MGLE01: UNIIIC CHIEF BRAMMERTZ CITES PROGRESS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001417 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH STATE FOR L E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2016 TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: UNIIIC CHIEF BRAMMERTZ CITES PROGRESS, SEEKS EXTENSION Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b). ¶1. (U) This message contains an action request. See para 16 below. SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (C) UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz said his team is now well-established, has considerable momentum, and is pursuing several fruitful lines of inquiry. In a meeting that took place before the GOL's official decision to ask for an extension, he confirmed that he has recommended that the UNIIIC be extended for a year. Brammertz' chief of investigations, Peter Nicholson, was confident this extension would allow his investigators a good chance of "cracking the case," at least in terms of how it was done, and which individuals bore primary responsibility. Brammertz indicated the complex assassination operation involved not only security officials, but perhaps an "outside proxy" organization. Several hypotheses were still be tested with the now-indexed body of evidence and eliminated one by one. Although UNIIIC is only authorized to provide technical assistance to Lebanese investigators concerning other acts of political violence, it is using this access to acquire additional evidence that can be used to supplement and validate the Hariri evidence. Brammertz' June 15 report to the UN Security Council will once again focus on administrative and compliance issues, but will contain enough findings to show progress is being made, without alerting those guilty to the investigation's lines of inquiry. For now, Brammertz said he has little basis for judging the senior Syrians as "not cooperating" with the investigation, but he emphasized that this view applies only to the present, and could change on the basis of future developments. At this time, he does not intend to recommend that UNSCR 1636 authority be applied to designate certain individuals as "non-cooperative, and therefore eligible for the application of UNSC-authorized sanctions against them. Commissioner Brammertz will be in New York for consultations with the UNSYG on May 9-10 and asked if he could meet with appropriate Department of Justice representatives regarding assistance with a witness protection program. End summary. ¶3. (SBU) UNIIIC Commissioner Serge Brammertz met the Ambassador and POLOFF at the Commission's headquarters in Monteverde, east of Beirut on May 3. UNIIIC Chief of Investigations Peter Nicholson joined the meeting. Brammertz received from the Ambassador supporting data (and explanatory notes) which the commissioner had previously requested. He said his investigators would most likely have additional requests in the next few weeks. Brammertz indicated he was also receiving forensic support from the Danish government. INVESTIGATION GATHERS MOMENTUM -------------- ¶4. (C) Brammertz expressed satisfaction with the current progress of his investigative team. He believes he now has a strong team in place, they have collated and indexed a large amount of previously collected evidence, they are continuing to collect new evidence and subject it to analysis, and finally, they are pursuing a number of fruitful lines of inquiry. The commissioner implied that their most promising hypothesis points to a very complex operation that involved not only security officials, but may also have involved an "outside proxy" organization. ¶5. (C) Brammertz, as he has in earlier meetings with Embassy officials, expressed concern about the quality of the evidence that was used to recommend the arrest of four Lebanese senior security officials, but he stressed that this opinion did not mean these suspects were not involved in the crime. Brammertz indicated that Lebanese General Prosecutor Said Mirza is growing increasingly uncomfortable with the extended incarceration of the officials and has hinted to Brammertz that he (Mirza) would like further guidance from the Commission. Brammertz said he had told Mirza the UNIIIC could only make recommendations and it was the responsibility of Lebanon's judicial system to determine whether there were sufficient grounds for arrest and detention. Brammertz confided to the Ambassador that although the available evidence did not yet support "a strong case" against the generals, he would not reverse the recommendation of his predecessor, Detlev Mehlis. ¶6. (C) Brammertz was noticeably keen to exploit the opportunities afforded by the expansion of UNIIIC's authority to provide technical assistance to Lebanese investigators who were looking into other acts of political violence since October 2004: bombings, assassinations, and attempted assassinations. He believed that additional evidence gathered from these investigations could help answer some of the outstanding issues of the Hariri assassination. The Commissioner was especially interested in the explosives used in several of the bombings and revealed that he has received forensic assistance from the Danish government. ¶7. (C) Although Brammertz recognized that truly professional assassins would try to eliminate commonalties between multiple crimes, he also said that his experience indicated the more numerous the attempts committed by one group, the more likely they would "slip up" at some point and provide investigators with hard evidence. He lamented the "pitiful" state of Lebanon's forensic abilities and crime scene evidence management skills, but he felt quite confident his team was getting close. ¶8. (C) UNIIIC's Chief of Investigations Peter Nicholson added that the large amount of preparatory work completed