MGLE01: JA'JA' FRUSTRATED BY FAILURES, SEEKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001521

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/WERNER/DORAN/SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINS LE SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: JA'JA' FRUSTRATED BY FAILURES, SEEKS
BETTER RELATIONS WITH SUNNI ALLY


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason Section 1.4(b)


1. (C) Samir Ja'ja', leader of the Lebanese Forces
political movement, received the Ambassador and Polchief on
May 12 for lunch in his home in the mountains of northern
Lebanon. The meeting was a broad tour d'horizon with Ja'ja'
expressing concern over the May 10 "labor" demonstrations in
Beirut. He also voiced his continued frustration with Saad
Hariri's unwillingness to listen to Christian advice, and his
equal frustration with the inability of the March 14 movement
to achieve its goal of removing Present Lahoud (although he
expressed some hope for the future). Ja'ja' reminisced about
lost opportunities for redemption for all parties, including
Emile Lahoud, after the murder of Rafiq Hariri. Touching on
Lebanese Forces' business, he said the party would slowly
take control of the daily operations of television station
LBC. Ja'ja' was joined by his wife, parliamentarian Setrida
Ja'ja', for the meeting with the Ambassador.

MAY 10 DEMONSTRATIONS A MISTAKE
--------------


2. (C) Ja'ja' said he had heard the demonstration of May
10 was the major subject at the subsequent cabinet meeting.
Hizballah and Amal members of the government had spent their
time in the meeting justifying their seemingly contradictory
roles as both government critics and cabinet members. For
Ja'ja' the demonstration was a net loss for Michel Aoun,
whose Christian supporters turned out in reportedly small
numbers with Hizballah for the event. Aoun's stated goal of
overturning the government could never be achieved by so
small an event. Ja'ja' said he was perplexed at Hizballah's
part in the demonstration. Neither Hizballah's Hassan
Nasrallah, nor Amal's Nabih Berri, seemed intent on
challenging Siniora seriously on May 10. Had they been
serious about attempting to overturn the Siniora government,
Hizballah could have turned out a much larger demonstration
than the 200,000 people who participated. The Ambassador
pointed out that PM Siniora had not backed away from his
reform program. However, Siniora saw that it would be
difficult to pass an entire reform package. He preferred to
discuss the package as a means of inspiring a national debate
on reform. Then, when opportunities presented themselves, he
would implement reforms piece by legislative piece. Ja'ja'
confirmed that Siniora had made the same tactical proposal to
the March 14th movement during an organizational meeting.

SAAD HARIRI STILL IGNORING CHRISTIAN ALLIES
--------------


3. (C) Saad Hariri sees Hizballah as a problem, but has no
vision as to how to deal with Hizballah, according to Ja'ja'.
Saad hopes that through dialogue he could sway Hizballah to
eventually give up its arms. Ja'j'a does not agree with this
approach. Worse, he fears Hariri, inexperienced in Lebanese
affairs, when left alone with Nasrallah, will lose more
ground than he gains and will succeed only in appeasing
Nasrallah at the cost of March 14th's strategic goals. He
grimaced as he thought back on the six-hour Nasrallah-Hariri
conversations, and their frequent talks together. "Our
conversations together last maybe 30 minutes," Ja'ja' said of
his own private talks with Hariri. To illustrate Hariri's
lack of talent as a negotiator, Ja'ja described a meeting
between the Nasrallah and Hariri to discuss possible
presidential candidates. Hariri had begun the meeting by
saying that they could discuss anyone but Aoun. This allowed
Nasrallah to continue without giving away his own misgivings
about Aoun as a candidate, with Hariri thus seen as the
spoiler by Aoun (who of course was informed immediately by
Nasrallah of Hariri's view). In another example from the
national dialogue, Saad apparently agreed quickly to
Nasrallah's position labeling Shebaa farms as Lebanese
territory without demanding a quid pro quo from Nasrallah.
When Ja'ja' took Saad aside and told him of his tactical
error, Hariri replied naively, "Well it (the land) is
Lebanese."


