MGLEO1: NASSIB, NAYLA, BOUTROS EVALUATE THEIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001107 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY SUBJECT: MGLEO1: NASSIB, NAYLA, BOUTROS EVALUATE THEIR STANDING IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SWEEPSTAKES Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Over the past week, the Ambassador had one-on-one lunches with the three presidential candidates generally considered the front-runners of the March 14 presidential contenders: Nayla Mouawad, Boutros Harb, and Nassib Lahoud. The policy differences among the three pro-independence politicians are slight. Each is thus focused on tactics -- on who has the best chance of winning the parliamentary vote and standing up to Michel Aoun's considerable popular support -- whenever presidential elections at last occur. Their presidential ambitions are now testing their shared promise not to undercut each other. Nassib, the most statesman-like of the three, counts on being the first choice of Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Patriarch Sfeir and some international players like Saudi Arabia. He not surprisingly favors March 14 zeroing in on a single presidential candidate as soon as possible. Acknowledged as a good tactician, Boutros counters that Nassib's very popularity with the Muslims makes him suspect among the Christians. Opposed to a single March 14 candidate, Boutros wants to utilize the deep hatred of Nassib by some Christian politicians -- Michel Aoun and President Emile Lahoud, inter alia -- to build consensus for himself and earlier presidential elections. As for Sitt Nayla, she said that she will pursue her candidacy as long as possible, as an important symbol of the power of women in Lebanon and the region. But, realistic about her chances, she said that, when it is time to choose a March 14 candidate, she will shift her support to Nassib, despite her long-term north Lebanon alliance with Boutros. End summary. NO REAL POLICY DISPUTES BETWEEN THE THREE CANDIDATES -------------- ¶2. (C) With the removal of Emile Lahoud from the presidential palace more difficult -- and taking more time -- than the March 14 forces anticipated or hoped, the Ambassador had separate one-on-one lunches to discuss next steps with the three presidential candidates most often considered (by themselves and others) to be the front-runners from the March 14 movement: Minister of Social Affairs Nayla Mouawad, Member of Parliament Boutros Harb, and former MP Nassib Lahoud. The three friends and political allies, in a private dinner several months ago that quickly became public knowledge, had a handshake agreeing that none would undermine the other in the presidential sweepstakes. When the time came to vote in a new president (conducted in Lebanon by parliament, not the citizenry),then they would all back whichever of the three of them had the best chance of success. Until then, they vowed to cooperate. ¶3. (C) What each says about his or her policy goals -- upholding the Taif-amended Lebanese constitution, strengthening the institutions of the state, supporting positive relations with Syria contingent upon Syria recognizing and respecting Lebanon's independence, using internal dialogue to build consensus on disarming Hizballah without destabilizing the country, etc. -- Nassib, Boutros, and Nayla seem to think alike on the principles. Thus, they focused in their lunches with the Ambassador on tactics. All three recognize that, once the presidency at last becomes vacant, Michel Aoun is their most formidable opponent. While Aoun will not have the parliamentary nod if the 71-member March 14 parliamentary majority maintains unity, Aoun can use his popularity to discredit others. In collusion with Hizballah and Amal, he could also threaten to prevent a quorum in parliament to influence the presidential elections. NASSIB, TOP CHOICE BY KEY PLAYERS, SUPPORTS A SINGLE MARCH 14 CANDIDATE NOW -------------- ¶4. (C) Nassib explained that his strength was the support he gets from Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri, who believe that Nassib is the best choice. Most important, Maronite Patriarch Sfeir has "whispered to me that I am his favorite." In addition, he said, Saudi Arabia backs him; Saudi influence can be used with Syria and others. Nassib also expressed belief that, internationally, he is generally the top choice. While still bruised from his loss, Nassib denied that his 2005 parliamentary defeat by Michel Aoun's Metn list eliminated his chances for the presidency. According to Nassib, when pollsters ask Lebanese citizens "off the top of BEIRUT 00001107 002 OF 003 their heads" who is their top choice for president, Michel Aoun comes out on top, with Nassib second. But when Lebanese are forced by pollsters to choose between Aoun and Nassib, then Nassib comes out ahead. