MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 3-5 VISIT OF PM A/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001310 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR PM A/S HILLEN, PM/RSAT, AND NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH LONDON FOR TSOU PARIS FOR ZEYA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2016 TAGS: PREL MASS PTER KPKO OTRA LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 3-5 VISIT OF PM A/S JOHN HILLEN BEIRUT 00001310 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During his recent visit to Washington, Prime Minister Siniora expressed confidence about Lebanon's ability to tackle critical problems through a process of national dialogue. Of these problems, the two most prominent are the fate of President Lahoud, who remains in place through a Syrian-orchestrated extension of his term in office; and Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization that, through its paramilitary presence on the border with Israel, holds decision-making power over war and peace that rightly belongs to the Lebanese state. Siniora did request U.S. support as the Lebanese tackled these difficult issues. He urged the United States to "empower" the Lebanese state and help Lebanon become a model of democracy and religious tolerance in the region. ¶2. (C) Your May 3-5 visit to Lebanon is an important opportunity to follow up on the commitments expressed to Siniora by President Bush, Secretary Rice, and other USG officials in support of Siniora's reform agenda, including in the security sector. You will be able to brief Siniora and other Lebanese officials on the recent decision under section 1206 authority to provide another USD 9.9 million in security assistance, information about which has not yet been widely shared. In addition, you can use the opportunity to press the Lebanese on the need to pursue genuine reform of the security sector. ¶3. (C) Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon opened up new opportunities for enhancing our security assistance relationship. Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Murr, LAF Commander Suleiman, and ISF Director-General Rifi, all of whom you will see, are key players. Ultimately, a coordinated approach to reforming the security sector with U.S. assistance must come from the top, that is, from Siniora. With Hizballah and Syria's other Lebanese allies back on the offensive, we must present new security assistance initiatives in ways that minimize our and Siniora's exposure to attack. The Sheba'a Farms issue -- ;which Hizballah exploits as a pretext for remaining armed -- directly affects UNIFIL's mission. End introduction and summary. A NEW ERA FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶4. (C) Post-civil war Lebanon had two distinctive, regressive characteristics: Syrian overlordship and a Lebanese regime intended to serve Ba'athist Syrian agendas rather than the Lebanese people. At the same time, two trends steadily diminished the capabilities of the security sector, particularly the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). First, a rising mountain of national debt squeezed the Lebanese government's discretionary spending ability, resulting in steadily lower defense budgets each year. Second, LAF equipment (much of it U.S.-supplied in a previous era of much more extensive defense cooperation) steadily aged under U.S. restrictions on military assistance and training to Lebanon. ¶5. (C) The terrorist assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005 triggered a massive public reaction against Syrian control of Lebanon. Combined with international pressure, this led to the withdrawal of Syrian military and overt intelligence forces from Lebanon -- after 30 years of presence -- in April 2005. Prime Minister Siniora's cabinet, arguably the first one genuinely "made in Lebanon" at least since the end of the civil war in 1990, took office in the summer of 2005. While the presence of the first-ever Hizballah cabinet member surely complicates the matters, Siniora's government is nonetheless intent on securing an upgraded military-to-military relationship and other forms of security assistance from the United States. KEY FIGURES BESIDES SINIORA: SULEIMAN, MURR, RIFI -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) A decade-and-a-half of Syrian control over the Lebanese security sector bred a cautious LAF leadership. BEIRUT 00001310 002.2 OF 004 Some of our contacts describe its commander, General Michel Suleiman, as a fence-sitter. While he leaned in a "Lebanese" direction earlier in 2005, when Syria and its Lebanese allies were clearly on the defensive following the Hariri assassination, he has been leaning back towards Damascus in recent months, as Hizballah and the Asad regime's other allies in Lebanon have gone on the offensive. ¶7. (C) You may hear a different perspective from Defense Minister (and Deputy Prime Minister) Elias al-Murr. Murr, son-in-law of President Lahoud, was seen as a "loyalist" (in the perverse use of that term, meaning loyal to Syria) prior to the July 2005 attempt on his life. Murr has since blamed that attack on Syria, whose military intelligence "proconsul" had what seems in retrospect to have been a tense relationship with him. The attempt on his life -- a bomb that destroyed Murr's armored vehicle, and from which he has not yet fully physically recovered -- literally blasted Murr from the pro-Syrian "loyalist" camp to the pro-sovereignty