MGLE01: LEBANESE FOCUS ON PRESIDENCY, ISRAEL,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001245

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA AND H
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2016
TAGS: PREL OREP KDEM KPAL PTER LE IS
SUBJECT: MGLE01: LEBANESE FOCUS ON PRESIDENCY, ISRAEL,
PALESTINIANS IN DINNER WITH CODEL DODD

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Classified By: DCM Christopher W. Murray. Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) At a 4/19 dinner hosted by the Charge d'Affaires,
Lebanese guests of various regional, political, and
confessional stripes focused on the issue of the presidency
in an occasionally boisterous discussion. "March
14"-affiliated guests called for the USG to use its leverage
in forcing the Syrian-installed President Lahoud to resign.
An MP aligned with Speaker of Parliament Berri argued back
that Lahoud was insignificant, and should not become the "be
all and end all." Senator Dodd urged all of the guests to
help Lebanon seize the historic opportunity presented by the
priority it held for U.S. policy, and to do so by getting
Lebanon's political house in order. The current window of
opportunity may not last forever, he warned. End summary.


2. (C) Charge d'Affaires hosted a dinner for Codel Dodd on
the evening of April 19. Lebanese guests represented several
different regional, political, and confessional perspectives.
They were:

-- MP Ali Osseiran, an American-educated Shi'a aristocrat
from southern Lebanon and a member (more out of political
necessity than anything else) of Speaker of Parliament Nabih
Berri's parliamentary bloc;

-- Ahmad Fatfat, a Sunni MP from the Danniyah region of
northern Lebanon, member of Sa'ad al-Hariri's Future Movement
parliamentary bloc, Minister of Youth and Sports, and -- in
the aftermath of the February 5 sacking of Beirut's
predominantly Christian Ashrafieh district by Islamic
radicals -- acting Minister of the Interior;

-- MP Robert Ghanem, a Maronite from the western Biqaa
Valley, a Hariri ally in Parliament (in which he chairs the
influential Justice and Administration Committee),and a
quiet presidential hopeful;

-- Dr. Francois Bassil, president of the Lebanese Bankers
Association;

-- Mosbah al-Ahdab, a young, independent MP from Tripoli who
joined the 71-member parliamentary majority led by Hariri; a
Sunni Muslim but not a member of Hariri's Future Movement;

-- Chibli Mallat, a lawyer, Middle East scholar, and
outspoken political activist; a Maronite like Ghanem, he is
running a highly public (if seemingly quixotic) campaign for
the presidency.

PRESIDENTIAL PUZZLE
--------------


3. (C) Fatfat, Ghanem, Ahdab, and Mallat are all affiliated,
in one way or another, with "March 14" -- the political
alliance taking its name from the massive rally held in
Beirut on March 14, 2005, one month after the assassination
of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. Its basic ideas --
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, restoration of Lebanese
sovereignty, an international investigation of the
assassination, and "reform" -- make up the platform of the
parliamentary majority led by Rafiq al-Hariri's son, Sa'ad.


4. (C) Not surprisingly, the "March 14" guests were focused
on the Lebanese presidency, still held by President Emile
Lahoud, the Syrian-orchestrated extension of whose term in
office in 2004 prefaced the elder Hariri's resignation as
prime minister and his assassination several months later.
Whether or not Lahoud remained in office was "the question,"
Mallat said. He argued that the USG could help by "staving
off" the problems Lahoud's opponents faced in the course of
removing him from office.


5. (C) Osseiran took issue with the "March 14" guests,
arguing that Lahoud was now "insignificant," and had made
himself so. There was no point in making him the "be all and
end all." He accused the United States of having acquiesced
in Syria's original installation of Lahoud as president in
1998, as if this cast doubt on the durability of U.S. support

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for Lebanese sovereignty in the present day.


6. (C) In any event, said Osseiran, the "March 14" forces
faced a serious obstacle in trying to electing a successor to
Lahoud in Parliament. Their 71-member majority was not large
enough to do so on its own. It could not count on support
from the parliamentary bloc of rival presidential aspirant
Michel Aoun, or the Shi'a blocs of Berri and Hizballah:
"Who's going to give you something for free?" Mallat
good-naturedly accused Osseiran of "letting us all down" by
not challenging Berri for the speakership of Parliament.


7. (C) Dr. Bassil referred to the consensus-based nature of
Lebanese politics. Sometimes, however, consensus had to take
a back seat to the priority of taking necessary action. The
primary task before the government, he said, was simply to
"make the reform and stop the corruption."

UNHELPFUL ARABS
--------------


8. (C) Ahdab and Mallat said that the "Arab world" -- that
is, other Arab governments -- was playing an unhelpful role
in the way it stood by Lahoud, such as at the recent Arab
summit in Khartoum. Authoritarian rulers in other Arab
countries had no interest in seeing one of their counterparts
removed from office by a popular movement. Some of the
guests urged that the USG use its leverage with Egypt and
Saudi Arabia in order to force Lahoud to make way for a
fairly-elected successor. Ghanem pointed out that, for all
the faults of its political system, at least Lebanon, in
contrast with other Arab countries, was a country where one
can find "former presidents."

ISRAEL, SHEBAA, AND PALESTINIANS
--------------


9. (C) Osseiran called for a greater "historical
perspective" in the U.S. approach to Lebanon. To make
Lebanon a positive model for the region, the USG had to first
"get the Israelis out" (a reference to the Shebaa Farms).
"You (the USG) brought them in," he continued, his voice
theatrically raised and his index finger waiving, as it had
-- supposedly, at other times in the past -- the Syrians, the
Palestinians, and Nasser's Egypt. In the meantime, the
Lebanese would have to put up with Hizballah's insistence on
low-intensity conflict with Israel; the alternative was
disarming Hizballah, which would lead to civil war, Osseiran
claimed.


10. (C) Osseiran suggested that an Israeli withdrawal from
the Shebaa Farms would be a "sweetener." It would make it
possible for Lebanon to make progress in reform and
long-delayed post-civil war reconciliation. Mallat dismissed
the Shebaa Farms issue as a "red herring," and said that
Lebanon needed to "stop fighting Israel with weapons." He
suggested that Lebanon even consider calling for "open
borders" with Israel.


11. (C) Mallat said that the issue of Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon was the "sorest point" in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. It was necessary to take the issue "head on" and
find ways to resettle Lebanon's Palestinian refugee
population permanently, dividing it up by some formula among
Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, other Arab
states, and countries in the West. Fatfat said that Interior
Ministry figures indicated that the Palestinian population
was much higher than is widely assumed: it is actually
520,000, he said.

SEIZE THE MOMENT
--------------


12. (C) In his discussion with the Lebanese guests, Senator
Dodd told them that "you don't want the U.S. Government to
pick your president." (Heads nodded in agreement around the
table.) Senator Dodd pointed to Prime Minister Siniora's
ongoing state visit to Washington as an indicator of the
unprecedented level of attention that Lebanon currently
enjoys. The Lebanese -- the guests around the table included
-- needed to seize the historic opportunity this presented.


13. (C) Doing so, Senator Dodd continued, required that the

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Lebanese get their political house in order, and quickly.
The had to stop fighting over the past, and to stop "asking
questions for which you don't know the answer" (in other
words, stop pitching the Shebaa Farms issue as the key to
solving all of Lebanon's problems). Rather, their goal
should be to establish a functional government -- this
included the issue of the presidency -- supported by the bulk
of the Christian, Sunni, and Shi'a communities, Senator Dodd
told them.


14. (U) This message has been cleared by CODEL Dodd.
FELTMAN