4. (C) The idea that an intra-Muslim conflict must be
avoided at all costs keeps Hariri hesitant to displease
Nasrallah, Ja'ja' said. Ja'ja' was certain that Hizballah
would never use its weapons inside of Lebanon. To do so
would reveal them to be the militia that they truly are. But
Ja'ja' was concerned about other developments with Hizballah.
He reported that the group has built religious centers in
predominantly Sunni Beirut and in Tripoli. The center in
Sunni-dominated Tripoli is a Shia mosque funded by Iranian
and Hizballah funds. Although the centers are not of a

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military nature, Ja'ja' said anything that Hizballah
constructs could be martial. According to Ja'ja', the
opening of the Hizballah center in the Tariq Jadida Sunni
neighborhood of Beirut inspired Sunni residents to petition
Hariri for weapons for self-defense. The Sunni-Shia divide
is the most important factor in Hariri's dealing with
Hizballah, Ja'ja' said. "He is careful with the Shia, but
not with us," Ja'ja' observed.


5. (C) Ja'ja' repeated his complaints that Saad Hariri is
looking out for his Sunni constituency to the detriment of
his Christian allies. He gave three examples of Saad's
alleged one-sided patronage. At Lebanese University, Saad's
people appoint deans of the various departments. The
present President, loyal to Hariri, has said he wishes to
appoint people based on objective criteria. Ja'ja', reading
between the lines, fears this means appointing only those
loyal to Hariri who meet such objective criteria. Recently,
the Ministry of Education was petitioned to give
accreditation to several small institutes of higher learning
in Lebanon, among them predominantly Christian centers. The
accreditation panel, after deliberations, recommended
awarding accreditation to one school associated with the
pro-Syrian Ahbash party and a second to the Hariri College.
None of the Christian institutions were approved. Ja'ja'
found it incredible that none of the Christian schools
considered could meet the standard for accreditation. More
importantly, Ja'ja' said, he cannot understand how Hariri and
his people could ignore the negative political optic of
denying accreditation to Christian schools while awarding it
to Muslim schools, given the divide in the country today. He
described these actions as being, in effect, gifts to Michel
Aoun, who rallied Christian supporters to him by blasting
Hariri's Sunni bias. Saad's agent Wissam Hassan controls
recent appointments to the Internal Security Force (ISF)
anti-terrorist unit. Hassan, acting on Saad's orders, is
filling the force with Sunni officers. Ja'ja' was undecided
as to whether Hariri's attitude was the result of political
naivete or unenlightened self-interest.


6. (C) Ja'ja' said that he has discussed his concerns with
Hariri. In the case of the ISF, Ja'ja' appointed George
Adwan to meet with Hassan on the issue of ISF appointments.
The two men sat down together for more than four hours and
worked out a plan acceptable to both sides. Ja'ja' said that
the plan, still fresh, will take up to two weeks for full
implementation. He will withhold judgment on the goodwill of
Hariri's group until he sees how the plan is managed. He
said that even Druse leader Walid Jumblatt understands the
tactical errors Hariri is making. He tries frequently to
nudge Hariri in what Ja'ja' thinks is the right direction.
Ja'ja' expressed an open admiration for Jumblatt. He said
that the Druse leader had broken with Syria in full pursuit
of retribution for the murder of his father Kamal Jumblatt.
That break has required him to break with Hizballah as well.
Initially, Jumblatt felt that he could influence Hizballah,
and having failed at that, he is "after them" now.
Reflecting on Jumblatt's role after the death of Rafiq
Hariri, Ja'ja' gave Jumblatt credit for breaking the
rhetorical taboo against open discussion of Hizballah's
weapons. He opined that if Jumblatt had been murdered, and
Hariri had been left behind, political reform in Lebanon
would probably have failed. Ja'ja' found Jumblatt a very
disorganized man, he said.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE FINISHED BUT WILL LIMP ON
--------------