camp. ¶8. (C) Murr's subsequent requirements for medical treatment have kept him out of Lebanon for long periods of time since July 2005. While in Lebanon, concerns about continued security threats have limited his freedom of movement. All of this has limited his ability to influence security policy decision-making. ¶9. (C) The current Director-General of the Internal Security Forces (ISF),General Ashraf Rifi, was appointed following his predecessor's arrest on suspicion of involvement in the Hariri assassination, at the recommendation of the UN commission investigating the assassination. Rifi is highly competent, cooperative with the United States and other friendly countries, and -- while close to Prime Minister Siniora and the Hariri family, and unlike other pro-Hariri ISF officials -- not obviously "political." He reports to the acting Interior Minister, Ahmad Fatfat, who will not be in Lebanon during your visit. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: WHAT IS NEEDED -------------- ¶10. (C) The needs for reform and capacity-building within the security sector vary from one element to another. Arguably, no element needs them more than the ISF. There is a widespread phenomenon of the LAF filling in the gaps left by civilian security services -- primarily the ISF -- such as in border security. In this light, security sector reform and capacity-building can serve the purpose of attaining a more appropriate balance of responsibility between the military and civilian security services. ¶11. (C) While happy to see the LAF receive more U.S. assistance, neither Suleiman nor Murr have pushed the envelope in pursuit of meaningful reform. For example, there has so far been no real attempt to match projected LAF equipment needs with future missions. Ninety percent of the defense budget goes to personnel, and cuts in the highest ranks, even though they are bloated, will probably not realize significant savings. The LAF, especially its intelligence organization, the G-2, continues to be responsible for things that, in a normal democracy, domestic civilian security and law enforcement services would be doing. ¶12. (C) To be effective, security sector reform, addressing the ISF and LAF as well as various other elements, will need to be coordinated at the highest level of Lebanon's political leadership. For most of the post-civil war area, the President of the Republic took the lead on national security while the Prime Minister -- usually Rafiq al-Hariri -- dealt with the economy. Now, with President Lahoud in many ways the last vestige of Syrian domination of Lebanon, this division of labor is not realistic. ¶13. (C) In this situation, with the USG and other potential security partners unwilling to deal with the discredited Lahoud, leadership in security sector reform will have to come from the Prime Minister's office. While Prime Minister Siniora in 2005 said he would establish a security reform coordination unit in his office, this has yet to happen. Siniora will require prodding on this issue. BEIRUT 00001310 003.2 OF 004 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: WHAT WE ARE DOING -------------- ¶14. (SBU) On the military and civilian sides of the security sector, we are working to build capacity and promote reform. Post's Office of Defense Cooperation has managed an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for years. USD 1 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) approved by Congress in 2005 will supplement IMET in FY-06, allowing 100 hundred LAF members to participate, as opposed to 16 LAF members in FY-05. USD 9.9 million in mid-year funding under Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) will purchase spare parts for U.S.-origin vehicles and equipment, body armor, ammunition for existing U.S.-origin weapons, and communications. The proposed purchases are drawn from the findings of November-December 2005 CENTCOM assessments of U.S.-origin equipment within the LAF. ¶15. (SBU) In response to a series of terrorist bombings, assassinations, and assassination attempts during 2005 that were clearly aimed at rolling back Lebanon's recent gains in sovereignty, USD 1 million from Economic Support Fund for Lebanon will fund FBI training of two 10-member "evidence response teams." This will measurably boost the capability of the ISF (and possibly other civilian services) to secure and investigate scenes of terrorist attacks. In addition, the FBI will shortly donate some USD 1 million worth of crime laboratory equipment to the ISF. ¶16. (SBU) Following on this initial FBI training program, the Department of State dispatched Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) pre-assessment and assessment teams to Lebanon in March and April 2006. These visits laid the groundwork for an ATA program to begin work, for the first time ever, in Lebanon. ¶17. (C) There are pitfalls here that require us to tread carefully in expanding our security assistance ties to Lebanon. Seemingly every major political decision in Lebanon's confessional system of government has to be taken by consensus, a reason why Siniora has a card-carrying Hizballah member of his cabinet (as well as one non-card-carrying Hizballah supporter). In December 2005, Hizballah virtually shut down Siniora's cabinet in response to his call for broadening the mandate of the UN investigation of the Hariri assassination, organizing a boycott by the cabinet's Shi'a ministers that lasted until February 2006. ¶18. (C) Hizballah and