over the previous three months was starting to pay off in terms of efficiently pursuing lines of inquiry. When asked if he was confident his team would "crack the case," he paused and said he was "70/30 confident" that before the end of the year, they would know how the crime was executed and who were its principal perpetrators. Due to the clear sophistication of the crime, Nicholson admitted it would be difficult to know every detail, but he did project quiet confidence regarding a successful investigation. ¶9. (C) Concerning the senior Syrians' cooperation with the investigation, Commissioner Brammertz said their present behavior was acceptable. In response to the Ambassador's question, he stated that he does not intend to use his authority under UNSCR 1636 to recommend that certain persons be designated as "non-cooperative" with the UNIIIC, and therefore subject to sanctions. Brammertz emphasized, however, that he was withholding overall judgment on the question of UNSCR 1636 cooperation until the inviestigation progressed further. He implied that as the investigation zeroed in on those responsible, the real test regarding cooperation would be reached. BRAMMERTZ SUPPORTS AN EXTENSION -------------- ¶10. (C) Commissioner Brammertz said he strongly supports a 12-month extension of the UNIIIC mandate and indicated that as long as his position with the International Criminal Court was protected he would stay at least through the end of the year. He said his team was now well organized, operating at high efficiency, and progressively attacking each challenge. Brammertz said he was still hiring the last few members of the team and remarked that process would be very difficult if he could offer the necessary professionals only a month or two of employment. (Note: This meeting with Brammertz took place before the Lebanese cabinet voted unanimously to back a GOL request to the UN asking that the UNIIIC be extended for one year.) ¶11. (C) He said the extension proposal was already being discussed by the UN Secretariat and he would be speaking with UNSYG Annan next week in New York about his wish to remain with the commission for at least another six months. Brammertz said he was still concerned about his prolonged absence from the ICC and inquired as to whether the USG could discuss this matter with the principal sponsors of that organization, specifically the Governments of Britain, France, and Germany, to facilitate the approval process. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL SHOULD PROCEED, BUT NOT YET REPLACE UNIIIC -------------- ¶12. (C) Commissioner Brammertz said he recently spoke with Minister of Justice Charles Rizk and came away concerned that the GOL is underestimating the task of establishing the International Tribunal for Lebanon. Noting that UNIIIC's present expiry is only six weeks away, Brammertz indicated that Minister Rizk does not appreciate the responsibilities of the proposed tribunal. According to Brammertz, Minister Rizk is proposing to establish the Office of the Special Prosecutor for the Tribunal in advance of the court's other structures. Brammertz sees serious complications with this approach, particularly relating to custody of evidence, unnecessary competition for staff, and crossed wires in the investigation itself. ¶13. (C) Rather than rushing to establish the tribunal, the Commissioner recommended that the UN and GOL take the time to do it right. He maintained that if the UNIIIC is authorized at least a six-month (and preferably 12-month) extension, it would be able to complete its investigation and transfer its findings and evidence in a more organized and comprehensive manner. He suggested that the Ministry of Justice may face serious challenges if it rushes headlong into the tribunal process. Brammertz acknowledged the political necessity to show momentum on creating the tribunal, but he looked to fill the current gap with motion (visits by Nicolas Michel, etc.) rather than actually trying to accelerate the court's establishment. INTERVIEW WITH BASHAR ASAD -------------- ¶14. (C) Concerning his interviews last week with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Vice President Farouq al-Sharaa, he characterized the two leaders as businesslike and relatively cooperative. But he also emphasized the interviews were not investigative interrogations. Although Brammertz said he covered a number of issues pertinent to the investigation, he indicated that he was not yet ready to confront the Syrian leaders with specific evidence-directed questioning -- that would have to wait for a later date. Brammertz described the Syrian president as surprisingly talkative, speaking in fairly good English, without notes and only one advisor. Sharaa, befitting his reputation, was more taciturn, but again, was attempting to appear cooperative. The Commissioner said he spoke with Asad for approximately 90 minutes, while Sharaa's interview was completed in an hour. ¶15. (C) Brammertz indicated he was satisfied that with last week's interviews, especially in that a procedural barrier had been broken, and that when he was ready to confront Syrian leadership with evidence-based questions, the Syrians would be hard-pressed to refuse. REQUEST FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶16. (C) Action Requested: Commissioner Brammertz inquired as to whether he would be able to meet with representatives from the U.S. Department of Justice when he is in New York next week. He indicated he wished to discuss issues pertaining to a witness protection program and perhaps additional requests for information the USG may be able to provide. He will be in New York at least from May 9-10, and possibly a few days longer. Embassy Beirut requests the Office of the Legal Advisor or other bureaus to determine if this meeting would be possible. FELTMAN