7. (C) When the national dialogue recommences on May 15,
Ja'ja' said he anticipates that it will take up where it left
off, with discussions of the presidency and Hizballah's
weapons. He is sure that all discussion of the presidency
will fail to arrive at any conclusion. Aoun is not prepared
to negotiate without the presidency in his hand. Hizballah
will not vote with the majority. Ja'ja' interprets the
constitution to dictate that two-thirds of a quorum is needed
to change the constitution. That quorum would be 65 of the
128 deputies. Even with this interpretation, Ja'ja' said
there are no legal recourses for getting rid of Emile Lahoud
before the end of his mandate. He wondered aloud if March 14
might use the street to drive Lahoud out. But he added that
the other side, Nasrallah and Aoun, have learned that the
street is dangerous and could backfire on them. Then, Ja'ja'
added quietly, "Who knows, in politics anything is
possible." Ja'ja' recalled the time just after the Hariri
assassination when Emile Lahoud might have repudiated his
Syrian ties, and won an unchallenged and peaceful

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presidential term. Instead, the president missed the
opportunity to redefine himself, and the opposition missed
the chance to depose him when popular sentiment was with
them. Now, Ja'ja' said, it is too late for both
protagonists.


8. (C) Given that the national dialogue will be unable to
resolve the presidency, Ja'ja' assumed that the discussion
would turn to the weapons of Hizballah. He did not expect
any progress on this issue either. Describing the atmosphere
in the national dialogue to date, Ja'ja' said that he fought
hard with Hizballah across the table. Speaking of the last
dialogue session, Ja'ja' said all the delegations focused on
Hassan Nasrallah when he tried to back-track on an agreement
to have the PM take up the Syrian border issue with Damascus.
Even Nasrallah's junior partner, Nabih Berri, indirectly
chided Nasrallah for going back on an agreement already made.
Aoun frequently defended his Shia partners, Ja'ja' said.
The Ambassador asked if lack of progress on disarmament could
be used to embarrass Michel Aoun, who has steadfastly claimed
that his own agreement with Hizballah could lead to their
disarmament. Ja'ja' said he was hesitant to enter into a
rhetorical battle with Aoun. He said, "with Aoun either you
fight full-out or you don't fight at all. Now is not the
time."

LEBANESE BROADCASTING COMPANY
IS JA'JA''S TOOL
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador asked Ja'ja' what his plans were for
the Lebanese Forces-owned Lebanese Broadcasting Company
International (LBCI). Ja'ja' explained that LBC had been
left in the care of Pierre Daher when Ja'ja' was in prison.
Daher had, over the years, been free to operate as he liked
in building up the company and directing its editorial
philosophy. As a result of Daher's work, LBC was a
powerful and valuable company as well as a respected news
source. Now that Ja'ja' was free, he intended to play a
larger role in the editorial direction of LBC and make it
more of an instrument of the party. As an example, Ja'ja'
pointed out the recent interview of Suleiman Franjieh on LBC.
He said, "I would not have given him so much time. Maybe a
little." Ja'ja' said Daher, a good friend and apolitical
character, was having some trouble adjusting to having a boss
at LBC. Setrida Ja'ja' smiled and said "He'll get used to
it." (Note: Two days earlier, the Ambassador and PAO met
with Daher, who offered a brief on LBC's fate that differed
considerably from that of the Ja'ja's. Daher, while
professing his personal friendship to Ja'ja', claimed that
the two were on the verge of a decision that would leave one
-- but only one -- of them in control, with the other to be
bought out. End note.)

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) At least one member of the Ja'ja' household still
thinks like a militia leader. Setrida Ja'ja' was remarkable
in the meeting for her instance on striking a strong posture
on all issues. At another point in the conversation, she
seemed to cross the line into the anti-Muslim racism of the
Lebanese Forces of yore: Setrida made mention of what she
referred to as the pro-Muslim attitude of a previous U.S.
Ambassador to Lebanon. "I wanted to ask him how he felt about
them after 9/11," she said. Her "he'll get used to it"
comment was particularly sinister as it was aimed at LBC's
Daher, who still claims to be a loyal friend of Samir Ja'ja'.
Setrida is not shy about making anti-Muslim statements. One
can easily imagine Setrida, holding the couple's Persian cat
in the half-darkness of their mountain retreat, and
whispering invective aimed at Muslims and other enemies into
her husband's ear.
FELTMAN