the Syrian regime's other remaining allies in Lebanon will similarly try to frustrate our efforts to expand security assistance. To avoid giving them ammunition -- figuratively if not literally -- we will need to present our security assistance initiatives strictly in terms of support for Lebanese state institutions and sovereignty. While these initiatives can objectively serve the goal of full implementation of UNSCR 1559, explicitly linking them to UNSCR 1559 will expose them to attacks by Hizballah and others, who will portray them as nothing more than ploys to disarm "the resistance," Hizballah. UNFIL -------------- ¶19. (U) You will also visit the headquarters of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),which was created in 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal and to help Lebanon re-establish control of the border with Israel. (According to UNIFIL, you are the highest-ranking Washington official ever to visit their current headquarters.) At present, the force is made up of just under 2,000 troops under the command of French Major-General Alain Pellegrini. ¶20. (U) In the past year, incidents of varying degrees of intensity took place along the Blue Line, although the last incident of major fighting was in November 2005. Most recently, on December 28, 2005, unidentified persons fired 122mm rockets into Israel from Lebanon. On February 3, 2006, Hizballah and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) exchanged fire in the Sheba'a Farms after the IDF shot a Lebanese shepherd near the Blue Line. ¶21. (C) There is a widespread assumption in Lebanon that BEIRUT 00001310 004.2 OF 004 Syria and Iran manipulate Hizballah to stage attacks across the Blue Line. The Syrian and Iranian connection with Hizballah (which receives up to $480 million per year from Iran for its military, political, and social service activities) is disruptive to regional stability, given the Israeli retaliation that it provokes and the attendant pressure on the Siniora government. ¶22. (U) In December 2005, the Secretary-General recommended the renewal of UNIFIL's mandate. The Security Council subsequently approved (on January 31, 2006) resolution 1655, which extended the mandate by six months to July 31, 2006. Important new points in the resolution -- compared to previous ones renewing UNIFIL's mandate -- included specific mention of Hizballah, recognition of Lebanese government efforts to strengthen cooperation with UNIFIL, urging of the Lebanese government to do more to assert its authority in the South, and the Security Council's intention to continue to review the mandate and structure of UNIFIL in order to adjust the force, as appropriate, to its mission. ¶23. (C) The Lebanese government has made some limited progress of late, such as the LAF's co-location of its liaison offices with UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura. Also, the Joint Security Force (JSF),an amalgam of the ISF and LAF, has more actively patrolled southern Lebanon. However, the JSF remains well below its advertised level of 1,000 personnel. THE SHEBA'A FARMS ISSUE -------------- ¶24. (SBU) Related to UNIFIL's mission is the issue of the Sheba'a Farms area. This tiny, semiarid, unpopulated corner of the Israeli-occupied Golan in the Syria-Lebanon border area comprises about 96 square kilometers of land -- according to some estimates, which vary because the boundaries are not clear. Importantly, the Sheba'a Farms lie south of the Blue Line (i.e., in Israeli-occupied territory), which the UN had demarcated in 2000 for confirming Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, in compliance with UNSCR 425 (1978). The United States and other countries view the Sheba'a Farms as Israeli-occupied territory of Syria's Golan region. ¶25. (C) The Blue Line is not a final border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel or the Israeli-occupied Golan, but it does stand as a point of demarcation in which both sides, Lebanon and Israel, are to enforce their own sovereignty and respect the sovereignty of the other party. Despite this, Hizballah, with most of the Shi'a community behind it, has insisted that the Sheba'a Farms are Lebanese territory. This interpretation is used by Hizballah to justify its military efforts to "liberate" this scrap of land as "legitimate resistance to occupation." ¶26. (C) While few Lebanese, Shi'as or otherwise, have found it worth their while to challenge Hizballah on this issue, many people of various political persuasions support border demarcation and a potential declaration that the Sheba'a Farms really are Lebanese. They do so on the grounds that such a finding (and the possibility of a subsequent Israeli withdrawal),would eliminate Hizballah's justification for its arms. ¶27. (C) It takes two to tango when it comes to border demarcation, however, and there is little reason to believe that Damascus would do anything -- like agreeing to the Lebanese status of the Sheba'a Farms -- that would expose Hizballah's main pretext for remaining armed. Continued ambiguity over the Sheba'a Farms suits the interests of the SARG. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that Israel would respond to any change in the Sheba'a's international status by withdrawing its military positions there. We need to work to lower Lebanese expectations on this issue, and certainly want to distance ourselves from any efforts that wind up reinforcing Hizballah's justification for "armed resistance." FELTMAN