MGLE01: DEFENSE AND ACTING INTERIOR MINISTERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001508 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH OSD FOR MARA E. KARLIN AMMAN FOR LEGATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016 TAGS: PREL OVIP ASEC MASS PTER KCRM LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: DEFENSE AND ACTING INTERIOR MINISTERS AGREE TO JOINT VISIT REF: BEIRUT 1507 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. (C) In a May 11 meeting with acting Interior Minister Ahmad Fatfat (other issues discussed are reported in reftel), the Ambassador raised the subject of the Secretary of Defense's coming invitation to Fatfat and Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias al-Murr to visit Washington. Fatfat said he had already been in touch with Murr, who -- given his continuing need to schedule medical treatment outside the country as a result of injuries sustained in a July 2005 assassination attempt -- thought it would be too difficult to coordinate his trip to Washington with anyone else. ¶2. (C) There was another reason why it would be difficult to make a joint visit, according to Fatfat: given the current security situation in Lebanon, it might be risky for both the ministers of defense and the interior to be out of the country at the same time. Coordination between him and Murr was better than before. This had helped ensure that the large, Hizballah-organized anti-government demonstration of May 10 took place without any incidents of violence, he suggested. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador emphasized to Fatfat that he and Murr could expect a greater number and quality of high-level meetings in Washington if they held them jointly rather than on their own. There are also substantive reasons of coordiation for the joint trip, especially since the LAF shares some police functions. He suggested that Fatfat and Murr try to schedule separate trips that would overlap for several days in Washington, at the end of one's trip, and at the beginning of the other's. Their joint meetings could take place during this short overlap. Meetings they did not need to hold jointly could take place either before or after. This would have the advantage of minimizing the number of days during which both were outside Lebanon. ¶4. (C) Fatfat agreed to this in principle, and -- after a brief telephone call placed by Fatfat -- so did Murr. Fatfat said that he would be available to travel to Washington anytime during the month of June. However, he preferred to visit Washington after June 6, because Washington-based Hariri family advisor Amal Mudallali would be back in Washington as of June 6. Fatfat said he needed Mudallali's help in organizing the Washington end of his trip. ¶5. (C) Comment: While Murr's requirements for medical treatment in Switzerland are real, we suspect that they were simply a convenient excuse in this case. Murr probably preferred to fly solo on an official visit to Washington, and Fatfat may not have been averse to the same idea. While the massive bomb intended to take Murr's life last July literally blasted him out of the pro-Syrian "loyalist" camp, relations between him and the anti-Syrian "March 14" ministers in Siniora's cabinet, such as Fatfat, have been characterized to date by mutual reserve and caution. Murr is, after all, still the son of the longtime pro-Syrian, now pro-Aoun political boss of the Metn region of Mount Lebanon, Michel al-Murr. Until his recent, quiet divorce, Murr was also President Lahoud's son-in-law. Signs of increased coordination between him and Fatfat are encouraging, and there is a valid argument, on national security grounds, that they should not both be outside Lebanon for a long period of time. But we understand the pressing need for even further improvements in Interior-Defense coordination, and this joint trip can help (as well as prevent one Minister from distoring what was said in Washington to his advantage). FELTMAN