MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DODD

UNCLAS BEIRUT 001164 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR H, NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OREP PGOV PREL LE SUBJECT: MGLE01: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DODD SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The current political situation in Lebanon is highly uncertain: the National Dialogue process, which raised expectations for significant political progress when it began six weeks ago, appears to have run its course. The rivalry between the pro-reform "March 14" coalition (consisting of blocs led by Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and Samir Ja'ja') and the pro-Syrian "March 8" coalition (led by Hizballah, Amal and Michel Aoun) is as heated as ever. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, who leads the pro-reform government, claims a mandate to pursue the goals of "March 14," but the way forward has not been easy since he took office in July 2005. Lebanese sovereignty has been under attack during his term in office, and "governance by consensus" has limited Siniora's ability to push for closure in the Hariri assassination case. The government has moved ahead gradually with plans for reform -- specifically on the economic and electoral fronts -- but there is well-organized resistance to these efforts which have not moved substantially forward. Pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud remains in office in defiance of UNSCR 1559 and is an additional obstacle to reform. PM Siniora and four of his ministers are visiting Washington from April 17-20 to discuss the government's reform efforts and U.S. support for the country in its transition to democracy. End summary. A PRO-REFORM PM HEADING A "MADE IN LEBANON" CABINET -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Fouad Siniora, longtime associate and political supporter of assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, took office as Prime Minister in July 2005. Supporting the government is a 72-member (out of 128) parliamentary majority, elected in May-June 2005 and led by Hariri's son, Sa'ad. Commencing work just months after the withdrawal of Syria's military and overt intelligence personnel from Lebanon, Siniora's cabinet was the first genuinely "made in Lebanon" cabinet after nearly 30 years of de facto rule from Damascus. ¶3. (SBU) The pro-reform, pro-sovereignty March 14 coalition is led by the younger Hariri, along with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja' (this coalition takes its name from the massive rally held in Beirut one month after the elder Hariri's murder on February 14, 2005). The coalition's stated political objectives are: determining the truth and meting out justice in the Hariri assassination, restoring Lebanon's sovereignty, and pursuing much-needed, but long-delayed reforms. ¶4. (SBU) Facing the pro-reform bloc is the "March 8" coalition, composed of the Shia movements Hizballah, led by Hassan Nasrallah, and Amal, led by Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri. Free Patiotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, with 21 parliamentary seats representing the traditionally powerful Maronite community, often sides with Hizballah and Amal on political issues and entered into a "cooperative alliance" with Hizballah on February 6, with the issuance of a joint communique that outlined common political goals. Michel Aoun has made clear on numerous occasions his desire to be Lebanon's next president. AN OBSTACLE COURSE TO THE TRUTH AND SOVEREIGNTY -------------- -- ¶5. (SBU) Despite the government's advantage of a strong parliamentary majority, its room for maneuver is limited. The uniqueness of post-civil war Lebanese politics makes the Siniora Cabinet more like a miniature Parliament (minus Michel Aoun's bloc) than an executive body controlled by the parliamentary majority. In it are ministers belonging to, or at least serving at the pleasure of, Hizballah and the Amal Movement, which are pro-Syrian and opponents of the "March 14" coalition. ¶6. (SBU) This situation has made it difficult for Siniora to pursue closure in the Hariri case, the truth of which is surely not to the Asad regime's taste. He was able to win grudging acquiescence from his Hizballah and Amal cabinet ministers in calling for an extension of the initial mandate of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC). Later, the Amal/Hizballah alliance answered him with a crippling, seven week boycott of the Cabinet from December 12 until early February. Their pretext was that the Prime Minister had asked the UN, without full Cabinet approval, for a broadening of the UNIIIC mandate to include all terrorist incidents since October 2004 and for the creation of an international tribunal to try suspects in the Hariri assassination. Since February, the full Cabinet has met but friction is never far below the surface. CAUSES OF INSTABILITY -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Throughout 2005, Lebanon faced an ongoing terrorist campaign that appeared aimed at eliminating some of Syria's critics, spreading fear, discrediting the Lebanese government, and ultimately rolling back Lebanon's recent gains in sovereignty. The September 2005 attempted assassination of television broadcaster May Chidiac, the December 2005 assassination of MP and leading journalist Gebran Tueni, and three other bombings in Beirut and its surroundings since July undercut confidence in the government. The response of the security sector has been slow, and a deadlock between Siniora and President Lahoud prevents it from more effective action. ¶8. (SBU) By closing its border crossings with Lebanon in August 2005, the Syrian regime demonstrated its willingness to put an economic stranglehold on Lebanon when it saw fit. Even more importantly, Syria's ally Hizballah remains a state-within-a-state, with an armed force that is a match for the Lebanese Armed Forces. Hizballah has ignored UNSCR 1559's requirement for disarmament of all militias and reserves the right to make decisions on inciting violence through its conduct of paramilitary operations along the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel. Hizballah justifies its violent actions by claiming that is a legitimate "resistance" to Israeli occupation of the Shebaa Farms, which it and many other Lebanese parties claim to be Lebanese territory. This claim is not widely shared by the international community. PUSHING AHEAD ON REFORM... -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Prime Minister Siniora, seeing an opportunity to break a deadlock on economic policy that existed for years between President Lahoud and then-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, assembled a capable economic team and forged ahead in drafting a detailed reform program. Its goal is to bring under control Lebanon's mammoth debt-to-GDP ratio, a problem that cannot afford to wait. Beyond fiscal adjustment, the government's plan also aims at increasing economic growth and employment by making Lebanon an easier place in which to do business. Finally, it aims at building social safety nets that make sound economic policy politically viable over the long term. ¶10. (SBU) The "Core Group" of friends of Lebanon -- including the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the UN, and the World Bank -- has made it clear that Lebanon enjoys an unprecedented window of opportunity for support for a credible and sustainable reform program. The government's economic team appears to understand this well, and has worked, on the one hand, to develop a detailed program that meets Core Group expectations. On the other hand, it has steadily sought domestic political "buy-in" to the program, starting within the Cabinet and with the goal of including all political players capable of blocking it. One significant problem is that President Lahoud can throw a monkey wrench into these many moving parts, in economic reform as well as the security sector. ¶11. (SBU) The Siniora government recognizes that political reform must accompany economic reform, and the prime minister has made reform of the electoral system a priority. While still a work in progress, the draft electoral law as currently written will introduce important reforms, including the establishment of an independent commission to oversee elections (in place of an Interior Minister who is likely to be running for election himself). ¶12. (SBU) Changing the electoral status quo will not necessarily benefit the "March 14" parliamentary majority in the next election. PM Siniora will face a challenge in shepherding a draft law, once it is finally produced, through his cabinet and on to the Parliament. For now, he simply needs a final draft law. REFORM AT A CROSSROADS -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Lebanon is presently at a critical juncture. A series of parliamentary "national dialogue talks" -- with Siniora, as well as Aoun and the leadership of Hizballah and Amal at the table -- has tentatively agreed to ask Syria to demarcate the Syrian-Lebanese border, establish normal diplomatic relations between the two countries, and restrict armed Palestinians to the camps. However, the talks show no sign of cutting through the immediate impasse over the Lahoud presidency, as well as the longer-term problem of Hizballah's disarmament. ¶14. (SBU) The next meeting of the National Dialogue is scheduled for April 28, but no one is quite sure whether further progress is possible. What comes after the conclusion of the National Dialogue is also uncertain. The pro-reform government faces numerous challenges and much will depend on moving forward with political and economic reform and the resulting support of the Lebanese people. FELTMAN