to depose him when popular sentiment was with them. Now, Ja'ja' said, it is too late for both protagonists. ¶8. (C) Given that the national dialogue will be unable to resolve the presidency, Ja'ja' assumed that the discussion would turn to the weapons of Hizballah. He did not expect any progress on this issue either. Describing the atmosphere in the national dialogue to date, Ja'ja' said that he fought hard with Hizballah across the table. Speaking of the last dialogue session, Ja'ja' said all the delegations focused on Hassan Nasrallah when he tried to back-track on an agreement to have the PM take up the Syrian border issue with Damascus. Even Nasrallah's junior partner, Nabih Berri, indirectly chided Nasrallah for going back on an agreement already made. Aoun frequently defended his Shia partners, Ja'ja' said. The Ambassador asked if lack of progress on disarmament could be used to embarrass Michel Aoun, who has steadfastly claimed that his own agreement with Hizballah could lead to their disarmament. Ja'ja' said he was hesitant to enter into a rhetorical battle with Aoun. He said, "with Aoun either you fight full-out or you don't fight at all. Now is not the time." LEBANESE BROADCASTING COMPANY IS JA'JA''S TOOL -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked Ja'ja' what his plans were for the Lebanese Forces-owned Lebanese Broadcasting Company International (LBCI). Ja'ja' explained that LBC had been left in the care of Pierre Daher when Ja'ja' was in prison. Daher had, over the years, been free to operate as he liked in building up the company and directing its editorial philosophy. As a result of Daher's work, LBC was a powerful and valuable company as well as a respected news source. Now that Ja'ja' was free, he intended to play a larger role in the editorial direction of LBC and make it more of an instrument of the party. As an example, Ja'ja' pointed out the recent interview of Suleiman Franjieh on LBC. He said, "I would not have given him so much time. Maybe a little." Ja'ja' said Daher, a good friend and apolitical character, was having some trouble adjusting to having a boss at LBC. Setrida Ja'ja' smiled and said "He'll get used to it." (Note: Two days earlier, the Ambassador and PAO met with Daher, who offered a brief on LBC's fate that differed considerably from that of the Ja'ja's. Daher, while professing his personal friendship to Ja'ja', claimed that the two were on the verge of a decision that would leave one -- but only one -- of them in control, with the other to be bought out. End note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) At least one member of the Ja'ja' household still thinks like a militia leader. Setrida Ja'ja' was remarkable in the meeting for her instance on striking a strong posture on all issues. At another point in the conversation, she seemed to cross the line into the anti-Muslim racism of the Lebanese Forces of yore: Setrida made mention of what she referred to as the pro-Muslim attitude of a previous U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. "I wanted to ask him how he felt about them after 9/11," she said. Her "he'll get used to it" comment was particularly sinister as it was aimed at LBC's Daher, who still claims to be a loyal friend of Samir Ja'ja'. Setrida is not shy about making anti-Muslim statements. One can easily imagine Setrida, holding the couple's Persian cat in the half-darkness of their mountain retreat, and whispering invective aimed at Muslims and other enemies into her husband's ear. FELTMAN