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the same wouldn't happen with other candidates, once the danger is eliminated that non-Aoun votes would be divided among many candidates. Yes, Nassib acknowledged, Boutros, too, comes out ahead of Aoun, although with less support than Nassib. But the point, he says, is that such polls show that the loss of Nassib's parliamentary seat does not make him an unacceptable choice for the presidency in terms of public opinion. ¶6. (C) In Nassib's view, the best way for the March 14 block to stand up to Michel Aoun's challenges is to "put a face" on their principles by choosing a single presidential candidate now. Expecting to be that person, Nassib said that he could then concentrate on distinguishing himself from Aoun in ways that the Christian public will begin to reject Aoun's insistence that only he can be a credible, strong leader. In essence, Nassib and Aoun could begin a kind of presidential debating process, in which Nassib believes that he would come across as the more thoughtful, sensible leader. As the Lebanese compare Nassib and Aoun, then President Emile Lahoud (Nassib's despised second cousin) becomes irrelevant, Nassib said. "The price will drop for getting rid of him," for people will stop focusing on Lahoud altogether. BOUTROS COUNTS ON HATRED FOR NASSIB PROPELLING HIS OWN CANDIDACY FORWARD -------------- ¶7. (C) Two days later, Boutros Harb acknowledged that Nassib is the March 14 frontrunner. But Nassib's Saudi connections -- his wife's sister was the wife of Saudi King Abdullah and has children with him -- and his backing by Jumblatt and Hariri do not help him with the Christian street, Harb said. Nassib is an easy target for Michel Aoun to attack. Moreover, Boutros said, Nassib is deeply hated by some key figures: Michel Aoun (who believes that, in 1990, Nassib -- then Lebanon's ambassador to Washington -- colluded with Washington and Damascus in having Aoun bombed out of Baabda Palace),President Emile Lahoud (generational family disputes),powerful Metn political boss Michel Murr (local political rivalries),and former president Amin Gemayel (more Metn politics). A Nassib candidacy will drive these four politicians into a common pact to prevent his presidency. The Ambassador asked whether Gemayel would really abandon his March 14 allies to back Aoun, whom Gemayel often describes as "crazy," vs. Nassib. "Absolutely," Boutros said, citing the deep antipathy Gemayel has for Nassib. ¶8. (C) This hatred, Boutros said, gives his own candidacy a boost. While claiming he has not forgotten his handshake with Nassib and Nayla, Boutros said that he is also sending out signals to people that, if Emile Lahoud stays in office until the end of his term, then it is highly likely that the parliamentary majority will simply elect Nassib Lahoud as president. For those who want at all costs to prevent a Nassib presidency, then they can make a deal now to have a Boutros presidency instead. For although Jumblatt and Hariri favor Nassib, they want Emile Lahoud out. So even they would accept a second choice -- Boutros -- as president, if that means a quicker disposal of Emile and thus a quicker assumption of the premiership by Saad. Although the Ambassador thought he was engaging in wishful thinking, Boutros saw a chance even Aoun, despite his presidential obsession, might find this argument appealing, especially as Aoun's son-in-law/advisor Gebran Bassil could then run for Boutros' abandoned parliamentary seat. NAYLA WILL FIGHT ON AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, BUT CONCEDES SHE WILL ULTIMATELY BACK NASSIB -------------- ¶9. (C) Sitt Nayla, on the other hand, accepted that she probably has the least chance of the three. She talked of how much wanted the presidency, what a credible president she would make, and how important it was for Lebanon and the Arab world to see a woman who insists on trying. "I think I deserve it," she said, talking of her years of public service and foundation work. But, when the time is right, she will give her backing to Nassib, she said. While she and Boutros have had a northern Lebanon alliance for years, she declared Nassib a more "trustworthy and wise" candidate whose international ties and credibility "would be good for BEIRUT 00001107 003 OF 003 Lebanon." Wistfully referrnig to her own presidential wishes, she also noted the symbolism, during this period of transformation in Lebanon, of having the widow of a previous president murdered by the Syrians ascend to Baabda Palace. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) In our view, Nassib is preferable in the abstract to all the other presidential candidates, including Boutros and Nayla (and Michel Aoun, too, for that matter),in terms of vision and statesman-like bearing and positions. He also seems to have the least baggage attached to him, especially as he closed down all family businesses in Lebanon when he entered politics and broke with the Syrian occupiers earlier than either Boutros or Nayla. But the choice of Lebanon's president is not ours to make, and Emile Lahoud shows no sign of budging from Baabda Palace. If any of these three could replace Emile Lahoud now, our interests would be well served in embracing the winner. FELTMAN