MGLE01: HARIRI SAYS HE IS READY TO CONFRONT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001277 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2026 TAGS: EG IR KISL LE PGOV PREL PTER SA SY SUBJECT: MGLE01: HARIRI SAYS HE IS READY TO CONFRONT HIZBALLAH AT NATIONAL DIALOGUE Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During an April 25 meeting with MP Saad Hariri, the Ambassador and econoff briefed him on Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's visit to Washington last week. Hariri agreed the visit was a success, and was also heartened by what he described as revitalized Saudi and Egyptian support for Lebanon. He explained that Saudi Arabia and Egypt are losing patience with Syria and are fearful of Iran's nuclear program. Hariri said that Iran is pumping USD 300-400 million into Lebanon annually to support Hizballah and other extremists. He claimed that Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has no strategic independence from Iran. Dismissing others' apparent infatuation with Nasrallah, Hariri said he will meet with Nasrallah on April 26 and deliver a firm and clear message. Hariri said he would not let Hizballah backtrack on the issue of its arms when the national dialogue resumes April 28. Conceding that no progress on the presidency is likely at the April 28 dialogue, Hariri urged the Ambassador to scare Aoun adviser Gibran Bassil to deter Aoun from protecting Hizballah. End summary. SINIORA VISIT HERALDS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT -------------- ¶2. (C) On April 25, the Ambassador and econoff met with MP Saad Hariri, the head of the Future Movement, at his home in Quraytem. The Ambassador began by briefing Hariri on Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's visit to Washington last week. Siniora was impressive and he represented Lebanon well, the Ambassador said. Hariri, who was planning to meet Siniora in the afternoon, agreed. Hariri continued that he was optimistic not only because of the successful visit to the US, but also because Egypt and Saudi Arabia were losing patience with Syria. He explained that Prince Saud al-Faisal had been personally offended when the US and Hariri rejected the Saudi Initiative in January. The US and Lebanon should have responded with a counter-proposal, and not an outright rejection, Hariri asserted. But now, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have returned back to the side of Lebanon along with public opinion throughout the Arab World, according to Hariri. Hariri said he talked to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak yesterday, and Mubarak advised him that there is no benefit in a Mubarak trip to Syria. Mubarak said that nothing would be accomplished, according to Hariri. ¶3. (C) Hariri said that Saudi Arabia and Egypt on are the same side as the USG with regards to Iran. They are concerned about Iran's nuclear program. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are atypically asking for more US involvement in the region, not less, because of Iran. They are scared of all the cards Iran holds: Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas. Hariri asserted that the key to helping Lebanon would be to pressure Syria through Iran. And the Arab states are on Lebanon's side on this issue, he said. READY TO CONFRONT THE IRAN-HIZBALLAH AXIS -------------- ¶4. (C) Turning to the Iranian-Hizballah nexus, Hariri reported that Iran is pouring money into Lebanon "like crazy." He estimated that Iran sends USD 300-400 million to Lebanon annually to support Hizballah, Palestinian militant groups, and Sunni extremists. The Ambassador asked Hariri how much independence Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah had from Iran. "Zero," replied Hariri, "On domestic issues he is okay, but not on strategic issues . . . not on Shebaa Farms." Hariri explained that Nasrallah does not appear to think that the Iranian regime is capable of making a mistake that could cost Hizballah or Lebanon. Of course, Nasrallah also appears bound religiously to Iran because it is the Wilayet al-Faqi. ¶5. (C) Hariri added that he will meet with Nasrallah tomorrow and intends to deliver a firm message. "He is a liar. He will try to go back on the dialogue, but I will not let him." With the national dialogue set to resume on April 28, Hariri said he was ready to stand up to Hizballah on the arms issue. "Hizballah thinks (Nasrallah) is coming to charm us with his lies. But we won't be charmed. They will try to backtrack on Palestinian arms, but we won't let them. I BEIRUT 00001277 002 OF 002 won't let them." ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked Hariri about his meetings with Nasrallah and why they last so long. Hariri replied with a smirk that while the meetings last six hours, the first two hours are "bullshit." Hariri claimed that once they began discussing business he spoke frankly to Nasrallah. Hariri said he was not awe struck at Nasrallah's gravitas. "Not like you Americans . . . why do all Americans who meet him get infatuated with him?," Hariri asked rhetorically, referring to US reporters who interview the Hizballah leader. (Comment: As the Ambassador and econoff arrived at Hariri's office, a prominent Washington Post reporter was leaving, commenting in passing how impressed she was with Nasrallah, whom she had met the previous day. End comment.) Hariri said he had challenged Nasrallah on why he was so critical of Siniora and his attempts at reform. He also criticized Nasrallah for allowing Iran to intervene so deeply in Lebanon. Then, without irony, Hariri seemed to acknowledge Nasrallah's charisma. He recalled how last time he met with Nasrallah, he intended a 30-minute meeting to deliver a clear message. Hariri gave the message but was then invited to dinner, turning the 30-minute encounter into several hours. YOU MUST SCARE AOUN -------------- ¶7. (C) When the national dialogue resumes, Hariri expected no progress on the presidency. Hariri planned to announce after the meeting that MP Michel Aoun and Hizballah are against change and, because of them, the country shall stay as is. Nonetheless, Hariri said that he was optimistic that a March 14 candidate could still replace President Emile Lahoud. He said that March 14 will back either former MP Nassib Lahoud, MP Boutros Harb, or Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad. Hariri said that he and his allies will be very tough on Aoun at the national dialogue, especially on the issue of Hizballah's arms. He clarified that March 14 will use Aoun's closeness to Hizballah to embarrass him. Hariri predicted that Aoun would not defend Hizballah's arms. ¶8. (C) Hariri then asked the Ambassador to deliver a strong message to Aoun. Stridently, Hariri said that the Embassy must scare the Aounists. Don't meet with Aoun. Rather, invite Aoun's senior adviser Gibran Bassil to the Embassy and "chew him out," Hariri said. "Tell them we know what you are doing and we are watching you; we know you are pushing Aoun to Hizballah," Hariri advised. "You need to scare Bassil." Hariri also advised that the Embassy deliver similar messages to Aounist MPs. Hariri continued that he wants to find the killers of his father, but Aoun does not seem to. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) While some March 14 participants had cautioned us that Hariri was uncomfortable with the reception Fouad Siniora received in Washington, Saad seemed genuinely to welcome the positive reviews of Siniora's performance. But we are struck by the lack of good or new ideas from Saad about the way forward in face of the ongoing political deadlock in Lebanon. Saad criticizes Aoun publicly and privately (with Aoun more than returning the favor),and he criticizes -- to us, at any rate -- Nasrallah and Hizballah. Yet he does not play up his March 14 Christian partners in ways that might reduce support for Aoun. And, despite the apparent futility of the exercise, he continues to meet for hours with Nasrallah, on a regular basis. With the March 14 bloc and the Aoun bloc thwarting each other's ambitions, Hizballah thus continues to be courted by both. Hariri tells us he hates Hizballah but must deal with the organization, and Aoun tells us he can control Hizballah. But both, in our view, are being used by Hizballah in order to maintain the status quo. FELTMAN