MGLE01: SAUDI AMBASSADOR SEES NASRALLAH (WHO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001072

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY SA
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SAUDI AMBASSADOR SEES NASRALLAH (WHO
BACKS AOUN),MUSES ON REPLACING SINIORA WITH MIKATI

Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a 4/5 meeting with the Ambassador, Saudi
Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja reported on his two-hour meeting
the previous evening with Hizballah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah. Nasrallah, Khoja said, reported that Hizballah
would back Michel Aoun for Lebanon's presidency and would
oppose Nassib Lahoud or any other March 14 candidate to
replace Emile Lahoud. Previously, Khoja said, Nasrallah had
remain neutral on Aoun; this shift, in Khoja's view, probably
stems from Syrian instruction. Nasrallah also told Khoja
that Syria would never agree to any positive initiatives with
PM Fouad Siniora, MP Saad Hariri, or any of their associates.
Predicting a dangerous deadlock in Lebanon, Khoja --
claiming to be "thinking outloud" and without instructions
from Riyadh -- asked whether it might time to encourage the
replacement of Siniora with previous PM Najib Mikati, in
order to build a constructive Syrian-Lebanese relationship.
The Ambassador said he saw no logical reason why the March 14
parliamentary majority would commit political suicide by
returning the premiership to someone who claimed long-term
friendship to Bashar al-Asad. The focus should be on the
problem -- Syria -- and not on producing a new Lebanese
premier at Syria's behest. Khoja also reported that he
pressed Nasrallah on threatening language he used publicly
the previous week. Insisting he was ready to have
Hizballah's arms the subject of Lebanese dialogue, Nasrallah
admitted that he had made a mistake in referring to violence
to prevent disarmament by force. End summary.

NASRALLAH BACKS AOUN FOR PRESIDENCY;
SAUDI SUSPECTS SYRIAN INSTRUCTIONS
--------------


2. (S) The Ambassador met Khoja in the Saudi Embassy on
4/5. Based on a two-hour meeting he had with Nasrallah the
previous evening, Khoja said that he had perceived some
changes and hardening in Hizballah's positions. Most
dramatically, Khoja said, Nasrallah said that, when
presidential elections occur, Hizballah will back Aoun.
(Khoja first said that Hizballah would "fight for Aoun."
When the Ambassador asked if Nasrallah was implying physical
or street action, Khoja said no.) Previously, in his talks
with Khoja, Nasrallah had remained coy on Aoun, saying that,
while Aoun was a strong candidate, Hizballah needed to study
the issue. Given that Nasrallah "doesn't like Aoun" and
previously hinted that he did not trust him, Khoja
interpreted Hizballah's support for Aoun as deriving from new
orders from Syria.


3. (S) Khoja said that he asked Nasrallah about other
potential presidential candidates. Nasrallah admitted to
Khoja that Nassib Lahoud was perhaps the best, in terms of
competence, honesty, and international profile. Khoja
agreed. But Nassib, Nasrallah said, has no relationship with
Lebanon's Shia. Moreover, Nassib's long-term vision for
Lebanon is at odds with Hizballah's. Nasrallah has no
confidence that the Shia would be protected under Nassib.
Nasrallah told Khoja that Hizballah also would try to block a
Nassib Lahoud presidency out of deference to Aoun, who
despises Nassib Lahoud more than any other candidate. While
noting that they had discussed only Nassib at length, Khoja
said that he perceived a "completely closed door" from
Nasrallah in terms of any of the March 14 presidential
candidates. Khoja said that he could not predict whether
Hizballah would take to the streets to try to prevent the
ascendency of Nassib or any other March 14 candidate, but he
acknowledged that was a possibility.

SYRIANS OUT TO WEAKEN, HUMILIATE SINIORA;
MAYBE IT'S TIME TO LOOK BEYOND SINIORA
--------------


4. (S) When asked why he seemed to backtrack a bit in the
national dialogue, Nasrallah told Khoja that, no matter what
the ongoing national dialogue participants asked, Syria would
never react positively to anything linked to Siniora. Syria
will not do anything that responds constructively to the
initiatives and requests from Siniora, even those backed by
the national dialogue. The Syrians, Khoja quoted Nasrallah
as saying, hate Siniora and want him destroyed politically.
Any opening to him might strengthen him, so they simply will
not deal with him. If Siniora keeps insisting on going to
Damascus, he will either get low-level meetings and

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cold-shoulder treatment rsulting in humiliation, or Bashar
al-Asad will invite President Emile Lahoud to come instead,
in a revival of the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Committee.
Siniora will be put in his place as an insignificant
subordinate to Emile Lahoud. The Syrian hatred extends to MP
Saad Hariri and to all of the March 14 associates of Siniora
and Hariri.


5. (S) Given this Syrian refusal to deal with Siniora,
Khoja said that Saudi Arabia was deeply worried about the
deteriorating relationship between Syria and Lebanon and the
continued deadlock inside Lebanon. Based on his meeting with
Nasrallah, Khoja concluded that the situation will never
improve as long as Siniora remains PM, since Syria will look
to actively undermine him, perhaps even with Hizballah's
assistance. Maybe, Khoja said, it is time to suggest to the
Lebanese that the cabinet resign and Siniora be replaced, in
order to permit political breakthroughs between Lebanon and
Syria and inside Lebanon.

TO SATISFY SYRIA'S CONCERNS,
KHOJA MUSES ON BRINGING BACK MIKATI
--------------


6. (S) Emphasizing that he was thinking outloud and without
instructions, Khoja asked what the Ambassador thought about a
renewed Najib Mikati premiership, given that the Syrians
might deliver to Mikati the type of positive relations that
they deny to Siniora. After all, Khoja pointed out, Mikati
had done a good job during his April-July 2005 premiership,
overseeing parliamentary elections on time and ruling
moderately. Mikati is well placed to bridge the current,
sharp political divides in Lebanon. He is not as blindly
pro-Syrian as he detractors allege.


7. (S) The Ambassador expressed astonishment and asked
whether Khoja had mentioned the idea to Nasrallah or
Nasrallah to him. "We discussed the idea," Khoja said,
claiming that they were simply brainstorming about how to get
Lebanon out of the current crisis; "what do you think?" The
Ambassador said that Khoja was looking to fix the wrong
problem. It was not Siniora who was preventing improvmeent
in Syrian-Lebanese relations; instead, the Syrians refused to
deal seriously with Lebanon's PM and the requests forwarded
by him as a result of the national dialogue. The focus
should be on getting Syria to respond constructively and
positively, not on replacing Siniora. In the spirit of UNSCR
1559, Syria should not be able to dictate who is and who
isn't an acceptable prime minister in Lebanon.


7. (S) In a lengthy debate, Khoja said that he agreed Syria
was the problem. But hej argued that the only way to
accomplish the goal of a positive Syrian response was
jettisoning Lebanon's PM in favor of someone with whom the
Syrians could work. Mikati would be in office at the
pleasure of the Hariri bloc, so he could not govern entirely
according to Syrian wishes. The Ambassador said that he
could not see any possible motivation for the March 14 MPs to
back a Mikati premiership, especially if they knew that Syria
would deliver to Mikati. In essence, the Syrians would show
that March 14 cannot produce results but friends of Syria
can. Backing Mikati in the knowledge he will be bestowed
with political gifts from Syria would be akin to political
suicide, the Ambassador said. Mindful of the long-term
competition to be Lebanon's preeminent Sunni leader, Saad
Hariri would not want another Sunni, not from the Hariri
bloc, to have success where his own appointee failed.


8. (S) Moreover, while Mikati is a far more sophisticated
and western-oriented politician than other pro-Syrians in
Lebanon, and despite the reported current scratchiness
between the Mikati and Asad families, Mikati would be seen as
governing Lebanon in Syria's interest. Once in office, he
could work with Emile Lahoud and Parliament Speaker Berri to
reverse many of the anti-Syrian gains of the past year and to
restore his own relationship with Bashar. All three of
Lebanon's top positions would be in the hands of people
aligned with March 8 pro-Syrian forces. Mikati, working with
Michel Aoun and Emile Lahoud, could help push Lebanon toward
early parliamentary elections in hopes of destroying the
March 14 parliamentary majority once and for all. While
agreeing with Khoja that Mikati had done a good job during
his 2005 premiership, the Ambassador thought that now was not
the time to contemplate his return. Mikati has proven an
able premier who may have a future term, but not now. Khoja
asked, "what other choice do we have?" The Ambassador
suggested keeping the focus on where the problem is, with the

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Syrians.

NASRALLAH BACKS AWAY FROM VERBAL THREATS
--------------


9. (S) Khoja noted that he had also criticized Nasrallah
for the statements he made at a Beirut "resistance"
conference last week, in which Nasrallah was televised
threatening to cut off the hands and end the lives of those
trying to disarm Hizballah by force. Such words, Khoja
reported telling Nasrallah, are completely contrary to the
spirit of the national dialogue. Khoja said that Nasrallah
admitted to making a mistake in using such words. Realizing
what he had done, Nasrallah professed shock when he saw
himself saying such words on the television news broadcasts.
He emphasized to Khoja that Hizballah was fully committed to
discussing the issues of its arms at the national dialogue.
Khoja shook his head when the Ambassador said that he thought
Nasrallah's words were perhaps a reflection of his real
attitude.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (S) It strikes us that our Saudi colleague got his
analysis right -- that the Syrians will continue to avoid any
kind of positive response to Siniora -- but the proposed
solution all wrong. Replacing Siniora with the traditionally
pro-Syrian Mikati (who, admittedly, did a good job last year
as PM) would be the equivalent of a reward to Syria for bad
behavior. Obsessed with trying to reverse the deterioration
in Syrian-Lebanese relations, Khoja appears ready to abandon
a prime minister closely connected to Saudi Arabia (and whose
patron, Saad Hariri, carries a Saudi passport) in favor of
one close to Damascus. We hope that Khoja, at pains to
stress that he was "thinking aloud," was truly just
brainstorming and not giving indication of the thinking of
Saudi Arabia. But it is significant that he discussed the
idea with Hassan Nasrallah, who we suspect put the hot AIR
into this trial balloon to begin with.
FELTMAN